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ABSTRACT 
 
 Governments are responsible for administrative arrangements dealing with disasters. 
Effective policies play a vital role in mitigating the impact of disasters and reducing likely losses 
of life and property. Yet, it had been noted that such losses were increasing, raising questions 
about efficacy of government policies and the factors that made them effective. 
 This study adopted a comparative method, responding to a long-standing demand of 
disaster research, for examining the record in India. There were noticeable differences among its 
states, with some having undertaken comprehensive reform in an all-hazards approach, while 
others continued with old policies. This research studied four states with the objective of 
identifying variables that were critical in undertaking policy reform for building capacities.  
 The roles of economic resources, democratically decentralized institutions, political party 
systems and focusing events were examined. Findings revealed that these factors had varying 
    
 
 
impact on state capabilities. Economic resources were an inevitable part of disaster management, 
but did not necessarily translate into policy reform. Panchayati Raj Institutions, which were 
democratically decentralized bodies, displayed tremendous potential. However, their role was 
limited mostly to the response phase, with states severely circumscribing their involvement. 
 The nature of political party systems was able to explain policy reform to an extent. 
Cohesive systems in Gujarat, Tamil Nadu and Orissa correlated with administrative capacities, 
unlike in fragmented Bihar. However, anti-incumbency sentiments and strong community 
mobilization impacted contestation more than electoral salience of public goods. The most 
nuanced and significant explanation was provided by experience of focusing events. States that 
suffered major disasters revealed unmistakable evidence of double-loop learning, leading to 
comprehensive policy reform and capacity building. 
 This research provides empirical support to theory about the role of focusing events and 
organizational learning in policy reform. Methodologically, it underscores the importance of the 
comparative approach, and its successful application in a federal framework. The significance of 
this research is most for policy makers and practitioners, as it serves to alert them on the need for 
reform without waiting for the next big disaster to catch them unprepared. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Organizing administrative machinery, dealing with disasters, is a vital responsibility of 
governance.1 Strong and effective emergency management has been a felt need in all corners of 
the world.2 Responsiveness of governance becomes evident in the manner in which it addresses 
the crucial task of ameliorating suffering and reducing losses. Public servants have a 
responsibility for formulating policies and building capacities for dealing with such situations.3 
The public perceives governments to have learnt from experience, theirs and others. Yet, a 
common complaint has been that government agencies are unprepared or ill prepared for the next 
big crisis and are unable to prevent large-scale loss of life and damage to property. 
It is, therefore, important to study disaster management to locate factors that make a 
critical difference in effective policy outcomes. This research undertook an examination of the 
Indian context and took up a comparison of states on select indicators of the policy issue. It was 
a methodologically promising exercise for concerns about standards, and evaluations for 
governance outcomes. In the absence of national benchmarks, due to the subjective nature of the 
enterprise it was difficult to say when outcomes were effective. Instead, this research found it 
more fruitful and reliable to compare across selected states, and find out why policy reform was 
better in some, and not in others. In the process, it also addressed normative concerns for 
delivery of public goods.  
 The methodological framework of this inquiry, responded to a long-standing demand for 
comparative analyses in disaster research. At the same time, it also noted the difficulties of cross-
national research in the shape of confounding factors. Differences in disaster experiences, 
                                                 
1 Christoplos, Mitchell and Liljelund (2001); Waugh (2000) 
2 Rosenthal (1988); Sakamura 2001. They discussed vulnerabilities and disaster records of Netherlands and Japan.  
3 Waugh (1999) 
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institutional arrangements, political systems, cultural values and numerous other idiosyncratic 
factors, posed serious problems, in a cross-national framework, that could hamper an in-depth 
analysis. Hence, it adopted the method of comparing across different provinces, emulating a 
trend that was becoming increasingly popular in India studies. A common legal, institutional and, 
to a great extent, cultural context provided control mechanisms in examining why some states 
exhibited better scores on governance measures in disaster management.  
The dependent variable was comprehensive policy reform for building disaster 
capabilities. It was operationalized by adopting measures of a Government of India-United 
Nations Development Program (GOI-UNDP) joint program, which began in 2002, and which 
was aimed at disaster risk reduction through capacity building. It provided a good basis for 
comparison among the selected states. The other part of the inquiry was a determination of the 
factors that were responsible for a systematic and significant variation in reform and capacities 
among the states. Disaster research in general, and in its Indian context in particular, had ample 
scope for exploring the theoretical and normative concerns of public administration. Moreover, 
there were not many empirical studies that systematically identified causal factors. Hence, this 
research looked at socio-economic factors that were capable of having a systematic and 
significant impact on the dependent variable. The independent variables were drawn from extant 
literature, with regard for concerns of face validity. Consequently, the research examined 
economic development, democratic decentralized institutions, cohesiveness of the political party 
system, and the factor of organizational learning due to experience of “focusing events”.4  
 Significant findings emerged from empirical research that provided crucial information 
about the impact of the explanatory factors. Higher levels of economic development indicated 
                                                 
4 Kingdon (1984), 100. An illustrative list of focusing events included crises, disasters, personal experiences, and 
symbolic events.  
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greater resources that could possibly be utilized to build capacities and strengthen administrative 
machinery. However, while resources were seen as necessary conditions, they lacked 
explanatory power for critical variations. Next, democratic decentralized governance 
mechanisms displayed great potential because of the critical role of first responders. Yet, with 
the extent of decentralization being limited, and their role in disaster management being severely 
circumscribed, local bodies were not found to be responsible for increased capacity building.  
The third variable was the nature of political party systems in democratic polities, which 
created electoral salience of policy issues, and also determined the prospects for reform. Field 
research was able to provide a significant correlation with delivery of public goods. 
Nevertheless, electoral dynamics of a two party system in Tamil Nadu, and greater community 
mobilization in Gujarat limited their impact to a significant extent. The last factor that was 
examined was the role of focusing events, and their consequences for organizational learning and 
policy reform. It was found that states that suffered major disasters were more likely to undertake 
policy reform in building capacities for tackling them. Despite conceptual concerns, it proved 
consistent in explaining the developments in different states along with credible answers for 
variation among them. It also provided a framework for a nuanced understanding in an important 
policy domain.  
 The first part of this chapter highlights the reasons to focus on this important domain of 
public policy. The second section examines the Indian context, with special reference to the 
policy reforms that had been taken up. The next section surveys the extant literature, in disaster 
research in general and about Indian emergency management in particular. It spells out the plan 
of this research in the fourth part before concluding with the significance of its contributions.  
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I. The Domain of Disaster Management 
 Emergency management5 has been an important item on the agenda of governance, even 
though it was not known for having a specific constituency or lobby to support its cause at all 
times.6 Its importance was underscored every time there was a major natural or manmade 
disaster. For example, the month of May 2008 saw two major events. There was a deadly 
cyclone that devastated Myanmar, killing tens of thousands and severely affected millions.7 Less 
than a fortnight later, People’s Republic of China suffered an earthquake measuring 7.9 on the 
Richter scale that resulted in more than 50,000 deaths, and suffering for millions.8 Both these 
incidents highlighted the myriad deficiencies of public administration.9 It had been no different 
in other places. If it was wildfires in Greece, it could be mud slides in Philippines, nuclear 
accidents in Chernobyl or Three Mile Island, or potential pandemics like SARS. And terrorist 
incidents in Mumbai, New York, London, Madrid, and Beslan or in the Middle East pointed to a 
different type of hazard that had gained prominence.10 All these served to direct attention of the 
public and policy makers towards the policy domain of disaster management. 
 Disasters had serious consequences for states and their economies. Despite developments 
in science and technology, the costs of disasters had been increasing. Interestingly, growing 
losses strengthened the arguments of scholars who stressed increasing vulnerability due to socio-
                                                 
5 Official and scholarly literature in India predominantly used the term ‘disaster management’. This research used 
the terms ‘emergency management’ and ‘disaster management’ interchangeably. 
6 NAPA (1993)  
7 UN News Centre 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=26634&Cr=myanmar&Cr1=&Kw1=Myanmar&Kw2=&Kw3= 
retrieved 15 May 2008 
8 Government of China http://english.gov.cn/2008-05/14/content_973846.htm retrieved 15 May 2008 
9 A sample of the literature can be seen in reports of BBC and New York Times that catalogued a long and lengthy 
list of shortcomings at  http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7430960.stm ,   http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-
pacific/7436647.stm, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/28/world/asia/28quake.html?_r=1&oref=slogin and 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/04/world/asia/04china.html  retrieved 8 June 2008.   
10 Waugh (2000) 
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economic development.11 In the ten years between 1997 and 2006, the International Federation 
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies noted that 1.209 million people lost their lives and 
2.679 billion persons were affected.12 Losses caused by disasters increased from US $ 75.5 
billions in the 1960s to US $659.9 billions in the 1990s.13   
 Disasters also extracted a very high price in social, psychological and economic terms. 
Their impact was felt in trails of destruction, families torn apart, children orphaned, livelihoods 
destroyed, and communities traumatized. They had a long-term impact on the social health of 
families and, in turn, the community.14 At the individual and family levels, loss of livelihood or a 
diminished earning capacity had an equally damaging effect.15 It was held that damages to 
domestic and business constructions imposed a burden that was never recovered through 
government compensation packages or insurance payouts.16 For businesses, losses were more 
than immediate calculations of damages, since profitability depended on intangible factors. The 
total impact was likely to be more, since an accurate estimation was difficult due to serious 
methodological difficulties in calculating primary and secondary losses.17    
 The opportunity cost of relief and reconstruction expenditures was also a reason for its 
enormous salience.18 Losses of infrastructure and public assets imposed a heavy financial burden 
on government resources. At the same time, the uncertainty associated with disasters made it 
more difficult to make appropriate budgetary allocations.19 First, it cost resources to restore 
normalcy and to invest in mitigation programs. Second, from an opportunity cost perspective, 
                                                 
11 Mileti (1999); Mitchell (1999) 
12 International Federation of Red Cross Societies and Red Crescent Societies (2007)  
13 UNDP (2004)  
14 Kendra and Wachtendorf (2006) noted that innovative plans were used in Tangshan, China to deal with     
physical and social reconstruction.    
15 UNDP (2004)  
16 Kunreuther and Kleffner (1992)   
17 Bourque et al (2006) 
18 Kreimer and Arnold (2000)  
19 Government of India (2004b); Sylves (1996); Waugh and Sylves (1996)  
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countries were forced to expend resources on disaster management that would have otherwise 
been more productively invested.20 There always were contending demands for available 
resources, making them a significant issue in all countries. For example, after Hurricane Katrina 
in US, there were calls for re-prioritization of resources.21 If it could happen in a developed 
country like the United States, the economically disruptive effects of disasters in developing 
countries were likely to be infinitely more.  
The world’s poorest stayed in these countries and their requirements had been well 
documented.22 The impact of disasters was much higher in poorer countries because even small 
economic losses were critical due to abysmally low capacities.23 Instead of being forced to spend 
on repairing downed electric lines, damaged infrastructure, providing emergency shelters, 
feeding displaced people or compensating losses, states would have spent scarce resources on 
more pressing priorities of laying new roads, connecting inaccessible areas, fighting disease, 
epidemics or investing in education and other sectors of human development. 
II. Disaster Management Reform in India 
 The importance of disaster management can be appreciated from the above. Its 
significance was more for democratic polities.24 They were likely to be held accountable for 
delivery outcomes by their constituents. Therefore, greater vulnerability served to increase the 
importance of this domain, with a potential for electoral repercussions. It increased the stakes for 
having effective policies that mitigated losses. For Indian administration, the salience was 
evident in view of the numerous natural and manmade disasters suffered by the subcontinent. It 
                                                 
20 It had not been suggested that investment in disaster management was unproductive or unwarranted expenditure. 
The limited point was that, in terms of meeting public requirements, there were more pressing or productive sectors. 
Albala–Bertrand (2006) made the argument that the output impact of investment in reconstruction and mitigation 
was higher than that of capital lost due to disaster. 
21 Republican Study Committee (2005)  
22 UN Millennium Development Goals http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/ retrieved 16 May 2008    
23 Ibid 
24 Boin and ‘t’Hart (2006) 
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had endured the devastation of natural hazards such as droughts, epidemics, floods, cyclones (as 
wind storms were better known in India), earthquakes and the rarely occurring tsunami (as wave 
surges were known) as the following table revealed. Industrial mishaps, terrorist incidents, 
transportation accidents in urban locations, communal and caste riots had also taken a heavy 
toll.25 The experience and vulnerability profile indicated a very high degree of salience. 
Table 1. Summary of Major Natural Disasters in India from 1900 to 2006
26
 
  # of Events Killed Injured Homeless Affected Total Affected 
Damages US$ 
(000’s) 
Drought 13 4,250,320 0 0 961,841,000 961,841,000 2,141,122 
average per event   326,948 0 0 73,987,769 73,987,769 164,702 
Earthquake 25 61,705 213,183 2,085,700 24,966,300 27,265,183 3,147,900 
average per event   2,468 8,527 83,428 998,652 1,090,607 125,916 
Epidemic 66 4,543,531 0 0 419,685 419,685 0 
average per event   68,841 0 0 6,359 6,359 0 
Ext.  Temp. 40 13,076 200 0 0 200 544,000 
average per event   327 5 0 0 5 13,600 
Flood 189 52,923 1,420 9,287,730 718,652,050 727,941,200 16,224,681 
average per event   280 8 49,141 3,802,392 3,851,541 85,845 
Land Slides 38 4,684 531 3,616,285 222,300 3,839,116 4,500 
average per event   123 14 95,165 5,850 101,029 118 
Wave/Surge 2 16,789 6,913 0 647,599 654,512 1,022,800 
average per event   8,395 3,457 0 323,800 327,256 511,400 
Wind Storm 140 163,242 17,212 9,236,745 78,415,340 87,669,297 12,719,100 
average per event   1,166 123 65,977 560,110 626,209 90,851 
  
 The above data revealed an alarming picture, even though they pertained to natural 
disasters only. Among these disaster agents, floods and cyclones had been most frequent, and 
                                                 
25 Parasuraman and Unnikrishnan (2002) 
26 Source: “EM-DAT; The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database, www.em-dat.net – Université Catholique 
de Louvain – Brussels – Belgium”. *Events recorded in the CRED EM-DAT. First Event:/1900, Last Entry: 
Sep/2006. Created on 8 November 2006 
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earthquakes had the second highest average death toll per event after the rarely occurring 
tsunamis. However, as detailed analysis revealed, human loss of life due to drought and 
epidemics did not account for a large numbers of fatalities after the 1960s.27  
 The situation was also alarming from a vulnerability perspective. 60% of India’s 
landmass was vulnerable to earthquakes, more than 40 million hectares to floods, 8% of its area 
of 3.29 million sq. km. to cyclones, and 68% to drought.28 Flooding in river plains had been a 
regular phenomenon in parts of India, like Bihar and Assam. Disaster literature, in general, and 
about India, in particular, noted an increase in number of ‘great natural disaster events’ that was 
attributed to growth of population and urban sprawl.29 There had been catastrophic natural 
disasters like the 1993 Latur earthquake in Maharashtra province, 1998 Kandla cyclone in 
Gujarat, 1999 super cyclone that battered coastal Orissa, the Republic Day earthquake of 2001 
that devastated large parts of Gujarat, and the calamitous 2004 tsunami that swept away coastal 
villages in Tamil Nadu and Andaman & Nicobar Islands.  
 The federal government also noted that 4344 human lives were being lost, and an 
approximate 30 million people affected by natural disasters every year.30 As far as disasters from 
manmade hazards were concerned, the 1984 Bhopal Gas Tragedy had been one of the worst 
accidents in the history of the industrial world. In addition, terrorist incidents, transportation 
accidents, communal and caste riots had also taken a heavy toll. In 2007, India suffered heavy 
                                                 
27 The 1965 drought killed 1.5 million people, whereas drought-related fatalities were 300 in 1987, and 20 in 2000. 
While deaths due to epidemics had continued, they were nowhere near the 0.423 million in 1926, 2.0 million in 1920 
and 1.3 million in 1907. Source: "EM-DAT: The OFDA/CRED International Disaster Database. Created on 1 
December 2006. www.em-dat.net - Université Catholique de Louvain - Brussels - Belgium" 
28 Government of India (2004b) 
29 Sinha, Anil K. (2001) 
30 Government of India (2004b) 
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casualties, next only to Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan in the entire world.31 Terrorist incidents in 
2001 and 2003 were particularly serious.32 
 Government and scholars in India began viewing this domain of public policy with a 
newfound sense of urgency, considering the vulnerability of the nation and the devastating 
impact of disasters.33 It resonated with the goals of disaster research.34 A greater focus on the 
subject was also due to external influences. There was increased international influence from 
exposure to and dissemination of overseas experiences and best practices. The United Nations 
had declared the 1990s as the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR). 
Official sources in India recognized the enormous influence of IDNDR.35 The 1994 Yokohama 
Strategy of the IDNDR played a significant role in changing its relief-oriented approach to one 
based on mitigation and prevention. A joint program for disaster risk mitigation was taken up in 
2002, by Government of India and United Nations Development Programme (GOI-UNDP) with 
the assistance of United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and European 
Union (EU). It was aimed at capacity building in seventeen of the most disaster-prone states in 
India.36 Overseas agencies, like USAID, assisted India in developing climate forecasting 
systems.37 India was also exposed to international norms and standards, being the largest 
recipient of World Bank aid for disaster management programs.38 In the industrial sector, a 
United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) initiative focused on vulnerabilities to manmade 
                                                 
31 NCTC http://wits.nctc.gov/reports/crot2007nctcannexfinal.pdf retrieved 27 May 2008 
32 Government of India (2004b)   
33 Reddy and Tiwari (2005). One indicator of policy priority in India, was when a theme was taken up for discussion 
in the annual conference of Indian Institute of Public Administration. Disaster Management was taken up in 2001.  
34 Mileti (1999) recorded the prominence accorded to normative concerns of disaster research. 
35 Government of India (2004b) 
36 Ibid, 15 
37 Ibid, 57 
38World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (2006a) noted a total financing of $8257 millions in 43 projects; A 
respondent in Gujarat pointed out that sophisticated earthmoving and rescue was procured after seeing foreign 
agencies operate them in the aftermath of 2001 earthquake; A respondent in Tamil Nadu admitted that they were 
exposed to international documentation practices after interaction with multilateral agencies, after the 2004 tsunami. 
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disasters, and was instrumental in improving practices in the sectors of transportation and of 
hazardous chemicals.39 It initiated a process in which the country gained insights through 
interaction with other countries and international bodies.   
 Comprehensive reform was taken up by the federal government. The Ministry of Home 
Affairs (MHA) was notified as the nodal ministry for Disaster Management in 2002.40 Policy 
makers realized a need to overhaul all aspects of the administrative approach towards disasters. 
In the new millennium, an Administrative Reforms Commission (ARC), only the second in 
independent India, was constituted by the federal government, to examine and suggest measures 
for efficient and sustainable administration at all levels.41 Its terms of reference included Crisis 
Management and to suggest ways to “(a) quicken the Emergency Responses of administration, 
and (b) increase the effectiveness of the machinery to meet the crisis situation and enhance crisis 
preparedness.”42 Soon after, a comprehensive Disaster Management Act was passed by the 
Indian Parliament in December 2005.43 In place of archaic Relief departments, provinces were 
encouraged to set up Disaster Management departments, Disaster Management Authorities and 
promulgate Disaster Management Codes in place of outdated Relief Codes.44 
 Comprehensive reform addressed long-term mitigation and prevention requirements of 
disaster management. The Indian Meteorological Department and the Central Waters 
Commission took up modernization and upgradation of flood forecasting, early warning systems. 
A National Core Group on Landslide Mitigation was set up, with Geological Survey of India as 
the nodal agency. Another National Core Group on Earthquake Mitigation was set up, and under 
                                                 
39 Gupta, http://www.nsc.org.in/texts/UNEP_BD.pdf retrieved 27 May 2007 
40 Government of India (2004a) 
41 Government of India (2005b), ARC Constitution Resolution. 
42 Government of India (2005b).  ARC Terms of Reference, clause 12 
43 The Gazette of India (2005). Section 2 (e) of the DM Act, 2005, included all phases of prevention, mitigation, 
capacity-building,  preparedness, response, evacuation, rescue, relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction in disaster 
management.  
44 Ibid, 12 
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its aegis an expert committee was tasked with drafting building bye laws, town and country 
planning, and zoning regulations. The Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) was asked to develop 
building safety codes, sensitize local government personnel, and train municipal architects and 
engineers. It was planned to complete modifications of Town Planning laws for all new 
constructions, finish retrofitting of prioritized structures, and adopt Model Town Planning laws.45 
Government of India also took the assistance of USAID in strengthening climate forecast system.    
 Large-scale changes were mooted for training and human resource development, too. The 
National Center for Disaster Management, which was set up in 1995, was upgraded to a National 
Institute of Disaster Management (NIDM) in 2003. Its purpose was to conduct research, 
undertake documentation, develop training modules, conduct training programs, and assist 
training institutions and state institutes. After promulgation of the Disaster Management Act in 
2005, NIDM was recognized as a statutory, nodal institution. The country’s premier institution 
for training civil servants, the National Academy of Administration, was notified as a nodal 
agency for training trainers. Natural disaster management cells were set up in state administrative 
training institutes, which trained government personnel, to increase awareness and spread norms. 
Academic courses, of engineers and architects, included subjects of disaster management. It was 
also introduced in school curricula in the 8th and 9th grades, to spread awareness.  
 When it appeared that federal disaster management had taken up comprehensive capacity 
building, the 2004 South Asian tsunami exposed its shortcomings in states. It highlighted the 
distance between the federal center and the states in terms of adopting policy change. In addition 
to a disproportionately high loss of lives, a total unfamiliarity with the disaster agent caught the 
                                                 
45 NDMA (2007) 
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administration totally unawares.46 As a consequence, India joined an international effort to install 
tsunami detection systems in the Indian Ocean.47 It became a high priority issue and India went 
ahead with a plan to install a network of seismic stations, with 50 tide gauges and a dozen open-
ocean tsunameter buoys. By March 2007, it had tested four tsunameter systems.48 
 In case of manmade disasters, statutory safeguards were introduced earlier. The Bhopal 
Gas Tragedy in 1984 resulted in benchmarks and industrial safety standards in a number of 
countries.49 Under the influence of IDNDR in the 1990s, a major exercise was undertaken to 
improve Awareness and Preparedness for Emergencies at Local Level (APELL) by UNEP, in 
collaboration with government and industry.50 Its purpose was to minimize technological 
accidents and environmental emergencies, and their harmful effects. This was done by 
identifying and raising awareness of industry-related hazards, encouraging risk reduction and 
mitigation, and developing co-coordination between industry, local authorities and community.51 
Importantly, a new set of rules, the “Chemical Accidents (Emergency Planning, Preparedness 
and Response) Rules, 1996” were a major outcome of the APELL program. A Road Transport 
Safety (RTS) initiative, focused on all hazardous and non-hazardous industrial goods, was 
launched with the cooperation of UNEP, USAID and National Safety Council of India (NSCI).52 
Similarly, in the oil and natural gas sector, the Oil Industry Safety Directorate (OISD) had 
                                                 
46 Asian Development Bank, U N and World Bank (2005). The only other Indian experience of a tsunami, in living 
memory, was in 1945.  
47 UNESCO. State-of-the-art technology in tsunami warning systems, according to UNESCO, included a series of 
seismological stations, real-time sea-level observing network and deployment of deep-sea pressure sensors capable 
of detecting the tsunami signal as it traveled over the deep ocean. http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=28551&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html retrieved 28 November 2008 
48 UNESCO http://ioc3.unesco.org/icg/files/ICG-IOTWS_IV.pdf retrieved 28 November 2008 
49 Rajkumar, Ahmad and Mohanta (2006) 
50 UNEP http://www.uneptie.org/pc/apell/ retrieved 26 July 2007 
51 UNEP http://www.uneptie.org/pc/apell/programme/casestudies/casestud.html  retrieved 26 July 2007  
52 Gupta, http://www.nsc.org.in/texts/UNEP_BD.pdf retrieved 26 July 2007 
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considered International benchmarks of IEC, API, NFPA, etc. while developing safety 
protocols.53  
 Indian federal policy reform was comprehensive and spelt out specific parameters for the 
different phases of disaster management.54 In the mitigation and preparedness phases, states were 
asked to integrate long-term plans with developmental policies. Schemes that addressed 
prevention and mitigation were given priority.55 Mitigation measures for earthquakes included 
designs for quake resistant construction and updating building codes according to Bureau of 
Indian Standards. States needed to set up specialist disaster response teams, in addition to 
undertaking vulnerability analyses, for reaching preparedness milestones.  In the response stage, 
it consisted of emergency plans as well as mock drills. Other steps included emergency support 
functions of procurement, mobile hospitals, search and rescue teams, and communication 
networks.56 Equally important were measures involving local communities and non-
governmental organizations, which were some of the key shortcomings identified even by the 
World Bank.57 The paradigm shift was a comprehensive overhaul that represented ‘double-loop 
learning’58 as far as federal policy making was concerned. Its objective was to change the 
fundamental objective from distribution of relief to addressing all-phases of generic disaster 
management.59 The sum total of changes represented a complete policy overhaul in Indian 
disaster management. 
                                                 
53 Verma, http://nidm.gov.in/idmc/call_for_abstracts.htm retrieved 7 May 2008 
54 Government of India (2004b) 
55 Ibid. Annexure II: The Tenth Five Year Plan chapter on Disaster Management 
56 Ibid, 78 
57  World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (2006b) listed ‘Lessons not learned from Bank Disaster Projects’ 
by Facts and Figures on Natural Disasters. The three most important lessons concerned (a) disaster management, 
preparedness and mitigation, (b) simple and flexible procurement that was fundamental to expeditious 
implementation, and (c) coordination between different units and existing agencies. 
http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/naturaldisasters/docs/natural_disasters_fact_sheet.pdf retrieved 26 July 2007. 
58 Argyris and Schon (1978), 22.   
59 Government of India (2004a); Sinha, Anil K.(2001) 
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III. Literature Review 
 In the classical tradition of disaster research, Fritz (1961) defined disaster as "an event 
concentrated in time and space, in which a society, or a relatively self-sufficient subdivision of a 
society, undergoes severe danger and incurs such losses to its members and physical 
appurtenances that the social structure is disrupted and the fulfillment of all or some of the 
essential functions of the society is prevented".60 Literature, broadly, talked of three perspectives 
about disasters.61 They were the classical tradition, natural hazards research and social 
constructionist schools. The classical paradigm saw them as interruptions of normal life in 
society, which was overwhelmed by the event. The focus was on returning to normalcy. The 
disaster research tradition looked at the disaster agent itself, studying the characteristics of 
disaster agents. More in the geographer-scientist mould, its proponents studied different disaster 
types, such as earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, etc. The objective was to understand them better 
and take appropriate steps to deal with them. Lastly, the social phenomenon school viewed it in 
terms of the social causes for vulnerability. There was a focus on vulnerability of the social 
fabric, and the disruption in society that was caused by disasters.62 
 Despite varying perspectives, some concerns had remained consistent. Scholarly 
literature on disaster management had been overwhelmingly concerned with particular events, 
disaster types, and impact on community.63 Scholarly studies were mostly centered on events 
such as 9/11, Hurricane Katrina, earthquake in Iran, floods in Bangladesh and others.64 There had 
also been a marked focus on understanding disaster dynamics, as well improving its 
                                                 
60 Fritz cited in Tierney, Lindell and Perry (2001), 8  
61 Perry (2006); Mileti (1999) 
62 Perry (2006) 
63 A sample of the vast literature would suffice to indicate voluminous scholarship. It included Sylves and Waugh 
(1996); Comfort, Rosenthal and Boin (2001); Mitchell (1999); Waugh (2000); Farazmand (2001); Tierney, Lindell 
and Perry (2001); Rodriguez, Quarantelli and Dynes (2006); Haddow and Bullock (2006); Birkland (2006) 
64 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences (March 2006), vol. 604; Case studies in Sylves 
and Waugh (1996), Comfort, Rosenthal and Boin (2001), and Farazmand (2001)  
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management.65 Several studies examined administrative practices and organizational behavior 
that were concerned with capacities and scholars scrutinized general issues of mitigation, 
preparedness, response or recovery.66 Literature examined institutional arrangements such as 
agency formation, institutional emphasis on terrorism, efficacy of Incident Command System as 
well as non-structural solutions for better administration.67 Prominent themes included issues 
arising in a federal framework, how organizations coped with disasters, adoption of 
technological change, organizational design, and how policy reform was brought about by 
focusing events.68  
  There was also a long and rich tradition of disaster research in Europe.69 However, early 
in its development, scholars recognized the role of United States as a baseline for such 
research.70 Research in this domain was mostly preoccupied by particular events. As McEntire 
noted, these studies researched international responses, and had also focused on particular 
disaster types.71 In contrast, he noted that there were very few studies about organizations that 
dealt with disaster management across the world. In terms of disaster research in comparative 
politics, he found that the output was utterly disappointing. Despite an urgent need to learn about 
disaster administration in other nations and recognizing that they provided a unique opportunity, 
there had been fewer attempts to study their lessons.72 
                                                 
65 Tierney, Lindell and Perry (2001); Mileti (1999) 
66 Tierney, Lindell and Perry (2001) 
67 Kettl (2006); Kapucu (2006); Sylves (2006) 
68 Waugh (1988); Comfort (1988); Drabek (1991); Waugh (2006); Stewart (2006); Birkland (2006)   
69 McEntire (2006) 
70 Dynes (1988) 
71 McEntire (2006)  
72 Boin and ‘t’Hart (2006) 
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 A focus on disaster types or particular events or specific vulnerabilities was 
predominant.73 Importantly, greater vulnerabilities of nations outside the developed world were 
gaining attention only now, though their significance was recognized early in the field.74 There 
were attempts at comparative research, although it was concluded that few nations had focused 
resources and policy attention on dealing with disaster reduction before the IDNDR.75 Great 
potential was seen for undertaking disaster research across nations, though there was a need to 
overcome methodological difficulties in determining equivalence and formulating measures for 
disaster impact.76 Recent attempts at a cross-national study of emergency organizations systems 
by Britton had only served to underscore the serious concerns that needed to be addressed by 
greater international research.77  
 Nevertheless, the bulk of scholarly output comprised of case studies, with the goal of 
analyzing reasons for failure. In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina and the 9/11 tragedy, 
attention on disaster management agencies had only been greater.78 Some identified non-
structural factors like poor implementation of plans, communication disconnect, flawed decision-
making, organizational weaknesses, lack of coordination, backward-looking strategies, greater 
regulation and ineffective leadership to be primarily responsible for the Katrina disaster.79 A very 
significant aspect of these studies was that they focused on unitary variables and there was no 
attempt to undertake a comparative examination of provincial-level factors, despite clear 
recognition that states and local governments were primary responders.                                                                                                                                  
                                                 
73 Mitchell (1999) and the case studies in Sylves and Waugh (1996); Comfort, Rosenthal and Boin (2001); 
Farazmand (2001) had samples of a vast literature that was rich in case studies. 
74 Dynes (1988) 
75 McEntire (2006); Britton (2006)  
76 Peacock (1997) 
77 Britton (2006)  
78 The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences (March 2006) vol. 604 was one example 
79 Waugh (2006); Kettl (2006) 
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 An overview of the disaster research literature revealed two major shortcomings. First, in 
the opinion of this research, the emphasis on a public administration perspective had been 
limited, despite great scope for addressing policy concerns. 80 Irrespective of the conceptual 
approaches to disasters, their conclusions were the starting point for policy intervention, as 
governments were seen as the only organizations with resources and authority to deal with 
disasters.81 Reducing vulnerability, affording protection through better preparation, response and 
recovery were good examples of public goods that needed to be addressed through public 
policy.82 Second was the need to undertake comparative research in disaster research.83 Even 
though, a need for systematic comparison had been articulated since the 1970s, there had been 
sporadic attempts at studying across events, organizations and socio-cultural systems.84 It 
remained an occasional tool, as the bulk of scholarship opted for case studies.  
 Moving on to literature on Indian disaster management, it was also found to have, by and 
large, remained faithful to case studies of specific disaster events and types. The literature, itself, 
was in two major categories. Bulk of it was reports and studies done by practitioners, 
governmental agencies and international institutions. 85 The other category consisted of scholarly 
analysis, as well as reports of non-governmental organizations. Needless, both reached 
diametrically opposite conclusions when evaluating the efficacy of disaster management in India. 
A great amount of work in this field had been conducted more by scientists, geographers and 
sociologists.86 But, an overarching perspective of disaster management in India was attempted 
                                                 
80 Mitchell (1999); Waugh (1999); Kettl  (2006) were some examples  
81 Schneider (1995); Waugh (2000) 
82 Ostrom, Parks and Whitaker (1978) discussed measures to identify public goods 
83 Tierney, Lindell and Perry (2001) 
84 Rodriguez, Quantarelli and Dynes (2006); Tierney, Lindell and Perry (2001); Mileti (1999) 
85 Sinha, Anil K. (2001); Sharma (2001); UNDP (2001); UNDP (2005); Provention Consortium (2005); USAID 
http://www.usaid.gov/in/our_work/strategy/strategy6.htm  retrieved 22 June 2008, were examples. 
86 Sharma (2001) was a good example  
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only by a few, who retained a focus on country-level variables.87 It was surprising that there had 
not been any consistent interest by scholars, given the fact that comparative analyses tended to be 
problem-driven.88   
 Most of the official records and reports had only documented events and statistics; there 
was hardly any attempt at critical evaluation. Moreover, there seemed to be an implicit approval 
of satisfactory administrative response.89 Even practitioners found that, on the whole, the task of 
disaster management was handled quite responsibly and adequately.90 The nodal agency dealing 
with the subject, Ministry of Home Affairs, recorded progress in the country’s able management 
of disasters,91 although it had realized the need to change and reform in a very fundamental 
way.92 Official documents had been a catalogue of to-do concerns, as well as a review of 
activities in pursuit of a new approach at the federal level.93 They also recorded policy changes 
that were taking place, noting the shortcomings of earlier policies. A few, highly useful, 
empirical studies had assessed the consequences of policy changes. One example was the work 
of Orissa State Disaster Mitigation Authority, which had a valuable assessment of policy 
implementation.94 Yet, on the whole, there was no attempt at rigorous, systematic analysis and 
reaching conclusions for implementing policy reforms.  
 The absence of critical analysis was also found in several works by scholars and scientists 
associated with government bodies. A few reports were candid in their assessment. For example, 
                                                 
87Parasuraman and Unnikrishnan (2002); USAID http://www.usaid.gov/in/our_work/strategy/strategy6.htm  
retrieved 22 June 2008   
88 Przeworski in Kohli et al symposium (1996) 
89 Government of India (2004a); Rajan (2001); Sharma (2001)  
90 Rajan (2001); Sinha, Anil K. (2001) 
91 Government of India (2004b) 
92 Government of India (2004a) 
93 Government of India (2004b); NDMA (2007); NIDM http://www.nidm.gov.in/Earthquakes3_ii.asp retrieved 6 
May 2008  
94 OSDMA/UNDP (2001) had documented experience sharing and offered assessment of their experience in disaster 
management. Its results and recommendations about involvement of Panchayati Raj institutions and its functionaries 
contained important lessons http://data.undp.org.in/dmweb/LESSONs%20Learnt-%20Orissa%20floods.pdf  
retrieved 25 May 2007           
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the guidelines for construction and building codes recorded an abysmal track record in 
compliance of these non-structural measures.95 Similarly there had been some attempts at 
identifying shortcomings, and re-assessing fundamental goals. 96 The need for a radically 
different approach of disaster management was a common theme. A very significant feature of 
official literature was the identification of the central role of provinces in disaster management.97 
While they correctly identified the unit of analysis, it was not used for any systematic 
comparison.  
 The other major stream of literature on Indian disaster management was by scholars, as 
well as activists of non-governmental agencies.98 They focused on a wide range of themes, from 
evaluating government response in specific disasters to community vulnerabilities. It was 
interesting to note that most of these works based their analysis on one or two incidents and 
attempted to inductively generalize about the gamut of disaster administration in India. For most 
part, there was little or no attempt to systematically analyze the field and derive fuller 
explanations thereby contributing to the growth of the discipline in theory and practice. The 
studies did not look at the whole field, in broad terms, and across states and disaster events. 
 Literature in this category had covered sociological issues such as community’s 
perception of acceptable risk, 99 socio-economically vulnerable groups, 100 and general lessons 
about disaster management.101 There had been case studies of specific events,102 comparison of 
                                                 
95 NDMA (2007) http://www.cidc.in/NDMA/pres/01_03_01.pdf retrieved 25 May 2007 
96 Government of India (2004b); UNDP (2001); OSDMA/ UNDP. Lessons Learnt: Orissa Floods- 2001.  
http://www.undp.org.in/dmweb/images/LESSONs%20Learnt-%20Orissa%20floods.pdf  retrieved on 25 May 2007     
97 Government of India 2004b); Sinha, Anil K. (2001) 
98 Haddow and Bullock (2006); ADEPT (2006); AIDMI (2005); Parasuraman and Unnikrishnan (2002) 
99 Pilgrim (1999) 
100 Singh and Ballabh (2005); Winchester (2000) 
101 AIDMI (2005) Special Issue 8, October 11, 2005 was about disaster management lessons in India.  
102 ADEPT http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/ACIO-6Q4BXU?OpenDocument  retrieved 9 
November 2006, had a case study on 2005 quake relief in J & K.; Wagle and Warghade (2006)  
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different events of the same disaster type,103 and general opinion pieces about the sub-field of 
Indian disaster management,104 among others. Majority of these scholars and groups were critical 
of policy interventions. The debacle was clear for them.105 They called for introspection and 
identification of weaknesses, in addition to outright criticism.106 The state was considered to be 
ineffective in preventing avoidable loss of life or property107 due to rigid bureaucratization, 
shortsighted planning, and lack of structured involvement of community and non-governmental 
agencies.108 If there had been lack of adequate mitigating measures in some cases, preparedness 
was found to be inadequate in others.109 Recovery in most had been below par, if not non-
existent.110 Scholars and, in some cases, international organizations too, noted grave 
shortcomings of lack of transparency and poor consultation,111 and no institutionalized 
involvement of local governments and NGOs.112 They stressed an urgent need to involve 
Panchayat Raj Institutions (PRIs) in an effort to de-bureaucratize, and involve non-
governmental, political agencies.113 Even the new Disaster Management Act of 2005 was found 
to exemplify top-down policy that was characteristic of disaster management as well as public 
administration in India.114   
 International organizations also made important contributions to literature. Their reports 
on specific events or on the state of Indian disaster management also included chronicles of 
                                                 
103 AIDMI (2006) compared three cyclones in AP, Orissa and Gujarat in its Special Issue 8, March 26, 2006.  
104 Parasuraman and Unnikrishnan (2002); Martin (2007) 
105 Winchester (2000); Parasuraman and Unnikrishnan (2002)  
106 Sharma (2001); Haddow and Bullock (2006); UNDP (2001); UNDP (2005); ADEPT (2006); Provention 
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107 Sharma and Rout (2001) 
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successful initiatives,115 post-tsunami reconstruction,116 and recovery in Gujarat.117 If lack of 
preparedness was a cause for devastation in the 2004 tsunami,118 absence of infrastructure 
affected supply of emergency provisions as well as medical assistance in others.119 A need to 
comprehensively address recovery operations was also articulated.120 They agreed with scholars 
that administration had failed in discharging its duties.     
 Amidst all these, students of public administration were likely to be disappointed for the 
lack of adequate concern about policy factors, as well as lack of critical and rigorous analysis. It 
was difficult to draw generalizable conclusions. Only a few organizations had undertaken a 
general study of Indian disaster management, and spelt out the lessons that needed to be learnt.121 
The exercise by the Independent Evaluation Group of the World Bank employed a comparative 
approach,122 although the unit of analysis was a nation. They found a series of shortcomings in 
India, such as a need to address long-term objectives, improve coordination, and establish 
procurement procedures, community participation and others. Another valuable study was done 
by USAID, which went into great detail about the failings of Indian disaster management and 
laid down benchmarks. They identified a number of shortcomings such as lack of responsiveness 
of government officers, no early warning systems, inadequate resources for mass evacuation, 
improper coordination among various government departments, and lack of standard operating 
procedures, among others.123 Its catalog of shortcomings included issues of planning, 
coordination, and shortage of resources and weaknesses of non-structural measures. 
                                                 
115 ISDR (2007) had recorded good initiatives such as Afat Vimo and SEEDS about masons’ training 
116 UNDP http://www.undp.org.in/dmweb/Tsunami/UN%20Tsunami-Final.pdf retrieved on 29 November 2008 
117 Provention Consortium (2005b) 
118 UNDP (2005); Asian Development Bank, U N and World Bank (2005) 
119 Relief Web (2006) 
120 Provention Consortium (2005b) 
121 AIDMI (2005). Special Issue 8, October 11, 2005 was about lessons derived from disaster management in India. 
122 World Bank (2006b) 
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Interestingly, the USAID report had a key finding that was central to this study. It noted the 
enormous variation in among different states of India. Thus, instead of aggregating all disaster 
management at the level of nation, it pertinently pointed to their differing levels of capacities.  
 In all categories, barring the few comprehensive studies, a distinct feature had been their 
preoccupation with specific disasters and events. Case studies had been the research design of 
choice, as seen in the profusion of professional and scholarly output on specific events.124 There 
had also been a noticeable focus on specific types of hazards and the different policy 
interventions for the various hazards.125 An overarching perspective of disaster management in 
India was attempted by few only, who retained their focus on country-level variables.126 
Government as well as scholarly literature shared the same concerns, as far as topics and their 
treatment were concerned.  
IV. Scope and Plan of the Study 
 A significant inference from the literature was that emergency management in India had 
learnt from experiences.127 The important thing, then, was to probe its reasons. Literature, it had 
been seen, had identified major shortcomings of Indian disaster management. However, two 
things were missing. First, there was no attempt to go beyond observed shortcomings and 
understand the reasons behind variation in performances of states. Why did provinces vary in 
policies and capacities? The inquiry had the potential to go beyond a catalogue of listed 
deficiencies and identify fundamental causes. Second, the entire effort was focused on specific 
events or disaster types. Instead, a much broader study of disaster management was required for 
drawing generalizations.  
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 To meet such a glaring gap in literature, this research undertook a comparison of states, 
which had varying capacities to deliver these public goods. In recent times, scholars, who had 
studied India, had undertaken comparative studies that addressed governance issues such as 
incidence of crime, success in inviting foreign direct investment as well as the spatial spread of 
development.128 Some of these explanations included institutional arrangements, social 
cleavages, socio-cultural traits, and rational choice explanations based on the political party 
system, among others.129 While such debates were not central to the quest, they shared a 
common concern about the efficacy of Indian public administration and, equally important, an 
application of the inter-state comparison method that had been adopted by them. A similar study 
was needed for emergency management, for mid-level theory building about disaster 
management. The literature that had been reviewed was noticeably silent on this important 
question. 
 The other important part of this research was to identify explanatory variables that were 
causal factors for different levels of administrative capacities to deal with disasters. Mere 
recognition of variation was insufficient. It was important to know why some states invested 
more in building robust organizations, were able to establish better procedures and practices that 
lead to greater capacity building and abler handling of disasters. Some of the reasons proffered 
by scholars for good outcomes included organizational learning, an intergovernmental context of 
shared governance, economic resources, adoption of technological change, organization design, 
subjective abilities of leadership, and experience of calamitous events.130 
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 The factors mentioned above were illustrative and revealed the range and variety of 
causality. However, some of them were either not fully applicable or were themselves a result of 
more fundamental and underlying factors. Intergovernmental context of disaster management did 
not play a major role in the Indian context because the federal center was constitutionally 
obligated to frame policy, as well as provide resources. Organizational design was itself an 
outcome of more fundamental causes and this research saw it as a major measure of variance on 
the dependent variable. Similarly, adoption of technological change also became the effect rather 
than a cause in this research. While accepting the important role of social cleavages and socio-
cultural specificities in different parts of India, it was nevertheless seen that these differences 
were not significant for a couple of reasons. First, spatial subjectivities were largely overcome by 
the role of center in importance of disaster management. Second, the numerous disaster 
experiences created an imperative to go beyond social divisions. Third, any influence on this 
count was controlled by the factor of a uniform structure in higher echelons of administration.131  
 The subjective role of personnel, either in terms of leadership or as a consequence of 
good human resource development practices, was also not examined.132 This factor gained 
credence whenever key personnel were shifted or sacked, as a consequence of unsatisfactory 
performance during disasters. 133 However, it was essential to recognize two major weaknesses. 
First, if leadership were the most significant independent variable, there would be problems in 
drawing generalizations and for creating interventions for better disaster management. Second, 
emphasizing better human resource development would lead to a circular logic since the 
dependent variable included variation in skill upgradation and training activities. 
                                                 
131 Jenkins (2004) 
132 Sylves (2006) 
133 Ibid, 33 noted Michael Brown’s resignation as head of FEMA, for failures after Katrina; Sylves (1996) 
mentioned the role played by James DeWitt in making FEMA an effective organization. 
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 Instead, this research identified the factors of development levels, institutional 
strengthening through local self-government, the nature of the party system in a competitive 
political context, and organizational learning from prior disaster experience of focusing events. 
Levels of economic development appeared to provide ready explanations for superior outcomes. 
Intuitively, it appeared self-evident that developed states that had more resources, were able to 
create better structural arrangements to address disasters. More developed states would have 
more resources to undertake better structural measures, to mitigate risks posed by hazards. They 
can also set up good early warning systems, establish robust communications networks and 
invest in enhancing capabilities of first responders, apart from addressing issues arising from 
long-term and short-term recovery. Thus their access to resources provided a clear, causal 
relationship to reducing vulnerabilities. In India, there was marked disparity between states that 
allowed such analysis. Data about economic progress of states was readily available in the form 
of periodic reports and statistics published by the Planning Commission, and Finance Ministry, 
as well as the Registrar General of Census Operations.134 
 On the other hand, levels of economic development did not always translate into superior 
capabilities for a couple of reasons .135 First, there may not be a focus on disaster management in 
policy agendas.136 Second, mere existence of institutions and availability of resources may not 
correlate with organizational effectiveness, and better practices. It was known that organizational 
practices, procedures, non-structural mitigating measures, institutionalized involvement of local 
communities as well as non-governmental organizations, were not dependent upon economic 
resources alone.137 They could offset shortcomings of resources and structural capabilities by 
                                                 
134 Dreze and Sen (2002) 
135 Kabra and Khator (2001) 
136 Kim and Lee (2001) 
137 Sakamura (2001) 
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developing coping mechanisms and arrangements that made optimal use of capacities. For 
example, Orissa was one of the poorest states in India. Yet, on values of the dependent variable, 
some saw it better than a more developed Gujarat.138 Moreover, issues of vulnerability also 
needed to be considered.   
 An institutional explanation that lent itself to examination was that states with well-
established local self-government tended to do better. Since local communities were the first to 
reach the scene, an active and responsive local government was seen to be a better explanation 
for superior outcomes. Not only would their response time be lesser,139 but local institutions were 
recognized as effective voices of local requirements.140 A favorable factor for this research was 
the uneven record of local self-government among Indian states. They were robust only in a few 
states like Maharashtra, Gujarat, and Karnataka. In some others, many these bodies had been 
superseded and their functioning taken over by states. Consequently, it appeared possible to 
derive causal linkages between effectiveness in disaster management and the extent of 
decentralization in the local bodies, called the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs). For example 
Orissa was successfully able to integrate Panchayati Raj Institutions in a community 
participation model.141 Periodic evaluation of panchayati raj institutions provided a stable basis 
for using this factor for comparison.  
 The next factor concerned the electoral system and governance that focused on the 
political party system. The nature of party systems was seen as a critical factor for making public 
goods electorally salient as well as in ensuring policy reform. Thus, the cohesiveness of the party 
                                                 
138 Sinha, Anil K. (2001). This was stated in 2001. The situation changed thereafter and Gujarat was later considered 
to have adopted wide ranging, comprehensive capacity building as discussed in the subsequent chapter on the 
dependent variable.  
139 OSDMA/ UNDP. Lessons Learnt: Orissa Floods- 2001. The study found that local institutions responded faster.  
http://www.undp.org.in/dmweb/images/LESSONs%20Learnt-%20Orissa%20floods.pdf  retrieved 25 May 2007 
140 Pilgrim (1999) 
141 OSDMA/ UNDP. Lessons Learnt: Orissa Floods- 2001. 
http://www.undp.org.in/dmweb/images/LESSONs%20Learnt-%20Orissa%20floods.pdf  retrieved 25 May 2007   
    
27 
 
systems in different states was examined for their impact on capacity building in disaster 
management. Cohesion of party system was noted as a significant factor in effecting policy 
reform. Thus greater cohesion of political parties and increased electoral salience of disaster 
management was hypothesized to lead to greater responsiveness of governments in developing 
capacities and practices in dealing with disasters.   
 The last variable that was considered was the factor of organizational learning. In the 
literature on disaster management, prior disaster experience was seen as a consistently “major 
predictor of how preparedness and response activities are undertaken”.142 Particularly 
devastating and severe disasters were ‘focusing events’, 143 which led to double-loop learning, 
with major policy consequences.144 Disasters like super cyclones or calamitous earthquakes or 
tsunamis became defining moments for governments which then undertook fundamental reform. 
In short, such learning had the potential to lead to a comprehensive overhaul, similar to a systems 
approach of organizational learning.145   
V. Contribution and Significance of this Research 
 This research made important contributions on several counts. First, it adopted a 
comparative method in an intra-provincial context in public administration. In the process, it 
hoped to revive the comparative study of public administration that had fallen into limbo after 
the heady days of 1960s.146 Second, in the sub-field of disaster management, it adopted a method 
that was more rigorous than the popular case study. Third, it contributed directly to literature on 
Indian disaster management, addressing concerns of scholars and practitioners. In this domain, 
                                                 
142Tierney, Lindell and Perry (2001) 
143 Birkland (1997) p.1, used Kingdon’s concept of ‘focusing events’ to explain linkages with agenda setting and 
policy making in disaster management. ‘Potential Focusing events’, as he called them, become known to policy 
makers and public at the same time. 
144 Tierney, Lindell and Perry (2001) 
145 Senge (1991). 
146 Heady (2001). The introductory chapter discussed the topic in detail 
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policy implementation had moved ahead due to a confluence of knowledge sharing, whereas 
scholarship had not kept pace. On the other hand, a vast literature abounded in “engineering”,147 
whose main focus was less on academic rigor and more on specific interests of clients, and 
contributed little to theoretical development.  
 Theoretically, this research filled an important gap in the literature about causal factors 
for good governance. Methodologically, it established the utility of applying the comparative 
method for disaster management studies, applying it at a sub-national level.148 It is the 
considered opinion of this author that such application had great relevance in other domains of 
public administration, too. The empirical concerns of practitioners had been addressed as the 
results of this research had significant implications for planning policy interventions at different 
levels. For the federal government, it provided a rationale for critical inputs. For states, it 
provided a framework to plan and implement disaster management. For institutions of local self-
government, it promised to indicate their core competencies. Moreover, recognition of the 
crucial role of local bodies was likely to hasten decentralization of responsibilities from state 
level. Overall, it provided an imperative to focus policy attention on a crucial area of public 
administration without waiting for the next major disaster to overhaul emergency management 
systems. 
                                                 
147 Elmore (1988) placed literature into three broad categories, as (i) ‘science’ which was academically rigorous and 
meant for testing hypothesis and developing general statements of cause and effect,  (ii) “engineering” undertaken 
for specific clients and their specific interests, and (iii) ‘craft’ that was limited to particular problems, institutions, 
political preferences and a particular period of time, 316 
148 Jenkins (2004) 
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Chapter 2: An Inter-Provincial Comparison of State Capacities 
Overwhelming use of case studies had been a striking feature of literature on disaster 
management.149 Specific events, locations, disaster types, and their impact, as well as a focus on 
particular phases of disaster management had, by and large, attracted scholarly attention.150 
Research had yet to witness a wider application of the comparative design, although it held great 
promise for scholars and practitioners. This research firmly believed that a comparative method 
could be particularly fruitful in identifying causal factors, which had direct bearing on effective 
disaster administration.151 Recognizing the strengths of the method, it was applied in an intra-
national context for a comparison among states.152 The inter-province application was a valuable 
contribution in a domain in which comparisons had been mostly used for cross-national studies.  
The first part of this chapter discusses the research question with particular attention to 
the dependent variable. It also outlines the independent variables for exploring their 
contributions. The second section sketches out important features of the Indian federal system 
and governance responsibilities towards disaster management, and places this study in its legal-
institutional framework. The research design is discussed in the third segment. It puts forward a 
rationale for the comparative research design, underscoring its suitability in the Indian political-
administrative context. It deals with research methods in disaster research, making a case for 
adopting an intra-national comparison. The fourth section operationalizes the dependent variable. 
                                                 
149 Drabek (1997) 
150 A sample of the vast literature included Tierney, Lindell and Perry (2001); Rodriguez, Quarantelli and Dynes 
(2006); Mitchell (1999); Waugh (2000); Kettl (2006); Mileti (1999); Kapucu (2006); Sylves (2006); Kalantari 
(2001); Col and Chu (2001); Sakamoto (2001); Terry (2001); Kim and Lee (2001); Farazmand (2001); Gupta 
(2007); Pilgrim (1999); Winchester (2000); Sharma (2001); Jain (2006); Kabra and Khator (2001); Reddy, Thapliyal 
and Sastry (1996); Jasanoff (1994) 
151 McEntire and Mathis training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/docs/EMT/Chapter%20- 
%20Comparative%20Politics%20and%20Disasters.doc- retrieved 8 July 2008. 
152 Reference to states in this research was not a reference to nation-states. They referred to provinces, and ‘center’ 
had been used to indicate the federal level. 
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Noting that disaster management does not easily lend itself to evaluation measures, defining the 
dependent variable was a significant part of the research. Last is a discussion on selection of 
cases and the method of testing the hypothesis. The data collection methods in this research are 
also presented in the same section. 
I. The Research Question and Explanatory Factors 
 The central question of this research addressed theoretical and normative concerns in 
disaster management. It aimed to identify the factors that had a systematic and significant effect 
on effective administrative capacities for dealing with disasters. What, if any, were the 
motivating factors for undertaking fundamental policy reform to develop good disaster 
management systems? These questions were important for middle-range theorizing in disaster 
research. For practitioners attempting to formulate appropriate policy interventions, the research 
question addressed extremely important issues. Hence, it attempted to provide answers to 
academic and normative concerns by examining disaster management and policy reforms in four 
selected states in India. Each of the states had known vulnerabilities, and provided an appropriate 
setting to examine the roles of different explanatory factors.  
 However, literature in the discipline had no template for a systematic examination of 
causality of capacity building in administrative systems. There were neither models to rely upon 
nor a list of explanatory variables, from previous research. Therefore, this research identified 
factors that had face validity, and those that were mentioned in literature, although not as a result 
of any evaluative exercise in an inter-provincial framework.153 Extant literature, for the most 
part, had referenced them, although not systematically. Yet, problems remained as there was no 
attempt at deriving a causal relationship. Was it possible to have effective administrative systems 
                                                 
153 Comfort (1999) had examined seismic disasters in different countries to study community-based, self-    
organizing processes.  
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only if there were economic resources to invest in them? Did self-governing local bodies make a 
critical difference to the system’s capacities? Were there other factors that could explain why 
some states enhanced their capabilities and were able to perform more effectively? These 
questions were critical to practitioners, and scholars had a responsibility to address them. 
However, before discussing the research design, it was necessary to explain the Indian setting.   
    II. The Federal Context 
The political-administrative system of India provided the context for this research and it 
was necessary to place it in the nation’s federal framework. India is a federal polity that became 
independent from British colonialism in 1947. It comprises of 28 states and 7 Union Territories 
(UTs).154 States were decentralized, provincial units with elected representatives and legislative 
autonomy. Union Territories, on the other hand, were under direct control of the federal center, 
i.e. Government of India. The Constitution demarcated powers and responsibilities between 
center and states, by drawing up different jurisdictional Lists. They were the Central, State and 
Concurrent Lists. While center and states had exclusive jurisdiction over the first two lists, 
respectively, the Concurrent List included subjects that could be addressed by both levels.  
States were administratively divided into ‘districts’, and administration was operationally 
carried out at the level of each of these 604 territorial units.155 Districts were an extremely 
important level in the institutional arrangement of administration, and were vested with key 
functions. The leadership positions at these levels were occupied by civil servants of the All-
India Services. Importantly, this framework had existed since colonial times, and had remained, 
                                                 
154 Government of India (2008). Andhra Pradesh, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Goa, Gujarat, 
Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, Jharkhand, Karnataka, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, 
Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan, Sikkim, Tamil Nadu, Tripura, Uttar Pradesh, 
Uttaranchal, West Bengal are the 28 states. The list of Union Territories consists of Andaman and Nicobar Islands, 
Chandigarh, Dadra and Nagar Haveli, Daman and Diu, Delhi, Lakshadweep, and Puducherry.  
155 Government of India (2008). Total area of India is about 3.3 million square kilometers, which is slightly more 
than one-third the size of the United States. The latter has 3077 counties. 
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unchanged even after independence. Consequently, there had been critical views that found the 
outdated, colonial outlook of higher civil services as dysfunctional and unresponsive to 
contemporary demands. It was considered to be a major cause of ineffective administrative 
outcomes, despite vast experience.156  
In recent decades, a third level of government had emerged below the states. This was the 
level of local self-governments, represented by Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs). There were 
three levels of these institutions, of which the Zila Parishad (ZP) was the highest and was 
coterminous with a district.157 The Panchayat Samiti (PS) was below it, at the intermediate level 
of a developmental block, and the Gram Panchayat (GP) for a large village, or a small group of 
them, was at the lowest rung. An important feature of the PRIs was an absence of uniformity in 
their structural arrangements. States had different institutional arrangements at the intermediate 
level, and also differed in the manner of elections to these bodies. Moreover, there was 
considerable variation with respect to the extent that states transferred functions, functionaries 
and financial resources to these institutions.158  
It was important to note that, disaster management was not specifically mentioned in 
either the Central or State lists, or even the Concurrent list.159 However, the constitution 
entrusted the center with residual powers to deal with all subjects not mentioned in the above.160 
Notwithstanding the center’s constitutional obligation, the work was operationally carried out by 
states, as the former had no independent machinery or mechanism to deliver public goods in this 
                                                 
156 Alexander (2003) 
157 Government of India (2006b). Three levels were proposed, with flexibility for the intermediate tier in states with 
a population of less than 20 lakhs. 
158 Government of India (2006b); Mathew (2000). There was wide variation among different states in the 
institutional arrangements, functions, functionaries and financial resources of PRIs. Nomenclature also varied 
between states, with the intermediate administrative level being called Taluka or Tehsil or block. By and large, 
districts had been common across different states, although they varied in size and population.  
159 Government of India (2004b); Sinha, Anil K. (2001) 
160 Government of India (2007a). It was taken up by the Center under Item 97 of the Union List. 
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domain. It provided states with financial aid, expertise and logistical assistance for different 
purposes in disaster management.161 In case of Union Territories (UTs), which were federally 
administered, the center shouldered the entire responsibility. The difference in central 
involvement was clear in the following example. When the 2004 South Asian tsunami devastated 
the UT of Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal, the central government was in 
direct charge of relief operations. Its personnel were handling all the activities, and it incurred all 
expenditure. However, in the province of Tamil Nadu, the duties were carried out by the elected 
state government. Substantial financial assistance was, however, provided by the center.  
Overall, the Government of India formulated disaster policy for the entire county, 
identifying its direction and thrust areas. The states, as autonomous self-governing units, were 
encouraged to formulate their own, in line with the central policy. Federal policy acted as a 
guiding force and helped in setting objectives. The autonomy of states and the imperative of 
federal division of powers did not empower the center with authority or leverage to enforce 
compliance in disaster management.162 The state had an incentive, in the form of federal grants 
and fiscal transfers, to adopt and implement central guidelines. More than any other level of 
governance, a state was accountable for disaster management. And at times, state governments 
took the lead in formulating policy.163 The states formulated their policies and built capacities 
through the programs of various departments. Implementation was ensured through districts and 
other field formations. Disaster management was one of the primary responsibilities at the level 
                                                 
161 Pande and Pande (2007) 
162 Government of India (2007a). Article 356 of the Constitution allowed the center to dissolve a state legislature and 
dismiss its elected government when the latter failed to discharge its constitutionally mandated duties. However, 
there had been sparing usage of this power in recent times. 
163 As the Secretary of the Department and Disaster Management in Orissa pointed out, the Orissa Disaster    
Mitigation Authority preceded its federal counterpart. Orissa was also a leader in setting up a Disaster Rapid Action 
Force.  
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of the district. Hence, states had been identified as the appropriate unit of comparative analysis in 
this research.  
III. Research Design for Disaster Management  
Major research designs in social science research included both quantitative analysis and 
qualitative methods.164 A quantitative method allowed control and manipulation of variables to 
identify the independent and autonomous impact of each of them. Yet, there was a possibility of 
inaccurate operationalization of concepts as well as wrongful categorization of variables due to 
conceptual stretching. 165 From a practical point of view too, collection of data from a large 
universe of cases entailed great costs. At the other extreme were the benefits of a case study,166 
although it had been commonly criticized for its limited value in determining causal 
relationships. Moreover, some scholars often considered area case studies to be unscientific.167 
The comparative method with a limited number of cases was a valuable compromise, using a 
plurality of cases for establishing similarities and differences, for drawing causal inferences .168 
However, its application in disaster research raised important concerns because the domain 
involved the physical, demographic environment and built-up environments,169 and also because 
it was difficult to establish a base template as natural elements differed in characteristics and 
impact.170 
                                                 
164 Phillips (1997). 
165 Sartori (1970) 
166 Eckstein (1975)  
167 Green (2002) 
168 Adler (1983) 
169 Mileti (1999); Vogel (2001) explained that urban locations had greater vulnerability due to population and 
economic growth; Mitchell (1999) found mega cities to be under greater threat due to greater complexities; 
McEntire (1997) noted that development increased vulnerability 
170 Quarantelli, Lagadec and Boin (2006); Bourque et al (2006) 
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The objectives of this study, with concerns for generalizable conclusions and in-depth 
analyses, were best achieved by adopting a research design with limited comparison of states.171 
The comparative method, while less detailed than a case study method, enabled a closer scrutiny 
than a statistical method. Practical concerns of disaster management appeared best addressed 
since it allowed comparison across a limited universe of cases on the same set of variables. It 
enabled researchers to derive cause-effect relationships. Thereby, it also facilitated formulation 
of a common framework for conducting comparative evaluations.  
The adoption of a comparative research design in disaster management also resonated 
with calls for a more widespread usage that were made since early days of the sub-field’s 
development.172 In the past, disasters provided scholars with opportunities for conducting cross-
national and international collaborative research.173 Globalization and international efforts for 
disaster reduction had also increased expectations of growing cross-national research.174 
However, systematic efforts to approach disaster management from a comparative framework 
began late.175 As a survey of disaster research by McEntire and Mathis showed, most of the 
studies had focused on international responses, causes and consequences of disaster agents, or 
about specific subject areas.176 Case studies formed the bulk of empirical scholarly work on 
disasters, event types, and emergency management organizations, although each of them 
                                                 
171 Kohli et al symposium (1996). Katzenstein opined that research direction was determined by nature of problem; 
Drabek (1997) 
172 Rodriguez, Quantarelli and Dynes (2006); Mileti (1999); Tierney, Lindell and Perry (2001); Britton (2006); 
Drabek (1997); McEntire and Mathis training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/docs/EMT/Chapter%20-  
%20Comparative%20Politics%20and%20Disasters.doc- retrieved 8 July 2008. 
173 Dynes (1988); Quarantelli (1997); Britton (2006); Mileti (1983) 
174 Peacock (1997); McEntire and Mathis training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/docs/EMT/Chapter%20- 
%20Comparative%20Politics%20and%20Disasters.doc- retrieved on 8 July 2008 
175 Benjamin McLuckie’s dissertation in Ohio State University was considered to be among the first. Dynes (1988); 
McEntire (2006); Britton (2006) 
176 McEntire (2006). 
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constituted only one case for observation.177 The cases that were explored ranged from a train 
accident in UK, earthquake in China, nuclear accident at Three Mile Island, earthquake in Iran, 
plague in Surat,  Bangladesh’s emergency policies, emergency management in Korea, 9/11 
attacks, Hurricane Katrina, etc.178 Research had “long been dominated by narrow analysis of 
particular cases…”179 Consequently, there had been little learning about the full impact of these 
crises.180 
When compared to the vast literature, applications of the comparative method in disaster 
management were scanty.181The few included sociological studies that examined the phenomena 
of volunteerism, emergent groups and adaptive behavior in different countries.182 The infrequent 
application pointed to problems in undertaking comparative research. Methodological decisions 
in disaster research were seen to be affected by issues of timing, access, generalizability, 
calculation of losses and procedures in collecting data.183 Moreover, methodological problems 
were added due to difficulties with concepts like region, community, society, nation, etc. as these 
were the socio-spatial contexts in which disasters took place.184  
There were possibilities of complications in comparisons due to differences in political 
systems, administrative organizations, levels of economic development, cultural beliefs, and 
historical traditions. All or any of them could significantly influence and impact the manner in 
which disasters were handled. In addition, there were differences in administrative capabilities, 
institutional arrangements and resource endowments, making it difficult to establish a national 
                                                 
177 Mileti (1987); Drabek (1997) 
178 Drabek (1997); Quarantelli (1997), 47; McEntire (2006) listed important case studies; Britton (2006); Khondker 
(1996); Sylves and Waugh (1996), Comfort, Rosenthal and Boin (2001), and Ali Farazmand (2001) volumes 
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template for cross-national comparisons. The assumption of unit stability was threatened when it 
became difficult to maintain a distinction between “primary” and “secondary” attributes.185 A 
cross-national comparative study of disaster management was complicated due to such 
confounding factors. The solution was not in abandoning the method, but in selecting appropriate 
units of analysis, because meaningful comparison was possible between similar cases.186 Once 
this weakness was addressed, these difficulties were surmountable.187 It became possible when 
controls were exercised, enabling a fruitful comparison among states.188  
Importantly, scholars had also recognized the advantages of adopting units of analysis at 
the level of administrative regions.189 Similarities, on counts of culture, political systems, and 
administrative arrangements, enabled the control of confounding factors. Selection of cases was 
better since research could ensure greater unit homogeneity on most common measures.190 At the 
same time, differences among them, in terms of capabilities, experiences, institutional 
frameworks, economic resources and other explanatory factors became suitable for drawing 
causal inferences.  
Early in the development of disaster research, it was recognized that India, besides being 
extremely disaster prone, was a promising area for comparative research.191 However, bulk of 
literature on disaster management in India had also comprised of case studies, as had been noted 
in earlier sections. Hitherto, the nation was the unit of analysis, while examining specific events 
or disaster types.192 There were no attempts to undertake systematic comparative disaster 
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research among states.193 This research aimed at filling the gap. It chose to focus on states and 
the manner in which they made policy interventions that critically determined their capacities. 
The rich and varied experiences of states made it possible to draw significant and 
valuable lessons, by identifying differences and commonalities between them. However, lest 
differences be overly emphasized, the presence of several significant, common factors that 
controlled for variation among states, were noted.194 First, the political system was a major 
unifying feature. The electoral system provided representation to all states in the national 
Parliament. A common institutional bond was reinforced by a political party system that was 
dominated by national actors. Second, the bureaucratic structure in the entire country was 
common to a great extent. There were the constitutionally mandated All-India Civil Services that 
manned the higher rungs of government in all states, and were a common resource for the entire 
country.195 In a case for organizational integration, personnel of these civil services worked in 
the center as well as states, alternating between the two in their careers. Third, to a great extent, 
states shared common, unifying attributes of religion, culture, and the same colonial past. Duly 
recognizing the difficulties of isolating culture as a conceptual category, this research design 
recognized and factored them.196 
Duly considering the objectives and the difficulties, a comparison of states’ capacities 
was found to be appropriate in a study of Indian emergency management. It promised to yield 
meaningful findings based on their differences, while controlling for most idiosyncratic factors. 
First, vulnerabilities of states varied according to geographical location and disaster types, such 
                                                 
193 Kohli (1990) held that given the size, diversity and population of India, it was difficult to generalize at the level 
of nation.  
194 Mitra (2006) listed uniform application of laws of property, fundamental rights, Election Commission, and the 
Supreme Court, as common institutions that enabled comparison between states 
195 Comfort (1999) 
196 Adler (1983); Eglene and Dawes (2006) 
    
39 
 
as floods, cyclones, tsunamis and earthquakes. For example, landslides were more regular in 
mountainous regions whereas coastal states were threatened by cyclones and tsunamis. Second, 
state governments were first responders, and not the federal center or the local governments of 
PRIs. Different states had exhibited varying capacities in dealing with disasters. 
A brief explanation about variation among state capacities emphasized the point. In a 
comparison of three devastating cyclones that struck three states in 1990, 1998 and 1999, fewer 
lives were lost in the first case due to better preparedness.197 In 2003, in a comparison between 
floods in the states of Assam and Bihar, it was seen that the latter lost about seven times more 
lives though its affected population was only fifty percent more and had twice the cropped 
area.198 A massive cyclone hit Andhra Pradesh in 1977 that killed more than 10,000 people and 
led to a far-reaching, capacity building exercise. Consequently, in 1979, 1983, 1987, 1990 and 
1995, there were fewer deaths in that state, despite devastating cyclones.199 However, 
neighboring Orissa took two more decades and a devastating super cyclone in 1999, before 
undertaking comprehensive capacity building. Variation among these states, directly lead to the 
question, why some were more capable.200  
IV. The Dependent Variable and Selection of Cases 
Prior to identifying explanatory factors, it was necessary to conclusively establish 
variation on the dependent variable, notwithstanding difficulties in identifying appropriate 
measures to indicate policy output.201 This research had operationalized the dependent variable 
in terms of states’ compliance of federal policies for capacity building in disaster management. It 
                                                 
197 AIDMI (2005) South Asia Disasters.net. Special Issue12  
198 Government of India (2004a) 
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was found worthwhile to examine if there were any other or better ways to establish a 
comparative template. 
 A common and intuitive approach would have suggested a comparison of losses of life 
and property in different states in the same time period, or in the same disaster. The objective 
seemed achievable by finding the state that suffered lesser damages. However, there were 
difficulties in adopting this seemingly simple and direct measure, as each disaster was unique in 
terms of agent type and the socio-economic characteristics of the impacted place.202 Moreover, 
there was ample scope for confusion because it was not possible to accurately relate casualties to 
disasters, apart from conceptual differences between damages and losses.203 Was it loss of life or 
damage to property that was to be considered a more accurate indicator of the abilities of 
governments? For example, the state of Bihar suffered fewer casualties in floods when compared 
to developed states like Gujarat and Maharashtra. Did it mean that it was doing the job more 
effectively or did it indicate an abject failure as people relied on themselves and not the state? 
There were further questions from these queries. Considering that vulnerable sections like aged 
and underprivileged sections were more at risk, there was no agreement on what constituted 
“disaster-related death, injury or disease”.204  
In terms of impact, it can be logically argued that injuries that disabled a person were 
potentially more damaging than loss of life, for they created additional liability on a continuing 
basis. Economic impact of disasters was another slippery slope. For a poor, landless villager, loss 
of his/her few belongings was more tragic and momentous than greater losses for the more 
resourceful. In addition, there was sizeable scope for ambiguity in computing indirect costs and 
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203 Asian Development Bank, UN and World Bank (2005) defined damages as impact on assets, stock and property 
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204 Bourque et al (2006), 99. 
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secondary effects.205 Finally, accurate aggregation of details required greater resources, thereby 
weakening chances of a wider application. In short, there were serious methodological and 
practical difficulties in using loss of life, and damages to property as a basis for comparison. It 
was a very unstable platform that militated against a uniform basis, as the outcomes were as 
much a function of the disaster agent as a reflection of state capabilities, among other factors. 
 The question of formulating credible, comparative measures was also posed to 
respondents during field research.206 They were asked for their opinion on which state was doing 
better in disaster management. The responses were interesting. One respondent suggested 
examining states’ ability to use resources that were provided by the federal government. The 
central government met the requirements for immediate relief to victims, as well as emergency 
restoration of infrastructure in and connectivity with affected areas, through a Calamity Relief 
Fund (CRF) and National Calamity Contingency Fund (NCCF).207 Some states were unable to 
spend their allocated amounts and failed to get additional resources.208 According to this 
measure, states that had been able to use more of their allotted resources were to be considered 
more effective. However, there were conceptual difficulties in adopting such measure because 
financial devolution was as much a function of disaster assessment as a causal factor in state 
abilities.209 Moreover, there had been allegations of partisan considerations playing a major role 
                                                 
205 Kreimer and Arnold (2000); Mileti (1999) 
206 Interviews of politicians, bureaucrats and other respondents. 
207 Government of India (2004a) 
208 Government of India (2004a), showed that Bihar, Chattisgarh, Manipur and Mizoram had not received their full 
annual allocations under CRF during 2003-2004: Government of India (2006a), showed Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh, 
Goa, Gujarat, Haryana, Jharkhand, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, 
Tripura and Uttar Pradesh had not received their full allocation during 2005-2006  
209 Economically underdeveloped states had lesser abilities to incur expenditure first and later claim reimbursement, 
said a senior bureaucrat. He also complained that allocation criteria under NCCF was opaque and allowed scope for 
partisan considerations. 
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in determining fiscal transfers.210 Lastly, correlating higher percentage of expenditures with 
greater effectiveness did not factor pathologies of implementation, notably corruption and waste.  
 Another respondent equated state competencies in disaster management with their overall 
administrative efficiencies. Apart from the prospect of increasing scope of the study, the 
suggestion did not help in operationalizing the variable. Other proposals included subjective 
appreciation of administrative steps taken in preparation for disasters and quality of response. 
One bureaucratic respondent opined that the speed with which states compiled information about 
damages and submitted it to the federal center was indicative of their system’s capabilities. Apart 
from the fact that documentation was an insufficient indicator of overall system effectiveness, all 
such documents were not in the public domain for authenticating claims. Yet another idea was to 
evaluate whether states had been able to integrate requirements of disaster management into their 
long-term development plans. While it directly addressed mitigation concerns, it was accepted 
that there was no framework to keep track of such developments. During field research it was 
found that none of the states had any mechanism to undertake monitoring of these reform 
measures. Hence, to avoid conceptual difficulties, this research adopted a different basis and 
focused on policy reform for disaster capacity building among states.   
 There was a logical correlation between system capacities and effectiveness outcomes. 
States that had developed greater capacities were in a better position to address disaster concerns. 
Their reform of disaster management policies and creation of capacities was central to effective 
policy outcomes. Hence, a measure of state capacities was seen to be a valid proxy for 
effectiveness. It provided a more robust measure of comparison than any after-the-event 
evaluation of specific measures. It offered a good picture of state abilities to deal with disasters 
                                                 
210 In the US, scholars held that federal disaster declarations and fund allocations were guided by partisan 
considerations. Sylves (1996); Garrett and Sobel (2003) 
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in a generic manner, without losing focus on particular disaster events and types. While it had 
been argued that a conceptual determination of limits of state capacities was difficult,211 it was 
possible to compare them among different states. Unlike comparison between independent 
nations where it could be impossible to determine limits of capacity building, the problem was 
manageable among states.   
The framework for a comparison among states was less complicated and had few 
confounding factors. Moreover, the federal policy had already laid down clear parameters and 
objectives. It included strengthening organizational structures, augmenting financial capabilities, 
improving human resources, building technical competence, enhancing training, and raising 
performance standards.212 It covered creation of disaster management authorities, new statutes, 
changing from a relief orientation to a comprehensive developmental outlook, setting up 
emergency support functions, developing fail-safe communications, and involving the local 
community as well as non-state actors. It was relevant to note that these measures also addressed 
weaknesses that had been identified even by the World Bank.213 
Therefore, a suitable platform for comparing policy reform and capacity building was a 
program that incorporated these aspects. Hence, this research without formulating any new 
measures for the dependent variable, adopted them from the Government of India - United 
Nations Development Program (GOI-UNDP) Disaster Reduction Programme. The program was 
being implemented between 2002-2008, with assistance from United States Agency for 
                                                 
211 Waugh (1999) 
212 The Gazette of India (2005); Government of India (2004b) 
213 World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (2006b) listed ‘Lessons not learned from Bank Disaster Projects’. 
The three most important lessons concerned (a) disaster management, preparedness and mitigation, (b) simple and 
flexible procurement that was fundamental to implementation, and (c) coordination between different units and 
existing agencies.      
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International Development (USAID), and European Union (EU). It was aimed at capacity 
building in seventeen disaster-prone states.214   
Four of the seventeen states in the program were selected for this study. They were Bihar, 
Gujarat, Orissa and Tamil Nadu. These states were not selected randomly, considering the 
appropriateness of purposive sampling in qualitative research.215 It was ensured that states’ 
selection was not a case of selecting on the dependent variable,216 while recognizing a wide 
range on its measures. All the selected states had a population of 35 million and above, an area 
more than 20 million square kilometers, and were considered to be major states.217 First, they 
were in the Northern, Southern, Western and Eastern parts of the country, factoring variation on 
regional grounds by having states from all four corners of India.218 Second they had experienced 
three of the most frequent disasters that had caused the greatest damage to life and property in 
India, cumulatively as well as on a per-event basis.219 The three most frequent types of disasters 
had been floods, cyclones, and earthquakes.220 The selected states had experience of floods and 
cyclones in northern and eastern India, cyclones and tsunami in the south, and earthquakes, 
cyclones and floods in the west. There was wide variation among these states on account of 
factors such as levels of development, record of Panchayati Raj Institutions along with the nature 
of the political party system. It was also important to note that they had different experiences of 
focusing events.   
                                                 
214 Government of India (2007b). The program was initially from 2002 to 2007, but was extended till 2008.  
215 King, Keohane and Verba (1994) noted that random selection may not be possible in qualitative research; 
Stallings (2006) recorded that disaster research mostly used purposive sampling. 
216 King, Keohane and Verba (1994); Geddes 1990  
217 India Today (2006) 
218 One of the considerations of Dreze and Sen (2002). 
219 Tsunamis had a higher per event casualty rate, but EM-DAT data revealed only two occurrences; Asian 
Development Bank/ UN/ World Bank (2005), recorded two tsunamis in the last hundred years, in the years 1945 and 
2004.    
220 World Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (2006a). The three most common disasters that dominated all 
World Bank financing were floods, drought and fire. 
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Operationalizing the dependent variable also necessitated an evaluation of states, in 
absolute terms and relative to each other.  For example, it was once noted that Orissa started its 
reform process way back in 1999, whereas Gujarat undertook the same only in 2001.221 To base 
the comparison on more recent data, this research relied upon progress reports obtained from 
GOI-UNDP program.222 Straightforward results were denied by too many program outputs, and 
inconsistent performances on different measures.223 Moreover, up-to-date physical progress 
reports, till April 2008, were available only for Gujarat and Orissa. The other two, Tamil Nadu 
and Bihar, had provided them till September 2007. No state had performed consistently well or 
uniformly bad in all the measures.  
A reasonably accurate picture was obtained by carefully sifting through different 
measures. Since information was obtained in April 2008, which was also the last year of the 
program, it was reasonable to assume that these reports indicated the final positions of each of 
the states, on a common scale. However, scholars had warned against using only one source of 
information.224 So, for the purpose of establishing the dependent variable, this research also used 
interviews, field observations and anecdotal evidence in support of information available in the 
GOI-UNDP Disaster Reduction Program reports.  
There was wide variation among the states as revealed in the financial and physical 
progress reports of the program. The physical progress report included structural and non-
structural components of the capacity building program, and represented a paradigm shift from a 
relief orientation to disaster risk reduction. It reflected federal priorities that were being 
                                                 
221 Sinha, Anil K. (2001) 
222 Government of India-United Nations Development Program 2002-2007 
http://www.ndmindia.nic.in/EQProjects/goiundp2.0.pdf . Retrieved on 4 July 2008 
223 Data in the GOI-UNDP program was pass word protected and not available in the public domain at      
http://203.124.149.176/drmreport/index.aspx . However, officials involved in the program made it available.   
224 Phillips (1997) suggested triangulation by using documents and other means to establish veracity of information 
obtained in interviews. 
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suggested to states to adopt, and undertake capacity building. The financial performances of 
these states provided a ready basis of comparison of their allocations and expenditures. The 
financial statement of the GOI-UNDP-EU-USAID program till December 2007 provided broad 
indications about relative performances of the selected cases. 
 
Table 2. Financial Statement of GOI-UNDP-USAID-EU Program
225 
 
Program 
State 
Funds  
Allocation 
to State 
Total Funds 
Available 
Actual 
Expenditure 
% 
Expenditu
re 
Latest 
Report  
 US $ INR INR*   
Bihar 3,322,618.00 *** 2 2,010,164.55 36.72 Dec-06 
Gujarat 3,601,200.00 47,027,519.00 5 8,636,154.00 55.49 Dec-07 
Orissa 3,359,318.00 56,071,014.00 3 2,820,807.00 36.92 Sep-07 
T.N. 2,833,664.00 30,175,392.20 3 9,748,167.00 56.85 Dec-07 
Total 13,116,800.00 133,273,925.20 
 
153,215,292.55 
 
  
* Indian Rupee-US Dollar conversion was 43.275 rupees to one dollar as on 3 July 2008 
***Report for Bihar was not current and did not indicate total amount received. However, funds that had been 
transferred to Bihar included $2,155,623.00 for the program and Rs.16, 308,130.59 (INR) for Human Resource 
Development and Equipment.   
 
From the above, few inferences were readily possible, as it was seen that Bihar and 
Orissa were not prompt in submitting progress reports and that Gujarat and Tamil Nadu had been 
able to expend more resources. While it was not conclusive evidence of poor performance, it 
placed an additional onus on them to disprove such inferences. Any meaningful evaluation had 
to be based on other sources of information and the Physical Progress Report.226  
                                                 
225 Data in the GOI-UNDP program was pass word protected and not available in the public domain at      
http://203.124.149.176/drmreport/index.aspx . However, officials involved in the program made it available   
226 Complete report of physical progress placed as Annexure I 
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Table 3. Physical Progress Report of GOI-UNDP-USAID-EU Program
227
 
 
                                                 
227 Data in the GOI-UNDP program was pass word protected and not available in the public domain at      
http://203.124.149.176/drmreport/index.aspx . However, officials involved in the program provided it    
            Output Measure Gujarat Orissa Bihar  Tamil Nadu 
  Total 
up to 
04/08 
%  Total 
up to 
04/08 
% Total 
up to 
09/07 
% Total 
up to 
09/07 
% 
State Disaster Management 
(DM)  Policy, Act, Plan, and 
Authority created 
4 100 3 75 2 50 3 75 
Redesignation of Relief Dept. 
as DM Dept. 
0 0 1 100 0 0 1 100 
Emergency Operation Centers 
 (EOCs) equipped 
1 100 1 100 1 100 1 100 
Relief Code amended for DM 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Building Bye-laws amended 0 0 0 0 1 100 0 0 
Funds available for ongoing 
schemes for mitigation 
1 100 0 0 0 0 1 100 
DM included in civil servants’  
training, schools& universities, 
Engg. and Arch. curricula 
3 75 2 50 3 75 4 100 
DM in Admn. Trg. Institute 1 100 1 100 1 100 1 100 
Master Trainers trained 2645 294 370 123 352 176 236 472 
Manuals and SOPs finalized 54 77 23 100 10 67 8 80 
 
 
 
 
 
S 
T
A
T
E 
 
L
E
V
E
L 
Mass media campaigns 14 - 1 100 1 4 8 80 
          
District DM Committees  
(DDMCs) formed 
14 100 16 100 14 100 6 100 
DDMC members trained 2509 295 446 112 1110 204 478 199 
Other officials trained 5358 367 423 121 1048 150 444 740 
District DM Plans finalized 14 100 16 100 14 100 6 100 
District EOCs equipped 14 100 16 100 14 100 6 100 
Emergency kits distributed 0 0 16 100 0 0 6 100 
PRI members trained in DM 1505 334 662 331 4279 611 165 138 
Architects and engineers  
trained 
543 143 1363 146 1141 172 53 88 
Disaster Resistant Demo 
Units constructed 
18 129 16 100 119 850 6 50 
Mock drills conducted 107 191 28 175 8 9 28 117 
District data entered in IDRN 14 100 16 100 14 100 6 100 
 
 
D 
I 
S 
T
R 
I 
C
T 
 
L
E
V
E
L 
District DM Plans updated 
 by DMCs 
56 100 16 100 9 21 0 0 
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Table 3. (Continued) Physical Progress Report of GOI-UNDP-USAID-EU Program
228 
                                                 
228 Data in the GOI-UNDP program was pass word protected and not available in the public domain at     
http://203.124.149.176/drmreport/index.aspx . However, officials involved in the program provided it    
          
Block DM Committees 
(BDMC) formed 
142 100 155 100 199 99 64 100 
BDMC members trained 8867 416 4466 288 8035 201 2643 206 
Other officials trained 12362 665 1581 102 3008 150 3045 476 
Block DM Plans finalized 142 100 155 100 156 78 56 88 
DM Team (DMT) members 
 trained in First-aid 
5187 346 4971 650 3156 158 1736 271 
Members trained in S & R  3121 111
5 
708 105 2104 105 1736 271 
PRI members trained in DM 9144 183 9459 158 28694 533 5272 275 
Village volunteers trained 
 at Block level 
8440 469 7016 117 16363 82 11919 186 
Masons trained 1284 128 2042 136 5118 49 26 2 
Mock drills conducted 296 208 62 40 69 5 111 58 
 
 
B
L
O
C
K
 
L
E
V
E
L 
Plans updated by BDMCs 380 134 126 81 38 6 30 47 
          
Gram Panchayat DMCs  
(GPDMCs) formed 
0 0 3127 3210 3061 89 8565 327 
GPDMC members trained 0 0 52257 163 51664 76 14943 57 
GPDM Plans finalized 0 0 2816 88 2185 64 2173 83 
DM team members trained 
 in First-aid 
0 0 9870 102 3542 26 627 2 
DM team members trained 
 in Search & Rescue 
0 0 9406 98 3974 29 634 2 
G
P
  
L
E
V
E
L 
Mock Drills conducted 0 0 502 25 545 3 771 15 
          
Village DMCs (VDMCs)  
formed 
11513 102 21542 93 9867 77 5204 153 
VDMC members trained 117155 103 257690 111 149872 117 4842 14 
VDM Plans finalized 10375 91 21107 91 6896 54 4649 137 
Village DMT members  
trained in First-aid 
38404 175 54844 118 8090 31 21653 64 
Members trained in  S & R 28167 141 45325 97 7619 30 18053 53 
Villages with Contingency 
 funds for Emergency response 
32 1 2305 10 1240 10 0 0 
Awareness meetings 14034 17 22574 97 9661 39 2521 74 
Mock Drills conducted 1681 40 4023 17 1586 2 1867 55 
 
V 
I 
L
L
A
G
E 
 
L
E
V
E
L 
Plans Updated by VDMC 
members 
8846 212 6356 32 1193 3 2042 60 
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From a close examination of the above measures, it was apparent that some were more 
important than the numerous items that involved training. Hence, they were separated from the 
rest for more consistent comparisons. The capacity building program was undertaken at different 
tiers of governance, such as the state, district, block, gram panchayat, and village levels. This 
research found it fruitful to stick to the same rubric for comparing the different states.  
At the state level, Gujarat showed overall superiority being the only one that had a 
Disaster Management Policy, formulated a plan, enacted a state-specific legislation, and set up a 
Disaster Mitigation Authority. While the other three had adopted the 2005 federal legislation, 
Gujarat enacted its own Disaster Management Act long before, in 2003. And along with Orissa, 
it had set up the Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (GSDMA), a specialized agency 
for comprehensive disaster management. In the matter of preparing standard operating 
procedures (SOPs) and manuals for different hazards, Gujarat covered more hazards, even 
though it fell behind Tamil Nadu in percentage terms. Importantly, it was the only other state, 
apart from Tamil Nadu, to report that it had financial resources for taking up developmental 
schemes that addressed mitigation needs. But on the other hand, it was one of the two states, 
along with Bihar, which had not redesignated the nodal department as Disaster Management 
department.229 
Orissa had also redesignated Relief Department and finalized all SOPs and manuals in 
percentage terms. Moreover, it was the first state in the county to set up Orissa State Mitigation 
Development Authority (OSDMA) in 1999.230 Specialized agencies were regarded to be 
indicative of greater professionalization in disaster management, as they performed very useful 
                                                 
229 Gujarat officials claimed that their Government’s policy to restrict number of departments prevented the creation 
of a new department for Disaster Management. There was no explanation in Bihar. 
230 Officials in Orissa also informed that they were planning to change its name to Orissa State Disaster Management 
Authority.  
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functions of constant interfacing with hazard inputs and scientific opinions.231 Thereby, it 
seemed to score higher than Tamil Nadu. As far as the issue of funds was concerned, respondents 
revealed during interviews that there was no dearth of resources. Tamil Nadu, though ahead in 
some measures, had not set up a disaster management authority. Moreover, its reporting was not 
accurate since it mentioned having formed such an agency, which was not validated during field 
research.232 Moreover, it was found that main focus in Tamil Nadu was on recovery and 
reconstruction. On the whole, Gujarat appeared to be ahead of the rest at this rung. Orissa was 
next, with a specialized agency for all-phases comprehensive disaster management, followed by 
Tamil Nadu and Bihar.  
At the district level, the picture was mixed. Gujarat and Orissa were ahead with respect to 
updating district level plans, in conducting mock drills, and in distributing emergency kits. Tamil 
Nadu performed poorly in two measures, alongside a similar number from Bihar. Despite 
distributing most percentage of emergency kits, along with Orissa, Tamil Nadu had constructed 
the least number of disaster resistant demonstration units and had updated none of its district 
level plans. It was also a poor third in conducting mock drills. Bihar, apart from constructing the 
highest number of demonstration units, figured at the bottom half in all other measures   
The same performance was repeated by Bihar at the next level, i.e. the Block level. It 
consistently figured at the end, on all non-training measures. Gujarat again figured at the top in 
preparation of plans, updating them and conducting mock drills. Orissa was also ahead of Tamil 
Nadu in finalizing block level plans and updating them. At the Gram Panchayat level, Gujarat 
did not register any progress because it took up village-level capacity building, as it did not 
function at gram panchayat level. Among the rest, the order was the same, with Orissa leading 
                                                 
231 Comfort (1988); Waugh (1996) 
232 “More Powers for Local Bodies Mooted.” The Hindu (Chennai) 29 December 2007. It carried a news item in 
which senior functionaries were reported saying that a State Disaster Management Authority would be formed soon. 
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Tamil Nadu and Bihar. Orissa was ahead in preparing plans and conducting mock drills. Only in 
the matter of forming disaster management committees, Tamil Nadu reported a staggering 
number more than its target, whereas Bihar trailed on all counts. Finally, at the lowest rung of 
villages, it was Tamil Nadu that performed ahead of the rest. It formed more committees, 
finalized more plans, and conducted more mock drills. Orissa was ahead of Gujarat in having 
more sensitization meetings and having more villages with contingency funds for emergency 
response. Bihar again was at the bottom, although it had the highest number of sensitization 
meetings, but with poor performance in all other measures.   
At three levels, state, district and block, it was Gujarat, followed by Orissa, Tamil Nadu 
and Bihar. At the Gram Panchayat level, it was Orissa that led the way, with Tamil Nadu leading 
at village level. Of the different tiers of governance, it needed to be remembered that state and 
district levels were the most important in disaster management. Administration had retained a 
top-down orientation in India with states at the key policy making level and the district being its 
most important implementing echelon. Therefore, states that had enhanced capacities at these 
levels, such as Gujarat and Orissa were considered to have performed better. Thus, on measures 
of most non-training items of the program, the order of performance was Gujarat followed by 
Orissa and Tamil Nadu, with Bihar at the bottom.  
Skill enhancement measures were separated to facilitate comparison. Training, while 
being an important capacity enhancer, was not an accurate indicator without common evaluation 
standards. And in this case, states undertook training without a common or uniform agenda or 
evaluation mechanism. Its efficacy was not clear and it made for a very tenuous measuring rod 
due to non-uniform content, length and quality of instruction. However, for the record, it was 
noted that even in these counts, Gujarat was ahead in most, followed by Tamil Nadu, Orissa and 
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Bihar, in that order. Yet, due to lack of uniformity on a number of counts, progress on these 
measures was not considered.  
The analysis presented above was open to criticism on the grounds that some measures 
had been considered more important than others. To obviate such challenges, it was imperative 
to present more arguments and evidence in support. First, this research recognized capacity 
building at the level of states to be more important since it was noted earlier that that they were 
central to disaster policies. Field research revealed that institutional arrangements of setting up 
disaster management authorities/agencies played a very crucial role in the domain. Gujarat was 
ahead in most parameters, and Orissa appeared to have overtaken Tamil Nadu for second spot. 
The last-referred and Bihar, without a specialized agency for all hazards, appeared handicapped. 
The most important agency dealing with disaster management in Tamil Nadu was the Office for 
Tsunami Relief and Rehabilitation. Its focus was on post-tsunami reconstruction, making it 
overwhelmingly concerned about one hazard, rather than comprehensive capacity building.  
In an earlier section, it was mentioned that this research sought empirical support for 
document-based findings with information obtained from interviews, anecdotal evidence and 
field observations. Hence, interviews were discussed next. There was a mixed response from 
respondents in central ministries, federal agencies and non-governmental agencies at the all-India 
level. Most respondents occupied senior positions in policy making and implementation in 
disaster management. Yet, when asked to make a relative evaluation of these four states, some 
refused due to concerns for political correctness in a federal, democratic polity. Some others 
believed it was not possible. But there were a few, who explained their assessment. In their 
opinion, it was Gujarat leading Orissa, Tamil Nadu and Bihar, with regard to progress in capacity 
building. In the states themselves, there were candid admissions of weaknesses in Bihar and 
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Tamil Nadu. Important political and administrative respondents and volunteers in Bihar admitted 
to serious flaws in implementation of the program. In Tamil Nadu, too, shortcomings of a narrow 
focus as well as lack of community empowerment were admitted.   
A second important source was anecdotal evidence about utilization of capacities in these 
states. During the program period, there were serious emergencies in Surat (Gujarat), Kandhamal 
(Orissa), and Nagapattinam (Tamil Nadu). While it was floods in the first case, communal riots 
in the second, it was the 2004 tsunami in the third. After heavy floods in 2007 in Surat district 
(Gujarat), large parts of the district needed a massive clean up operation for which heavy 
machinery was required. Using the State Disaster Resource Network (SDRN), officials were able 
to obtain required equipment, and rapidly cleared the enormous amount of silt and sludge.233 
Similarly, Kandhamal district (Orissa) was cut off from state headquarters by rioting mobs in 
December 2007.234 However, deployment of a specialized Orissa Disaster Rapid Action Force 
(ODRAF) enabled communication to be restored in a matter of hours, and reinforcements 
reached the affected locations. In contrast, there were places in Nagapattinam (Tamil Nadu) that 
were cut off after the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004. It took three to four days to clear debris and 
restore communications. Local authorities did not use the India Disaster Resource Network 
(IDRN), an electronic database, for locating logistic support.235  
Field observations also provided basis for supporting inferences about relative capacities. 
An important pattern that emerged during field research was that Gujarat had adopted a more 
comprehensive approach, by factoring manmade hazards too. It displayed remarkable sensitivity 
                                                 
233 SDRN was an electronic database maintained by the state. Information gathered from interviews in Gujarat 
revealed that officials were able to locate about 1500 numbers of heavy earthmoving equipment, by accessing the 
SDRN. 
234 Information gathered from interviews in Orissa.   
235 Information gathered from interviews in Tamil Nadu. Officials at field level dealing with disaster management 
admitted unfamiliarity with IDRN. 
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towards terrorism, communal riots and industrial accidents. It had established a state wide 
Disaster Resource network that was made available to all panchayat headquarters through a 
Wide Area Network. The disaster management agency in Orissa also showed greater sensitivity 
towards different disasters, including industrial dangers and other manmade hazards. It had set 
up the ODRAF, on the lines of a specialized federal force to deal with disaster rescue and relief. 
The ODRAF was a very valuable resource that proved its utility in different disaster situations, 
of natural and human causation. On the other hand, Tamil Nadu appeared to be limited by its 
focus on tsunamis, for most part, and cyclones to some extent. Bihar was the weakest, with 
neither structural nor non-structural capacities for an all-hazards disaster management.                   
Bihar, yet, was first only in terms of construction of disaster resistant demonstration 
units. However, ground level interaction with masons and villagers revealed a greater awareness 
and adoption of seismic resistant techniques in Gujarat, especially in the district of Kutch. 
Gujarat had also undertaken innovative measures such as home insurance and micro zoning, 
apart from retrofitting public buildings on a massive scale. For the record, Tamil Nadu also 
utilized insurance as a policy tool in post-tsunami construction.236 In conclusion, on the basis of 
progress report of the GOI-UNDP program, information supplied by respondents, opinions 
formed during field research and anecdotal evidence, the capacities of the states, more to less, 
were in the order of Gujarat, Orissa, Tamil Nadu and Bihar.   
Having established the dependent variable, the next couple of chapters examined its 
variation in terms of explanatory factors. In an earlier chapter, the role of economic resources,237 
                                                 
236 Interview with senior officials in Tamil Nadu  
237 Lester et al (1983); Williams and Matheny (1984); World Bank (1997); Vogel (2001); Albala-Bertrand (2006); 
Mileti (1983); McEntire (1997); McEntire and Mathis training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/docs/EMT/Chapter%20-    
%20Comparative%20Politics%20and%20Disasters.doc retrieved 8 July 2008 
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organizational learning from focusing events,238 institutional development in the form of 
decentralized organizations,239 and rational choice explanations based on the nature of the 
political party system240 were noted as important variables. They were used to examine why 
some states invested in building robust organizations, and were able to establish better 
procedures and policies that lead to greater capacities.241  
V. Data Collection Methods 
 Information was obtained mostly from reports of government, agencies set up by 
government, and UNDP reports. Material from other sources such as national and international 
agencies such as National Institute of Disaster Management (NIDM), National Disaster 
Management Authority (NDMA), All India Disaster Management Institute (AIDMI), USAID, 
International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR), Action Aid and others had also been used 
where available. The public domain contained reliable information on economic development of 
these states. Similarly, data provided governments and available with other sources described the 
extent of democratic decentralization in different states. Reports of the Election Commission of 
India were used to explain party fragmentation in these states. Feedback on experience of 
focusing events was based on documentary evidence and on interpersonal communication. Being 
a qualitative study, it relied heavily on interviews242 and questionnaires. Direct interaction with 
political leaders and bureaucrats at federal, provincial, and local levels provided important 
                                                 
238 Nice and Grosse (2001) 
239 Lester et al (1983); March and Olsen (1984); Green (2002); World Bank (1997); Farazmand (2001); Sapat 
(2001); May (1997) 
240 Geddes (1994); Lester et al (1983)  
241 Literature noted several attempts to identify causal factors. Farazmand (2001) mentioned knowledge, leadership, 
commitment and creativity; Sapat (2001) in a comparative study of American states, identified problem severity, 
capacity of officials, interest groups and elite commitment; Schroeder (2001) noted leadership 
242 Interviews had always been used. Robert Dahl (1961) admitted to having received very important information 
through interviews; Stallings (1997) noted that the survey method was common in disaster research. In a later work 
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information about perceptions and causal linkages. A total of one hundred and seventy nine 
respondents took part in the interviews in the national capital and the states. Their responses 
provided a “coherent account of causality” to delineate causal processes.243 These subjective 
perceptions proved useful in explaining the correlation between the dependent and explanatory 
variables. They supplemented written material and also provided insights into causal 
mechanisms.  
Disaster research literature had noted that there couldn’t be a truly random selection 
process, especially in the choice of cases. It was also true of selection of districts, blocks as well 
as respondents. In this research, local level leaders and government employees were interviewed 
at village and block levels in four districts in each of the states. At the district level too, 
responses were similarly obtained. And the process was repeated at state and federal levels. On 
the whole, the range of respondents covered the different stakeholders in the domain. They 
included policy making politicians, government employees involved in policy making as well as 
implementation at various levels, locally elected politicians and community leaders as well 
members of non-governmental agencies. Care was taken to interact with politicians of different 
parties at state and local levels. Similarly, non-governmental agencies included those that were 
favorably disposed towards government as well as those that were not. All reasonable and 
prudent steps were taken for obtaining reliable and credible information that explained the 
relationships between the variables. 
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Chapter 3: Democratic Decentralized Institutions and Disaster Management  
 Over the past few decades, democratic decentralization had become an important agenda 
for international bodies and the academic world.244 Studies had examined its relationship with 
governance. Role of local, self-governing, decentralized institutions was considered a significant 
factor, with consequences for the delivery of public goods. The subject’s growing scholarship 
had created scope for its application in the disaster domain. It was theoretically opportune to 
examine democratic decentralization for its role in policy outcomes. Methodologically, 
decentralized institutions were a stable platform for comparison of impact on governance 
reforms in the domain.  
 A well known adage was that “all disasters are local”. It was also commonly believed that 
‘first-responders’ had an important role in dealing with them.245 Hence, this chapter examined 
whether greater decentralization, in terms of functions, financial resources and trained 
functionaries created capacities and flexibility to deal with disasters more effectively. The 
proposition that was tested was whether local, self-governing, decentralized levels of 
government had a significant and systematic impact on the effectiveness of policy outcomes in 
Indian disaster management.  
 In federal India, democratically decentralized bodies were called Panchayati Raj 
Institutions (PRIs), and were situated below the level of provinces. This research considered 
them as decentralized institutions rather than states, since the latter were well established levels 
of governance, and since they were already the basic unit of analysis in the dependent variable. It 
was hypothesized that local governance institution had inherent strengths arising from 
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information, resources and accountability, which enabled them to make significant and critical 
provision of public goods in this domain. The evidence showed that PRIs played a signal role in 
outcomes, to the extent that they were involved. They enhanced overall capacities in the state, by 
adding local resources that were brought to the table. PRI leaders were not only proud to mention 
the extent of their involvement but also exuded confidence at discharging higher responsibilities. 
Second, greater decentralization also translated, partly, into greater responsibilities and in 
disaster management, making it easier to infer a relationship of accountability. A third notable 
aspect was a broad correlation between measures of decentralization and the dependent variable, 
with more decentralized states performing better. To the extent that they did discharge such 
roles, the results were superior. However, decentralization was controlled and limited. 
Consequently, these institutions displayed little autonomy or initiative and preferred to act on 
state directives. Hence, it was concluded that there was no evidence of a positive impact on 
disaster management outcomes because their capacities and role were severely limited. Local 
self-governments in India had a very circumscribed role and their independent contribution in 
disaster management proved insignificant to overall capabilities. While the possibilities of a 
positive relationship were not denied, information obtained in the field provided no conclusive 
evidence.   
  The plan of this chapter is thus. The first section reviews literature on democratic 
decentralization and its impact on delivery of public goods, before studying its role in disaster 
management. In general, despite mixed opinion on its efficacy in delivery of public goods, 
literature on disaster management had been more positive about their relationship. Before testing 
the hypothesis, it was imperative to know the Indian local self-government system, known as 
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Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs).246 Hence, the second section briefly discusses statutory 
provisions in their evolution as well as key developments in selected states. Thereafter, the third 
part deals with variation on measures of democratic decentralization, among selected states. The 
fourth section evaluates evidence obtained in field research. The last segment analyses the 
findings and examines whether any cause-and-effect relationship exists, in an effort at process 
tracing.247   
I. Decentralization and Public Goods in Disaster Management 
 In academic and practitioner domains, there had been a visible trend to explore the 
relationship between decentralization and good governance. Multilateral bodies like the World 
Bank or international aid agencies, such as USAID for example, advocated greater adoption of 
decentralization.248 The former was seen as an answer to the many ills that characterized 
centralized administration as well as bureaucratization, apart from serving the causes of equity 
and efficiency.249 However, results were not unequivocal about consequences. There had been 
mixed results about a positive correlation between decentralization and economic growth,250 and 
it was noted that democratization or decentralization per se, did not lead to economic 
development or equitable distribution of resources.251 
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 Decentralization was a broad overarching concept that covered many important 
perspectives.252 Its recent theoretical lineage could be traced to Dahl and his postulates on 
pluralistic participation.253 It was seen as an alternative to top-down governance, and a better 
option than bureaucratic reform.254 Its strong point was accountability, especially in light of 
bureaucratic behavior that seemed impervious to it.255 However, definitions of democratic 
decentralization had been a matter of concern and many avoided the issue by focusing on its 
major features. A working definition of the concept would be a transfer of authority to lower 
levels of governance within a nation. The direction of change was both vertical and horizontal, 
downwards as well as outwards, with the locus being the federal center and/or the states. 
Decentralization has been discussed largely in the context of a unitary state, with authority being 
transferred to levels below the central government. However, federal polities had also adopted 
this framework, as in the case of India and the United States, where decentralization took place 
below the level of provinces.  
  Primarily, scholars had dealt with forms of decentralization, reasons for transfer of 
functions, and their impact.256 It was seen that there were numerous forms, from devolving 
political authority to a lower level in unitary governments, to transferring it below provincial 
levels in federal countries. Different philosophical and theoretical questions cropped up, as 
scholars tried to bring coherence to the wide range of transfers. For example, some approached it 
with a view to locate its primary objective and described it in terms of spatial, political, market 
and administrative decentralization.257 Others classified them as deconcentration of functions, 
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delegation of authority, devolution of power and resources, and transfer of functions, and as 
deconcentration or administrative decentralization, financial devolution or fiscal decentralization, 
and local self-government or democratic decentralization.258 
   From the literature on the subject, this research chose the categories of political, fiscal 
and administrative decentralization.259 The distinguishing characteristic of political 
decentralization was that local representatives were elected. The fiscal dimensions of 
decentralization themselves covered a wide range and included transfer of expenditure powers, 
assignment of taxes, intergovernmental fiscal transfers, and budgeting and monitoring 
mechanisms for fiscal flows.260 Literature had noted gains in efficiency and equity in the process 
of fiscal decentralization.261 Administrative decentralization, on the other hand, included 
deconcentration, delegation or devolution. There was, however, considerable overlap that 
defeated attempts at pigeonholing all of them into exclusive, watertight classifications. Mere 
political decentralization without the other two was a limited and weakened system since the 
higher level usually claimed better sources of revenue.262 Administrative decentralization placed 
a question mark on the factor of accountability if implemented alone. On the other hand, fiscal 
decentralization alone was not feasible, since it appeared to amount to patronage. The 
interconnections between the three forms were clear when there were calls for making 
decentralization more effective, by proper sequencing of the three.263   
 Advocates of democratic decentralization listed several advantages. The discussion was 
mostly centered, although not limited to, greater effectiveness due to better information, more 
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accountability, and greater pressure to perform. On the other hand, detractors pointed out that 
these institutions were vulnerable to elite capture, unhealthy competitiveness, corruption and 
fissiparous tendencies.264 A fundamental assumption in all these arguments was that elected 
representatives were in a position to control the bureaucracy and determine its output. Concerns 
of implementation had been subsumed to the political leadership’s ability to frame policy and 
achieve better results.  
It had been said that greater information channels provided accurate and speedier 
information about resources for an appropriate match with problems or requirements.265 In its 
absence, central allocations, unaware of local specificities, faced the possibilities of incurring 
expenditure on inapplicable and ineligible segments.266 Tiebout in a pioneering work laid the 
scholarly foundation for fiscal decentralization. He held that full mobility of local voters ensured 
that local resources were used in a manner that best matched local preferences.267 Oates 
developed it further by explaining that uniformity imposed heavy costs, especially if there was 
great heterogeneity among communities and regions.268 Decentralization was likely to make 
better use of resources since planning was done at grassroots with full knowledge of field 
conditions.269 It was proposed that since people moved to locations that had their ideal 
government, there was likelihood of competition among local governments to offer appropriate 
public policies to attract capital and labor.270  
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The role of community in governance, more so in disaster management, was clearly 
recognized,271 and local governments were seen as appropriate platforms to build relationships 
with it. Consequently, grassroots planning was able to factor local resources in a better manner. 
However, there was a structural bias in democratic decentralization, with emphasis on 
institutional design and technical capacity of its administration, and not as much on its 
relationship with its constituents,272 thus leaving scope for Community Based Organizations 
(CBOs). Importantly, building partnerships with local agencies was a major part of agenda of 
IDNDR.273 The other significant advantage of decentralization was the proximity of elected 
representatives to constituents, and greater information about them, which was seen to increase 
accountability.274 Elected representatives and their constituents lived in the same area, and made 
it easier for the latter to pressure the former for better services. Finally, it was also opined that in 
all cases where constituents had greater interest in local issues and elections, decentralization 
exhibited a positive correlation with delivery of public goods.275  
At the same time, literature also sounded a warning against regarding decentralization as 
an unmitigated blessing, as results were mixed.276 As found in empirical studies, its success was 
predicated on a number of factors.277 It was observed that it could also lead to detioration of 
public goods delivery. There was a great danger of these bodies being captured by local elites 
and powerful sections of society.278 However, it was also held that there was no basis for 
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generalizations on capture by local elites, in all circumstances.279 Democratic decentralization 
was also heavily dependent upon the availability of trained personnel.280 Corruption was another 
major concern. Due to capture by local powerful forces, and insufficient and ineffective 
oversight mechanisms, there was a strong possibility of increased corruption. Some studies found 
a greater correlation with corruption in a federal arrangement.281 However, some empirical 
studies noted a negative correlation between corruption and decentralization.282 In the context of 
India, field level perceptions revealed that greater awareness of state responsibilities was a 
dampener to bribe-seeking behavior.283  
Decentralized institutions did not appear to provide any assurance of optimal outcomes. It 
was observed that fiscal transfers were determined by political considerations to a great extent.284 
On the other hand, utilization of transferred funds by local bodies was not without problems. 
Local bodies displayed a tendency for irresponsible, fiscal behavior since they knew that higher 
levels of government were most likely to bail them out.285 It was also widely noted that when 
local governments depended excessively on financial transfers from higher levels of government, 
there was erosion of local accountability, especially in developing countries.286 Another 
unfortunate consequence was a reluctance of local leaders to take necessary, but unpopular, 
decisions such as levying taxes to raise resources.287 Local bodies preferred to depend on fiscal 
transfers rather than exercise their powers of taxation. Consequently, it limited their ability to 
                                                 
279 Bardhan and Mookherjee (1999) 
280 Cohen and Peterson (1999)  
281 Treisman (2000) 
282 Fisman and Gatti (2002) 
283 Widmalm (2005) 
284 Khemani (2004). It was noted that higher tiers of government had more and better sources of revenue. Hankla 
(2007); Mishra (1987) noted a total inadequacy of funds at local levels in India 
285 De Mello (2000); Khemani (2004) 
286 Khemani (2004) 
287 Mitchison (2003) in a study of Uganda, noted the narrow tax base of local institutions and the difficulties they 
faced in meeting costs of programs 
    
65 
 
make credible promises or challenges during elections.  Further, in relation to provision of a 
broad range of social services, there were problems in making electoral promises of specific and 
achievable goals.288 These findings were of concern to disaster research due to their impact on 
policy outcomes.  
 In the domain of disaster management, conventional wisdom held local institutions to be 
significant factors. The oft-repeated ‘all disasters are local’ outlook explained it. First responders 
were fire, medical and police officials around the world. Even in developing countries like India, 
it was police and other officials, who were first responders, although they did not work for the 
local bodies.289 The aim of emergency management was to take appropriate steps to prevent loss 
of life and property and to provide for basic human needs during a disaster.290 Consequently, 
there was a heavy cost to pay in case of failure to act properly, as well as reward in case of a job 
well done.291 Local governments and officials had important responsibilities in disaster 
management, and were often vested with legal authority or political responsibility.292 As a result, 
there were political costs with serious electoral repercussions.293 It was also held that 
effectiveness of DM depended on community demands.294  
It was also noted that poor information dissemination lead to local officials becoming 
aware of imperatives of central plans and policies on disaster management, but without knowing 
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the underlying rationale.295 An immediate reason for local officials’ reluctance may be due to 
different priorities coupled with scant resources at their levels.296 Moreover, disaster 
management policies involved taking unpleasant and unpopular decisions. Whether it was 
implementing re-zoning, introducing new building codes, or changing lifestyles, disaster 
management imposed restrictions on behavior and choices. However, despite the many 
weaknesses, there was recognition of their strengths and local bodies were seen acquiring greater 
capacities for tackling disasters.297 
II. Democratic Decentralization in India 
 Early studies in India had observed a strong need for local self-government because of 
failure of centralized planning and absence of public participation.298 It was a considered to be a 
remedy against weaknesses in central plans, with local governments being able to perform more 
efficiently and with greater economy.299 Yet, local self-governments, known as Panchayati Raj 
Institutions (PRIs), lacked a constitutional mandate till 1992. Local self-government in India was 
a three-tier structure below the states, with Gram Panchayat (village panchayat) at the lowest 
level, Block Panchayat at the intermediate, and Zila Parishad at the district levels.300  
The lowest unit of decentralization was the Gram Panchayat (GP). The population of a 
notified panchayat was about 2400 in two to three villages. It had executive and deliberative 
powers.301 The elected head of this body was called Sarpanch.302 Ward members or “panch”es 
were the others elected at this level. The Gram Sabha (village body) was the general body of all 
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adult citizens of the GP. There was wide variation in the role and responsibilities of the Gram 
Sabha, with some states assigning the responsibilities of approving budgets and the beneficiaries 
of targeted programs, and other states providing them with only oversight powers. 
At the intermediate level, a group of Gram Panchayats (GPs) were organized into a 
Panchayat Samiti (PS).303 There was great variation at this level. While some states had 
organized it to be coterminous with a Community Development Block (CDP), others constituted 
it differently. It was headed by the Block President, also called Pramukh in some states. The 
Panchayat Samiti comprised of directly elected members as well as sarpanches who were ex-
officio members. Thereafter, a group of Block Panchayats formed the Zila Parishad (ZP), which 
was coterminous with a territorial district. The latter, as noted earlier, was the highest level of 
field administration of a state. The ZP chairman or president, as he/she was called in different 
states, headed this body which also had directly elected members. Election processes to these 
three tiers of local self-government were not uniform in the states, with a mix of direct and 
indirect elections at intermediate and top levels.  
  Initially, democratic decentralization was mentioned only as a normative goal of the 
Indian democratic state. Consequently, it was left to states to decide the powers and functions 
that were to be devolved to PRIs. Therefore, while some states actively encouraged democratic 
decentralization, a majority of them paid lip service. Some states like Karnataka, West Bengal, 
Andhra Pradesh and Kerala had devolved more than the rest.304 This changed in 1992-93. The 
73rd and 74th amendments to the Indian constitution identified twenty nine subjects that were to 
be transferred to decentralized self-government institutions. As the Minister of Panchayati Raj 
explained, these amendments laid down the law for the entire country in the matter of  
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• “Constitution of panchayats at the three levels of ‘village’, ‘intermediate’ and 
‘district’ (except that the intermediate level may be dispensed with, in States with a 
population of under 20 lakhs); 
• Regular five-year elections to these Panchayats, with elections within six months if a 
Panchayat is dissolved for any reason whatsoever;  
• Stipulated reservations for women and historically disadvantaged sections of society 
such as Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, including SC/ST women (and an 
enabling provision for reservations in favour of the Other Backwards Classes);  
• Constitution of District Planning Committees (DPCs) through the election of at least 
four-fifths of the members by, from and amongst the elected members of the district 
Panchayat and the Municipalities in each district. The DPC is required to 
‘consolidate’ the development plans prepared at each of the three levels of 
Panchayats and the Municipalities within the district into a ‘draft district 
development plan’ which is then to be forwarded to the state government. The 
remaining one-fifth of the DPC members are to be nominated by the state and could 
include Members of Parliament (MPs), Members of Legislative Assemblies (MLAs) 
as well as civil society experts who could assist in the planning process with their 
technical expertise.”305 
The constitutional amendments created an imperative for all states to implement 
decentralization. The federal ministry of Panchayati Raj undertook an “activity mapping” 
exercise to keep track of steps taken in different states in compliance.306 Transfer of financial 
sources was seen as critical for success and so the amendment mandated establishment of State 
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Finance Commissions (SFC), for recommending fiscal transfers. The SFCs were expected to 
propose the mechanism for providing financial resources to the PRIs. However, the State 
Legislature had discretion to accept, reject or modify its recommendations.307 The federal policy 
also urged the transfer of functionaries and powers to the local bodies.308 
III. Decentralization among States   
 In the pre-73rd amendment period, when it was left to states’ discretion, there was great 
variation in their policies concerning local self-government. The constitutional amendments were 
supposed to change that, albeit with a modicum of discretion still remaining. Yet as the record 
showed, uneven progress was noted even thereafter.309 Crucial to this study was recognition of 
differences in terms of devolved functions, finances and functionaries. They indicated the extent 
to which states had decentralized.  
 The important measures for evaluating decentralization had been regular conduct of 
elections, devolution of functions, finances, and functionaries. A great deal of emphasis had been 
placed by this research, on a decennial review of PRIs that was undertaken by the Institute of 
Social Studies in New Delhi. The last study was completed in 2000.310 Although dated, it gave a 
fairly good picture, although there was no specific relative evaluation of states. On the basis of 
information about the selected states, there was consensus that Gujarat was the most, and Bihar 
the least decentralized among them. Tamil Nadu and Orissa figured between the two, and there 
was reasonable evidence that the former was more decentralized. 
                                                 
307 Mathew (2000)  
308 Government of India (2006b) 
309 World Bank (2000) 
310 Mathew (2000) 
    
70 
 
 Gujarat was the only one to have held regular elections to PRIs, without any interruption. 
They were postponed only for two years in 1975 and 1986.311 Equally important, these bodies 
were rarely superceded, and the few times it happened were due to procedural failures.312 Gujarat 
exemplified a high sense of responsiveness towards these institutions by amending the Panchayat 
Act forty five times, in response to local requirements and demands. It was reportedly taking 
steps to transferring the twenty-nine subjects to PRIs, with most development programmes 
already being implemented through them.313  
 PRIs in Gujarat had traditionally received far greater revenues than in other states. In the 
pre-1992 period, it was reported that the state had transferred about 25% of its revenues to 
various panchayats institutions and in 1977-78, their per capita income was Rs. 9.0 (nine 
rupees).314 The comparable amounts in other states were, for example, Re. 0.78 in Uttar Pradesh 
and Re.1.25 in Orissa. It was, nevertheless, evident that few PRIs in Gujarat were interested in 
raising their own revenues through taxes and fees, and were reluctant to exercise their powers. 
Therefore, it was estimated that about 98% of funds were transferred by higher tiers, and PRIs 
raised only 2% from their own sources. The total amount of funds transferred to PRIs was 
Rs.4328 crores in 2007-08, and was Rs.5239 crores was proposed for 2008-09.315 
 Moreover, it was also observed that PRIs were, more or less, functioning as agencies of 
the state, instead of being autonomous institutions that determined priorities and policies in their 
subject areas.316 Within the three tiers of PRIs, it was also found that village panchayats did not 
enjoy good administrative support, though they had many responsibilities and the authority to 
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levy taxes and fees as well. Moreover, unlike in Tamil Nadu and Orissa, the Gram Sabha in 
Gujarat did not have the power to approve the budget, although it was expected to meet twice a 
year. Therefore, despite the relative success of Gujarat in decentralization, its PRIs did not 
function as autonomous agencies of governance.  
Tamil Nadu has had a long history of local self-government. It was considered to be one 
of the best decentralized states, despite irregular local elections.317 The state’s 1994 Panchayati 
Raj Act envisaged a major role for Gram Sabha.318 It approved budget proposals and annual 
plans, apart from selection of beneficiaries of government schemes. Part time clerks were 
appointed to assist in their administration. At the intermediate level, Panchayat Unions (PUs), as 
Block Panchayats were called, had greater responsibilities. The District Panchayat (DP) at the 
top, monitored the tiers below. On the matter of finances, the first State Finance Commission in 
Tamil Nadu submitted its report in November 1996. In terms of actual disbursements, each DP 
was allocated ten million rupees, and PUs and GPs were given one million rupees and a total of 
seven hundred million rupees, respectively. It was also decided to allocate 8% of total tax 
revenue to local bodies, increasing their allocation from Rs. 646 crores to Rs. 1174 crores. 319 
Orissa had a mixed record in democratic decentralization. In the post-1993 era, the Gram 
Sabha was entrusted with more powers.320 It was convened twice a year and decided on local 
programs.321Importantly, it had the power to identify beneficiaries of targeted programs as well 
as approve the annual budget of the GP. At the intermediate level, the Block Panchayat was 
responsible for development programs, as well as primary education, although it had no 
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administrative power over teachers. The ZP, which was the highest body in local administration, 
oversaw activities in public health, education, social welfare, civil supplies and others.322  
Notwithstanding the sizeable role and powers of these local institutions in Orissa, they 
were under the control of state government and its officials.323 Elected representatives could be 
removed by government functionaries. Significantly, it was not the electors who decided but 
administrative echelons of state government. Similarly, there are other provisions that allowed 
government to control and supersede GPs, Block Panchayats and Zila Parishads (ZPs). Despite 
expanding the role of these local bodies, they did not enjoy meaningful control over officials. It 
was not any better in the matter of financial devolutions. The first State Finance Commission of 
Orissa submitted its report in 1998, recommending a sizeable increase in allocations to local 
bodies. A number of the recommendations were accepted and implemented.324 Yet, fiscal 
transfers to PRIs were much lower, in comparison to Gujarat and Tamil Nadu.  
At the bottom of the decentralization scale, among the four selected cases, Bihar always 
had a poor record of Panchayati Raj from before the 1993 constitutional amendments. Elections 
were not held regularly, and there was poor participation by non-officials.325 It was noted that 
these bodies did not have adequate finances, nor were they effective. It was also opined that there 
was no effective and clear division of responsibilities between state and the panchayat 
institutions. While development functions were transferred to some extent, PRI s did not enjoy 
freedom or discretion to decide on priorities or policies. Grass roots planning never took root 
because decentralized planning was decided by the District Planning and Development Council 
that was headed by a state minister. 
                                                 
322 Jena (2000) 
323 Government of Orissa (1994). Chapter IV of the Orissa Zila Parishad Act   
324 Government of Orissa letter no. 20342 dated 13 May 2008, to the author 
325 Sinha, K.K. (2000) 
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 After the 1993 constitutional amendments, Bihar amended its PRI statutes. One result 
was strengthening the institution of Gram Sabha which was endowed with more powers to 
monitor GP activities. However, unlike in Tamil Nadu and Orissa, it did not have any authority 
to approve, and could only ‘consider’ budgets, accounts, audit reports, vigilance reports and all 
program related activities.326 As far as functional devolution was concerned, the Bihar Act 
assigned thirty one functions to GPs, twenty seven to Panchayat Samitis and twenty four to Zila 
Parishads.327 Yet, the state retained concurrent power and weakened the devolution. It was felt, 
even in 2000, that there was no clear division of powers between state government and local 
bodies. The state further eroded the authority of these bodies, by retaining wide powers for 
removal of popularly elected leaders, or in matters of superintendence of PRIs. In the matter of 
functionaries too, PRIs did not have control over its personnel, such as the Panchayat Sevak 
(village assistant), who was secretary of gram panchayat, the Block Development Officer, who 
was the executive officer of the Block Panchayat, or the more senior chief executive officer of 
Zila Parishad. 
On count of financial resources too, Bihar’s post-amendment record was not satisfactory. 
As in other states, its PRIs rarely used their powers to levy taxes, which included holding tax and 
profession tax. Their main sources of income were intergovernmental transfers. The state was 
not prompt in constituting the State Finance Commissions too. Worse, the PRIs lost a 
considerable sum of money, at the rate of Rs 100 per capita, amounting to Rs 5000 millions 
($125 mn. appx.), due to procedural and legal tangles.328 The state government did not transfer 
                                                 
326 Government of Bihar. Section 7 of the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006.  
327 Government of Bihar. (2007a). Note on State of Panchayats referred to sections 22, 47 and 73 of the Act; 
Government of India (2006b) noted devolution of only 25 subjects 
328 Sinha, K.K. (2000) 
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any state funds to PRIs, but conveyed those received from the federal government.329 PRIs in 
Bihar had lesser funds than most other states, and were also handicapped in terms of transfer of 
powers and functionaries. The record showed that their role was limited and that they were 
subject to intense control by the state. 
IV. PRIs and Disaster Management in India 
 Field research was aimed at examining the relationship between democratic 
decentralization and disaster management outcomes. It was hypothesized that decentralization 
played a significant role in positively impacting administrative outcomes in the domain. It was 
expected to be a significant predictor of disaster capacities. Interviews were predicted to report 
that strong and robust local self-governing bodies with greater functional, financial and 
personnel resources, would lead to superior consequences in disaster administration. 
 The overwhelming majority of the one hundred and seventy nine respondents were in two 
categories, based on the nature of their occupation at four levels, which depended on the location 
of their position in the governance hierarchy. The two types of respondents were political 
functionaries and civil servants. The political respondents were elected functionaries of PRIs and 
the state legislature. The different levels at which the respondents were situated were the gram 
panchayat, development block, district, and the state. A few persons at the federal level and some 
members of non-governmental organizations as well as international agencies were also 
interviewed. Among all of them, members of the state legislature were central to policy making 
at the state level since disaster management was a state responsibility. Official respondents at 
state, district and block levels were directly involved in working along with PRIs.  
 They were asked to respond to basically two questions. First, they were asked if PRIs had 
played any role in disaster management in the past. This question was included to gauge the 
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extent of involvement, and recognized the wide variety of tasks that were involved in disaster 
management. Respondents were expected to identify the responsibilities shouldered by PRIs in 
disaster management. It was also expected that greater decentralization had a positive 
relationship between responsibilities and outcomes. States which ranked higher on 
decentralization scores were expected to shoulder greater responsibilities and also to discharge 
them better. Since theory postulated a positive correlation with disaster management, it was 
expected to provide causal linkages with superior policy outcomes, which was the intent of the 
next question. The second query was more subjective and respondents were requested to explain 
whether PRI involvement improved the situation and made it qualitatively better than when the 
state took on the responsibility. Apart from explaining causal linkages, a response of greater 
confidence in their abilities, was expected to provide supporting evidence. It was presumed that 
states which had robust local institutions would report better outcomes as they were better 
positioned to explain the issues.  
Bihar 
Findings in this state were, apparently, as per expectations. The Gram Panchayats were 
associated with disaster management in a very limited manner in this state. Second, there was 
only limited involvement of the PRIs in disaster management. They did not enjoy any autonomy 
in decision making and functioned as executing agencies and wings of state government. Third, 
notwithstanding their limited involvement, most of the respondents, except those at state level, 
were emphatic about the utility of PRI’s role.  
 All the respondents accepted a role for PRIs in disaster management, although there were 
some differences about the extent of involvement. They were made responsible for monitoring 
and distributing relief. There was no doubt that PRIs were not independent and autonomous in 
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decision making, and respondents made it clear that they were working on behalf of the state, 
and in accordance with its directives. In addition, they were also associated, for the first time in 
2007, in estimation of damages to houses and identification of beneficiaries for compensation. 
This responsibility was entrusted only recently. 
 There were a few elected respondents who reported a greater role in providing inputs to 
development and disaster planning. This seemed an unlikely view, apart from one that was 
shared only by a miniscule, in which their response appeared to have been exaggerated. It 
seemed to be based on the role of PRIs in preparation of Community Based Disaster 
Management Plans (CBDMPs), under the GOI-UNDP program. While preparing these plans, 
most of the respondents accepted that PRIs were acting on directions from the state officials. 
Importantly, perceptions of senior functionaries at state level were revealing. They believed that 
there was no autonomous role of PRIs in disaster management. Preparation of plans was firmly 
controlled by official machinery and was processed by state-appointed voluntary agencies. 
 Despite their limited involvement and lack of autonomy, the respondents had tremendous 
confidence in PRI capabilities in disaster management. A rare minority brought up the issue of 
widespread corruption leading to poor outcomes. Only one official respondent believed that they 
were not effective because of political animosities and differences. Even in a severely 
circumscribed sphere of activities, the overwhelming majority reported superior outcomes. This 
included both official and non-official functionaries, except at state level. Echoing the literature, 
a majority of them asserted that PRIs were more capable because of superior local knowledge 
about problems and resources. Greater vigilance, proximity to the scene of action and awareness 
of needs of people, made them more effective, surmised one district official. Elaborating further, 
a couple of them believed that they were effective in disaster management because they had 
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greater experience, on an annual basis, unlike civil servants in transferable jobs. Another local 
leader agreed that public goods delivery was predicated on calculations of political reward and 
loss. A significant number said that they could do better, but for excessive control and 
supervision of government officials, and inadequate funds.  
 A special mention was made of the responses of state level respondents, both political 
and bureaucratic. They were totally dismissive about the PRI role in disaster management. They 
held corruption among PRI leaders to be a major issue that impacted effectiveness of local 
bodies. PRIs were thought to be incapable as well as lacking responsiveness. One legislator 
believed that rules about constituency demarcation and allocation eroded accountability.330 
Factors like insufficient experience, lack of awareness about their potential and capabilities, 
along with rigid governmental procedures were said to be the reasons for incapacitated local 
bodies in disaster management. At another level, these responses appeared to be justifications 
against decentralization. Such rationale would have been in accordance with literature which 
believed that state level politicians and bureaucrats were extremely reluctant to surrender power 
to decentralized institutions.331 However, the negative feedback was chiefly from state level 
respondents. Overall, to the extent that the positive contribution of PRIs was recognized, it was 
noted that superior information, experience, and greater accountability were responsible. 
Orissa 
Located on the eastern coast of India, Orissa had been prone to cyclonic storms and floods. As in 
Bihar, there was no evidence of any effective role in disaster management for the Block 
Panchayat or the Zila Parishad. Only the gram panchayats were involved. Several broad trends 
                                                 
330  He attributed lack of accountability to a roster of reservation of panchayats as well as a non-party basis of local 
elections, resulting in lack of long- term stakes of participants. 
331 Literature had noted the reluctance of government functionaries to share power with decentralized governance 
organizations. Narain (1969); Seshadri and Reddy (1974); Mishra (1987); Mathew (1996); Shah and Thompson 
(2004) 
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were apparent in the responses of political and civil service functionaries. It was seen that PRIs 
took an active part in disaster management, much more than in Bihar. There was a greater 
perception of autonomy, especially in preparing CBDMPs, although PRIs had no autonomous 
decision making authority. In policy implementation, they functioned as agencies of the state. 
Finally, a large majority of respondents were clearly enthused about PRI role and potential. In 
addition to common references to floods and cyclones, the super cyclone of 1999 stood out as a 
defining point in collective memory. Many elected functionaries admitted a heightened 
awareness of and greater sensitivity towards hazards, after that event. 
 It was seen that PRIs had played an important role in disaster management. An extremely 
large majority of the respondents reported that these institutions started playing an increased role 
after 1999. They began to take an active part in the process of preparing community based plans 
to tackle disasters. However, they were dependent on the state for all their needs and functioned 
like any other line agency of government. Most of the respondents accepted that PRI role was 
evident in disseminating information, relief distribution, evaluation of damages and preparing 
CBDMPs. Teams formed by the PRIs took part in dissemination of information, search and 
rescue, distribution of food grains, and assisting in public health and first-aid. Their role 
extended to preparedness, in addition to participation in the response phase. The most common 
activity was distribution of relief. 
 Further, organizations such as the Cyclone Shelter Maintenance and Management 
Committee (CSMMC), in which the sarpanch was the central functionary, played a direct role. 
As a pointer towards the central role of CSMMC, one elected leader recollected a November 
2007 meeting about the impending cyclone Sidr. It indicated that CSMMCs were more active 
than PRIs in matters pertaining to disaster management. However, that committee had the 
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sarpanch in leadership position, revealing a clear linkage with PRIs. Another important area, in 
which local bodies played a significant role, was in preparing disaster management plans for 
gram panchayats. Although many respondents were unaware of details about the plans, most 
admitted to attending the planning process. An interesting distinction was drawn by a 
respondent, by relating PRI participation to past experience. Areas that experienced severe 
disasters witnessed greater participation, he said. Ersama block, the worst affected in the 1999 
cyclone, was an example.   
 One block official recounted that training was given to sarpanches, block chairmen, vice 
chairmen and others, in the use of safety material and kits. Sensitization meetings were held to 
increase their awareness about different hazards like cyclones, drought, tsunamis, and fires and 
so on. An official block level respondent reported that guidelines were laid down to involve all 
the locally representatives in disaster management activities such as evacuation, temporary 
shelter, community kitchens, security, first-aid and health assistance. 
 Comparing roles, there were some elected leaders, who believed that NGOs were more 
important and central in disaster management than PRIs. NGOs, on their part emphasized that 
disaster management had brought them nearer to PRIs.332 There was some confusion, with one 
GP level political representative disregarding the role of gram panchayat in preparing disaster 
management plans, as he believed that NGOs were the only ones who were involved. However, 
he seemed to be an exception as he was unaware of the CBDMP in his jurisdiction. Similar 
confusion was evident in some civil servants, at the block level, who tended to equate all non-
official participation in the disaster management with the role of NGOs. Yet, the centrality of 
NGOs was not established either. As some volunteers complained, NGOs had no greater role, 
and that PRIs did not allow them to participate in relief distribution.  
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 It also became evident that PRIs functioned, largely, as executive agencies of 
government, and not as institutions of self governance with autonomous jurisdiction and 
decision-making authority. There were a significant number of respondents who thought that 
PRIs “cooperated” in preparing disaster management plans. More than anything else, it revealed 
an opinion of local bodies being used as one more agency of government, instead of being a 
separate source of decision making. District level officers commended PRIs for their effective 
dissemination of alert messages received from state. Elected respondents at the block level also 
did not feel that they had a meaningful, independent role.  
 The effectiveness of PRIs was clearly acknowledged by an extremely large number of 
interviewees. Both elected leaders and civil servants accepted that local bodies were responsible 
for handling their responsibilities well, in terms of preparedness, response and planning 
activities. Notwithstanding the vital role played by NGOs in Orissa, respondents perceived that 
PRIs were also effective. Their confidence stemmed from a variety of reasons, as explained by a 
majority of them, such as information advantage from being closer to constituents, knowledge of 
local sentiments, superior knowledge of resources, greater constituent support, higher levels of 
local participation, and flexibility in responses. As an example, one sarpanch mentioned how 
GPDM plans were changed due to recent experience of floods. Another significant factor was 
that during emergencies and for disaster management, political differences were subsumed in 
larger interest, said an elected functionary. They believed that their only constraint was financial 
resources.  
 However, there were some skeptics who pointed to widespread corruption among PRI 
leaders. One respondent was particularly scathing in criticism, saying that corruption had 
derailed direction of all activities and programs. Yet, even he was confident about the inherent 
    
81 
 
capabilities of PRIs, provided they were given funds, functions and functionaries. He too agreed 
that political differences got subsumed during times of disaster, citing the example of the 2007 
floods. It was interesting to note that partisan considerations did not play a major role, possibly 
because of the need to come together and pool resources during emergencies. 
 Importantly, at the state level, there seemed a dichotomy of opinions between official and 
elected functionaries. All the elected functionaries were categorical that PRIs had a very limited 
role in disaster management, despite greater capabilities. They opined that PRI involvement was 
inconsequential in planning and policy making, and was limited only to relief distribution, and 
evaluation of damages. A member of the state legislature pointed that due to the low level of 
education among PRI leadership, in addition to the fact that they were ill trained, they did not 
recognize the true extent of their powers and abilities. Official respondents, by and large, 
repeated the official policy position that underscored the value of non-official participation. They 
appeared to have recognized the severe limitations of state abilities, which was evident in their 
cooptation of NGOs.333 On the whole, it was evident that PRIs had a very significant impact on 
disaster management outcomes. 
Gujarat 
In the discussion on the dependent variable, it was seen that Gujarat had greater capacities in 
disaster management than the other selected states. In an earlier section in the chapter, it was 
noted that it had also scored high on measures of decentralization. Field responses only 
confirmed that PRIs had important consequences for positive outcomes. Considering its all-
hazards approach, and correlating it with a higher score on decentralization, it would have been 
logical to expect Gujarat PRIs to be undertaking greater responsibilities in disaster management. 
However, it was found that there was no significant difference in the range of PRI 
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responsibilities when compared with a state like Orissa, for example. And again, significantly, 
PRIs did not enjoy or exercise any operational autonomy in the disaster domain, choosing to 
function as subordinate formations of state government.  
 All the respondents accepted that PRIs were entrusted with substantial responsibility in 
the domain. Only one of them, a veteran of the Kutch earthquake disaster management team, was 
outspoken in his dissatisfaction with its scope, as he believed that it could be wider. The others 
said that PRI role extended to provision of relief, as in most other states, preparedness functions 
and some response measures. The range of activities included dissemination, evacuation, search 
and rescue, community kitchen and relief distribution. Another state level public representative 
said that PRIs were made responsible for clearing rubble and giving relief after the 2001 Kutch 
earthquake. Yet another informed that school construction in earthquake hit Kutch district was 
taken up by Village Education Committees, in which the sarpanch was a member.  
 Importantly, only one block level official pointed out that PRIs were statutorily involved 
in the discharge of disaster management responsibilities.334 Many local leaders admitted that 
disaster management was a fixed part of the agenda of the general body meeting of the village 
panchayat, which was held every six months. Disaster plans were approved in the meetings. 
Preparing CBDMPs was a major task of PRIs, although there were a significant number of 
respondents who were not fully aware of its modalities. In industrialized areas, PRIs’ 
participation was more institutionalized due to statutory provisions of the Factories Act. 
Sarpanches and other PRI members were a part of the Local Crisis Groups (LCGs), and were 
associated in mock drills. 
                                                 
334 Government of Gujarat (2003). Sections 25 and 26 of the State’s Disaster Management Act specified the role and 
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 One member of the legislature pointed out that in case of drought, the state declared an 
emergency only after receiving a resolution from PRIs. He also mentioned that elected and 
official personnel of gram panchayats were jointly involved in the process of estimating loss of 
crops, which was the basis of the drought resolution. Damage assessment in case of floods, was 
done by PRIs. Moreover, the state had also authorized PRIs to take up development works 
costing less than Rs. 2 Lakhs ($5000 approximately), to aid in relief and recovery without any 
approval from government authorities.   
 There were some who did not share the same confidence about PRIs and their leadership. 
One sarpanch, who took part in block level disaster management meetings, said that he did not 
find a great deal of participation or meaningful discussion. An official respondent thought that 
sarpanches did not have interest in those meetings because they were not well-informed. 
Speaking about the role of PRIs in the post-quake scenario, a block level official was dismissive 
about their involvement. However, these views represented a very small percentage of the 
responses. While quality of participation and disinterest in meetings were possible scenarios 
because uniform conditions could not be expected, the post-quake comments were 
understandable, as the state had taken on all responsibilities in 2001.  
 On the whole, the respondents made it abundantly clear that PRIs had functioned as 
agencies of the state, carrying out its directives. The sections 25 and 26 of the Gujarat DM Act 
clearly and unequivocally laid down the chain of command and directed local bodies to obey the 
directions given by district and state level authorities. Government direction was also evident in 
instructions to village panchayats to clear drains as a measure of preparedness, mentioned one 
respondent. One official explained that project officers went from village to village, developing 
plans, increasing capabilities, holding mock drills, preparing plans and mobilizing NGOs and 
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community groups. It indicated that even in Gujarat, preparation of CBDMPs was very much a 
state-driven program. Yet, even as agencies of the state government, most respondents agreed 
that PRIs played an important part. While the extent of their participation was quite similar to the 
situation in Orissa or Tamil Nadu, there were qualitative changes. In part, this was because 
Gujarat has had a tradition of non-state actors playing a key role in development. The 
cooperative movement in the dairy sector was a national bench mark. Moreover, unlike in Orissa 
and Tamil Nadu, NGOs did not play a major role, leaving greater space for PRIs to represent the 
community.  
 Irrespective of the extent of PRI participation and government direction, an extremely 
large majority of the interviewees were significantly proud of their effectiveness in carrying out 
whatever tasks were assigned. Even respondents who were not aware of local disaster plans, 
expressed confidence in PRI abilities, and some of them had actually been involved in its 
implementation. An important source of their effectiveness was due to pooling resources and 
submerging political differences during disasters. Other explanations attributed credit to the 
prudence of locally elected leaders, and their proximity to ground level conditions. One senior 
official believed that PRI effectiveness was because the state developed techniques to involve 
them after the disastrous 2001 earthquake. In the limited area in which they functioned on behalf 
of the state government, the PRIs made a significant impact on quality of outcomes in disaster 
management. 
Tamil Nadu 
Even after more than three years, memories of the 2004 South Asian tsunami were fresh in 
public memory. Not unsurprisingly, the focus of elected and bureaucratic respondents regarding 
all-hazards capacity development was derived from their tsunami experience. And as in the other 
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states, the most effective level of PRI participation was the gram panchayat. In addition, there 
were several other noticeable trends. First, field level findings gave clear and unambiguous 
evidence about PRI role in disaster management. There was near unanimity over the role of PRIs 
in disaster management, among gram panchayat presidents, as sarpanches were also known. All 
the respondents were acutely aware of the fact that they were significant actors during 
emergencies. Second, mirroring the experience of the other states, it was seen that PRIs did not 
exercise autonomy and carried out directions from the state. The third important observation was 
that they were equally confident about their abilities to deliver public goods in disaster 
management, within the limited scope. 
 Every one of the respondents provided evidence of PRI participation in the disaster 
domain. Immediately before and after the disaster event, they were used for dissemination of 
warning, foodgrains distribution, and damage assessments, distribution of foodgrains and for 
organizing community kitchens. A special mention about their role in dissemination of disaster 
alerts and warnings was warranted. A senior official explained their role in early warning 
systems, wherein some panchayat presidents were given wireless sets. What began as an 
experiment in Early Warning System in a pilot program was now extended to more vulnerable 
panchayats in 13 coastal districts.335 Moreover, respondents stated that they were keenly 
watching weather news. Increased awareness also meant that local officials and leaders provided 
district officials with information. One senior officer recounted that he got calls from panchayat 
presidents to find out about tsunami alerts as had happened in October 2007. 
 All the cyclone shelters were under the control of gram panchayat.  One elected 
functionary referred to the immense authority enjoyed by the Gram Sabha, which had the power 
to approve disaster plans and local budgets. One respondent gave the example of her gram 
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panchayat, where the Gram Sabha had the final say in locating the site of a cyclone shelter. The 
Panchayat president was a member of all committees and the gram panchayat was significantly 
involved in disaster management. In addition, there were cyclone shelter committees that were 
elected by seashore residents, in the presence of panchayat presidents.   
  As far as CBDMPs were concerned, the PRIs continued to play a central role, stated 
most of the respondents. There were some who were unaware of details, but such persons were a 
minority. For example, one said that the disaster management plan did not seem to have been 
prepared through PRIs, although different committees formed under the plans had included the 
panchayat president, village administrative officer, ward members of the panchayat and others. 
The increased role and number of NGOs may be a possible reason why some local leaders were 
not fully aware about PRI role in preparing plans.  
 As in the other states, it was also abundantly clear that these institutions functioned on the 
directions of the government. They did not enjoy an independent say in the matter of disaster 
management. An example of state control was that PRIs were only allowed to incur an 
expenditure up to Rs. 5000 ($125 appx) during emergencies.336 Perceptions of state control were 
uniformly present among all categories. One block level officer exulted about his control over 
panchayat presidents, speaking about his role in deciding the release of government grants. 
Another block level official gave an example of how PRIs were co-opted in a top-down fashion, 
when he said that presidents of village panchayats in a temple town were always instructed to 
take preparatory steps before major festivals. Not unsurprisingly, in Tamil Nadu, the District 
Collector had the authority to suspend Panchayat resolutions.337   
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 On the whole, though, there was a broad consensus that PRIs were able to deliver better 
results in their limited jurisdictions. Notwithstanding the strict control of state and the larger role 
of NGOs, the local bodies were perceived to be efficient and effective. Some state level 
respondents believed that it was due to training and capacity building those local bodies had 
improved their ability to deal with emergencies. One local leader mentioned that the 2004 
tsunami sensitized them, and they took greater interest in mock drills, equipment details and 
other relevant information. In an impressive display of knowledge, fishermen of his seaside 
panchayat reeled off details about GPS, satellite radios, C-band radios and other equipment that 
could be used by the fishing community. Their keenness to learn was correlated, by many 
respondents, to the direct and devastating experience during the tsunami, making them more 
willing to take on responsibility. In Tamil Nadu too, a positive correlation between decentralized 
institutions and disaster management outcomes was evident.  
V. Conclusion 
 Field observations provided valuable information about the relationship between 
democratic decentralization and disaster management outcomes in India. Apparently, there was a 
broad correlation that appeared to confirm the hypothesis. It was only when this research delved 
deeper, did it emerge that this variable was not a major predictor of capacity building among the 
states. Primarily it was because of the limited scope of PRIs in disaster management. At best, 
decentralized institutions were good and effective agencies of government that could handle their 
responsibilities effectively. Yet, since the responsibilities were very limited, there were no 
grounds to infer a significant and systematic impact on the dependent variable. 
 A comparison of the four states revealed broad areas of similarity as well as issues in 
which differences were visible. In all the states, the respondents were aware of the importance of 
    
88 
 
disaster management and the broad direction of its objectives. Second, there were no great 
differences in responses, of all categories and at all levels, except among state level actors. In 
most states, except Gujarat, the top tier was disdainful about PRIs effectiveness that was 
reflected in a marked disapproval by the political respondents at state level. 
 The most important issue on which all of them had similar responses was about the 
limited sphere of PRI involvement. Local bodies did not exercise autonomous decision making 
authority, and their participation was rigidly structured by the state. Consequently, the common 
denominator of involvement extended only to distribution of relief and assessment of damages. 
The other states, excepting Bihar, also involved them in dissemination of warnings, and 
responsibilities of the response phase such as search and rescue, community kitchens, first-aid 
and public hygiene. It was seen that PRIs discharged their duties commendably, notwithstanding 
the occasional complaint of corruption and malfeasance. The other was that local stakeholders 
were aware of PRIs’ inherent merits. 
 Another important feature was the role of NGOs. In Orissa and Tamil Nadu, these 
organizations played an important role and occupied space that might have been held by PRIs. 
Consequently in those two states, they were important actors in the domain. In Gujarat and 
Bihar, it was different. Gujarat appeared to have dispensed with an institutionalized role for 
NGOs during non-disaster times. Therefore, PRIs had a more visible role in Gujarat. Bihar, on 
the other hand, had not formulated a well-thought out policy to deal with NGOs.338 
 The attitude of state level actors towards PRI participation and recognition of the latter’s 
strengths was significant. Except in Gujarat, the others were dismissive about PRI claims of 
effective delivery. While in general, it can be attributed to reluctance to surrender power and 
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authority, members of the state legislature may have correlated it with a reduced role for 
themselves. Many civil servants also remained skeptical, although a number of them believed in 
the strengths of PRIs. In Gujarat, however, there was greater acceptance of PRIs in all domains, 
including disaster management. A likely explanation may lie in the fact that, in the past, local 
bodies had been stepping stones for leadership positions at the state level.339 
 On the basis of evidence obtained in the field, democratic decentralization did not emerge 
as a significant predictor of disaster management outcomes in India. Local bodies functioned as 
executing agencies of government rather than autonomous tiers of governance. They had no 
effective control over their personnel340.Uniformly, across all the four selected cases, there was 
no evidence of local bodies addressing disaster management concerns because they were deemed 
important by their inhabitants. While the strength of these institutions was visible, they did not 
play a meaningful role in a manner that impacted capacities for dealing with disasters in India. 
At best, they eased the situation for the state, by handling some important functions during the 
immediate aftermath. To their credit, it was found that there was no inevitability of capture of 
local bodies,341 and with the salience of disaster management, they held promise. Whether they 
can contribute more effectively, in all-phases of disaster management, or whether they will be 
victims of the numerous pathologies that had been outlined in theory, remained unresolved. In 
the Indian context, the situation did not warrant positive conclusions for this research. At the 
same time, it can be argued that it did not disconfirm either. Yet, since it failed to conclusively 
indicate a positive relationship, it did not bear out the hypothesis of this research. 
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Chapter 4: Economic Resources and Reform of Disaster Capacities 
 
 Ordinarily, it is easy to correlate the role of economic resources in impacting delivery 
outcomes in disaster management. Straightforward, linear reasoning might correlate greater 
wealth with better results. Resources that were invested in enhancing capacities were expected to 
improve effectiveness. This research, while recognizing their importance, was aimed at 
investigating if it was the critical factor that was responsible for policy reform for greater 
capacities and effective disaster management. The premise enjoyed face validity, although its 
implications were grave for less wealthier regions. Literature, while not specifically identifying it 
as the most important determinant, made ample references to its role. Nevertheless, the 
explanatory factor of economic resources remained vague and general, with the intervention of 
other variables needed to explain linkages with disaster management reform. 
 The emphasis on economic resources was significant and had serious implications. For 
example, a comparison of American emergency responses to 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina would 
then find the relative underdevelopment of Louisiana to be the reason for its well-publicized 
shortcomings. It can be argued that economic resources translated into better capabilities that 
came into play before, during and after disasters. Yet, explanations were never unilinear342 as in 
the case of Tamil Nadu and Orissa. On account of all economic and human development indices, 
Tamil Nadu figured high above Orissa. A resource-based argument would have predicted the 
former to have undertaken policy change to build superior capabilities. However, as a discussion 
of the dependent variable revealed, Orissa was found to have built better capacities. It had 
                                                 
342 Ragin (1987), explained that it was difficult to develop consistent causal relations because outcomes did not 
usually have one cause and that they did not occur in isolation 
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undertaken fundamental reform with comprehensive capacity building in disaster 
management.343 
 This chapter explored the relationship between states’ levels of economic development 
and delivery of public goods in disaster management. It was a test of the hypothesis that 
economic resources were required to undertake policy reform to build greater capacities and, 
thereby, effect superior outcomes. Hence, states which were more developed were expected to 
have more robust capacities to deal with disasters. According to the underlying logic, field 
research was expected to reveal causal linkages between the two. It would have meant that the 
relative prosperity of Gujarat, and corresponding poverty of Bihar were the reasons for their 
respective measures on the dependent variable. Since the logic was deterministic, and rendered 
all improvement in disaster management as a function of economic prosperity, the inquiry had 
great value. If proved true by field research, it had serious repercussions for normative 
discussions of the subject.  
 Findings of field research provided critical and credible inputs about the hypothesis. First, 
economic factors were found to be significant in the policy domain. Capacity building mattered 
for effectiveness in public goods’ and higher levels of economic development were enabling 
factors. The next important finding was that states’ investment in reform and capacity building 
was incumbent on other factors, and that there was no automatic correlation between the two. 
Prosperity and availability of resources did not automatically lead to reform, but depended on 
other intervening variables. They enabled the reform in capacity building, but did not provide the 
critical impetus for change. Finally, it was found that even less developed states had no 
difficulties in gaining access to resources. There were adequate sources of finance available, and 
states did not have to be highly developed to be able to invest them. Consequently, while higher 
                                                 
343 It was found in Chapter 2 that Orissa had superior capacities in measures of disaster management.  
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levels of development provided economic resources for disaster management, they were not a 
sufficient condition. States did not find themselves constrained for funds, notwithstanding their 
development levels. Moreover, a country or state’s economic indicators did not determine the 
levels of public investment or expenditure on public goods and disaster management 
infrastructure.   
 The different states in this study varied on measures of economic development. Thereby, 
they presented a valuable sample to investigate their role in this chapter. Its first section reviews 
the literature on the subject. Thereafter, in the second part, it establishes the variation among 
states, on a scale of economic development. Field data is presented and analysed in the third 
segment, to enable valid and systematic conclusions. That is the content of the last part of the 
chapter.   
I. Economic Resources and Disaster Management Capacities 
 A survey of literature showed that economic resources had constantly figured in 
discussions in delivery of public goods, in general. They were considered along with 
technological pressures, political demands and administrative-organizational arrangements;344 
organizations’ stake, information about risk, vulnerability, and experience;345 market failure, 
industry strength, industry structure, quality of statutes, and strength of public interest groups’ in 
discussions of explanatory factors relevant to disaster management.346 The World Development 
Report 1997 noted the centrality of state role in promoting social and economic development, 
implicitly recognized the importance of its capacities to deal with forces that disrupted 
development.347  It had been observed that development was “a viable means to reduce the 
                                                 
344 Lester et al (1983) 
345 Mileti (1983) 
346 Williams and Matheny (1984) 
347 World Bank (1997) 
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quantity and severity of disasters”.348 Economic development allowed countries and states to 
tackle disasters. It was commonly understood that economic resources played an instrumental 
role in providing choice to address important and significant problems.349 It was stated that 
socio-economic resources fixed the outer limits of possibilities, or alternately provided 
opportunities.350 In an empirical study of hazardous wastes, a direct correlation was found 
between economic resources and policy outputs.351  
 The converse was also true, as pointed out in the World Development Report 1997, that 
states with low capacities had difficulties in dealing with internal pressures as well as external 
threats. Thereby the economic resources argument addressed concerns of the disaster research 
school as well as social vulnerability approach.352 In the broadest terms, it was held that socio-
economic development of the poor was found to be a good way of addressing vulnerability of the 
weaker sections.353 Scholars also noted that lack of resources hampered disaster management.354 
Relating the size of a nation with abilities, it had been said that smaller countries were more 
likely to have difficulties because they were overwhelmed easily.355 An interesting case was the 
earthquake that occurred in Kashmir, in both the Indian and Pakistani sides, in 2006. A more 
developed India was able to deal on its own. Pakistan, its smaller and less developed neighbor, 
on the other hand, was overwhelmed. Notwithstanding its reliance on international aid, the latter 
                                                 
348 McEntire (1997), p. 234 
349 Dreze and Sen (2002) 
350 Lester et al (1983) 
351 Lester et al (1983) included an overview of literature; Williams and Matheny (1984) found that fiscal capacity 
was a significant indicator in explaining regulatory outcomes regarding hazardous wastes 
352 World Bank (1997) 
353 Winchester (2000); Tierney, Lindell and Perry (2001) elaborated that ethnicity and income levels had an 
important impact in preparedness levels.  
354 Carroll (2001) 
355 Khator and Kabra (2001) 
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was not able to come to grips even after a long time.356 In India’s case, its economic growth had 
allowed it in 2004 after the Indian Ocean tsunami, to refuse international aid. This was not 
always the case, as the 2001 Gujarat earthquake experience showed.357   
 At a very basic level, there may not be any disaster management possible without 
resources. It was noted that requirements of each phase of the all-hazards approach, entailed 
availability of resources. Specifically, in the mitigation phase, there was a requirement of long-
term structural measures such as building levees, dredging canals, clearing flood plains, 
constructing multipurpose irrigation projects, among others. The NFPA 1600 standards identified 
(5.4.3) a mitigation strategy to include “Relocation, retrofitting or removal of structures of risk 
… redundancy or duplication of essential personnel, critical systems, equipment, information, 
operations, or materials”. In terms of non-structural measures, it included managing resources 
(5.5.2) such as “personnel, equipment, training, facilities, funding, expert knowledge, 
materials….”358 A cost element was evident for each of them. 
 In the preparedness phase, early warning systems needed to be developed as did 
adequate communication facilities, in addition to capacities in health care, training of personnel 
and stakeholders. During the response phase, the focus shifted to search and rescue, evacuation, 
fire fighting, immediate health care, sustenance, clothing and shelter along with emergency 
provisions for daily life. It was also evident that resources were needed to restore electricity, 
water, communications and highways, plug breaches in canals, repair bunds and levees, 
reconstruct damaged bridges and culverts, as well as restore other infrastructures and facilities. It 
                                                 
356 Then President of Pakistan was critical of Western governments for insufficient international aid. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4465600.stm BBC. 24 November 2005, retrieved on 28 November 2008; The 
situation was bad even after an year. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/scotland/5397380.stm  BBC 1 October 
2006 retrieved on 28 November.   
357 Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (2001) 
358 NFPA 1600 (2004)  
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was believed that greater resources exercised a mitigating influence on the damages caused by 
disasters.359 The utility of investing in long-term plans had been recorded, noting that sound 
recovery had great impact in reducing losses.360 Developed and diversified economies were able 
to undertake recovery operations better, underlining their ability to raise internal resources or 
obtain external help. However, it was also seen that restoration of production systems, with 
wider economic linkages, was difficult to achieve.361   
 The relationship between development and disaster management was not, however, 
considered to be positively correlated in unequivocal terms. Theory had long held that impact of 
disaster was a result of interaction between the physical, demographic and the built-up 
environments.362 The built-up environment was held to be a factor that increased vulnerability.363 
Thereby, the correlation between development and vulnerability pointed to a weakness in the 
‘development improves disaster management’ logic. Development also lead to greater 
urbanization and concentration of population, and thereby increased the vulnerability profile of a 
place.364 The growing trend of urbanization in the world, leading to more and more mega cities, 
was seen to pose greater dangers because of the inherent weaknesses of such locations, 
complexity of the urbanizing trend as well as disasters, and finally due to the under-examined 
interplay between the two.365 It was also said to increase the vulnerabilities of society, by 
creating false confidence that resulted in construction in flood plains, concentration and larger 
                                                 
359 Vogel (2001); McEntire and Mathis, training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/edu/docs/EMT/Chapter%20- 
%20Comparative%20Politics%20and%20Disasters.doc- Retrieved 8 July 2008. 
360 Albala-Bertrand (2006) 
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profiles of development projects that turned out to be threats, which increased the damage 
potential.366 
 Importantly, there were empirical studies which did not find conclusive support for a 
positive relationship. Having accepted earlier that lack of resources hampered governments, it 
was found that resources in themselves were no guarantee for superior results.367 One analysis 
declared them to be insignificant predictors, when compared to technological pressures, and 
administrative-organizational arrangements.368 Moreover, literature referred to a host of non-
structural measures such as building codes, zoning regulations, limiting development and 
measures to reduce exposure that did not apparently require fiscal investments.369 Finally, a 
notable weakness in the ‘development leads to better disaster management’ argument was that 
there were always competing demands for resources, and pressure groups or lobbies were 
important for obtaining budgetary claims.370 Unfortunately, it was widely recognized that this 
policy domain never enjoyed the constant support of an organized constituency and was usually 
a loser in budgetary allocations.371 The uncertainties surrounding disasters meant that there was 
little opportunity for a pressure group to develop in the absence of a certain and impending 
emergency or when memories of past events faded from public memory.  
II. Economic Development of the States 
At the outset, it was necessary to note the wide disparities in economic development, 
among the selected Indian states. Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, among the selected states, were 
commonly understood to be more developed than Orissa and Bihar. Failure of planned 
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development, in the pre-reform as well as the post-reform periods, had been recognized in the 
wide variation on different indicators.372 It made it possible to correlate levels of development 
with the policy reform to develop capacities.  
Notwithstanding discordant notes on the positive impact of economic resources, this 
research tested their relationship. Therefore, it was found to be necessary to clarify conceptual 
concerns regarding the assessment of levels of development. What were the measures that 
enabled a determination of a state’s economic health? Commonly, indicators such as Gross State 
Domestic Product, Gross Per Capita Income, Per Capita Tax Earnings, and tax-to-revenue ratios 
were used for this purpose. However, each had its own strengths and weaknesses in reflecting 
levels of economic development. It could be argued that per capita income was a good indicator 
as it showed average individual levels of economic prosperity. Yet, it did not take into account 
the gross disparity in incomes. And, it also did not indicate if a state had enough resources to 
spend on disaster management capacity building. Next were tax earnings and revenue-to-income 
ratios. It could be argued that states were able to spend on disaster management only if they had 
additional resources, since governments needed revenues to incur expenditure in building 
capacities. However, this did not apply in exploitative and rent-based economies, and allocations 
were dependent on organized lobbies for budgets. It meant that higher revenues did not 
necessarily find investment avenues in the disaster domain. Another indicator was the Per Capita 
Gross State Domestic Product (GSDP), which reflected the quantum of economic activity and, in 
a very general way, the state’s level of prosperity. And there was the Human Development 
Index, which was a broad indicator of the socio-economic development of a state.373 The premise 
was that economic development lead to development in social indicators such as health, 
                                                 
372 Misra, B. S. (2007); Guruswamy, Baitha and Mohanty (2006) 
373 UNDP http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/indices/hdi/ retrieved 29 November 2008  
    
98 
 
education, etc. However, questions had been raised about the causal connection between 
development and equitable progress in social sectors.374 In the disaster domain, in one of the few 
quantitative analyses, it was found that this variable was equated with per capita personal 
income, per capita state spending, median family income and percentage of population below 
poverty level.375 Such a combined approach, while glossing over the finer points conceptually, 
nevertheless provided a good idea about the level of a state’s economic development. This 
research also used a combination of indicators. 
This research used a combination of measures of Per Capita Gross State Domestic 
Product, Per Capita Income along with poverty indices. Most of these indicators were consistent 
with each other. The selected states figured at the same levels in scales of per capita incomes and 
GSDP measures. They co-varied uniformly on all these indicators, giving a fair indication of 
where they figured on a common scale of development. Gujarat and Bihar occupied their 
respective places as the most and least developed of the selected states.  Second in the scale was 
Tamil Nadu, which had traditionally been a developed state. Orissa, on the other hand, was an 
underdeveloped state, which was third among the chosen four cases.  
 A striking feature revealed by the data was the remarkable rise of Gujarat. Its growth was 
significant because the southern state of Tamil Nadu had been traditionally considered a 
relatively developed state.  Not withstanding considerable infrastructural development,376 it 
slipped from its position and was overtaken by Gujarat. In most indicators of economic 
development, Gujarat had emerged as one of the most developed states in India. And in some, it 
was at the very top. This rise has been mirrored in the indices on Per Capita Income. The other 
                                                 
374 Dreze and Sen (2002) used education and health indicators to study the distributional aspects of economic growth 
among different states in India 
375 Lester et al (1983) 
376 Krueger and Chenoy (2002) opined that infrastructure was an accurate indicator of economic progress since it 
was a prerequisite for economic development 
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measures also provided adequate indication of Gujarat’s economic progress, vis-à-vis Tamil 
Nadu. The other two, Bihar and Orissa, were consistently poor on economic indicators. While, 
Bihar was seen to be the more underdeveloped, Orissa was not vastly different. On the whole, 
while Gujarat and Tamil Nadu represented the developed states in India, Bihar and Orissa 
exemplified the other end of the spectrum. Within the same country, the development gap 
seemed to be significant. 
Table 4. Per Capita Income of States 1981-2004 (in rupees)
377
 
 
                            1981                  1990   2000    2004  
 
Bihar        3363            4092        4233            4701 
Orissa         4149               5365              5735        6487 
Gujarat       6480                8832       13298        16779 
Tamil Nadu    5305            7415  12167   12976 
  
 A rank analysis also documented the remarkable growth of Gujarat among a list of the 14 
major General Category of States that covered cover large, non-hilly provinces.378  
Table 5. Rank Analysis of Per Capita Income of States 
379 
 
                                1994                      2000    2004  
 
Bihar               14   14                14 
Orissa                13   13     12 
Gujarat               4    4      1 
Tamil Nadu            5    5                 6 
 
The position with respect to Per Capita State Domestic Product and its growth rates 
provided greater clarity on Gujarat’s development vis-à-vis Tamil Nadu. The other two states, 
Bihar and Orissa, lagged far behind.                                                         
                                                 
377 Mishra, B.S. (2007)  
378 Small, hilly provinces formed a Special Category of States, whose structure of economies was different. 
379 Mishra, B.S. (2007) 
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Table 6. Per Capita Net State Domestic Product (Current Prices 28 Feb. 08)
380 
   1999-2000           2002-2003               2005-2006          2006-2007   
Andhra Pradesh   15507  19568          26226             29582 
Assam     12282  14421          18211             20166 
Bihar         5766       6928           7875              9214  
Chattisgarh    11761  13145          20151              NA 
Gujarat       18864  22683          34157              NA  
Haryana    23121  30380          41988   49038 
Jharkhand     11435  11865          19066   20811 
Karnataka    16603  19388          27101   NA 
Kerala     19294  23207          30668   33609 
Madhya Pradesh   12384  12303          15304   16578 
Maharashtra    23340  26697          37081    NA 
Orissa         10567  11788          17610   20240  
Punjab     25611  29316          36759   40566 
Rajasthan    13619  13128          17306   19512 
Tamil Nadu    19378             21813          29958   32733 
Uttaranchal        13672  18819          24585   27879 
Uttar Pradesh        9719   10632          13316   14685 
West Bengal    15826  18746          25223    NA 
  
Table 7. Rate of Growth of GSDP (% per year) 
                                              1980-81 to1990-91       1991-92 to1998-99   
Bihar      4.66 (12th)   2.88 (14th) 
Orissa      4.29 (13th)   3.56 (13th) 
Tamil Nadu     5.38 (5th)   6.02 (4th) 
Gujarat     5.08 (8th)   8.15 (1st) 
Source: Planning Commission
381
 
 
 Finally, the same position was reflected in the poverty indices. In an inverse manner they 
were indicators of levels of development. The greater the population under poverty level, the 
lower was the state’s position on an economic development scale.  
                                                 
380 Government of India, Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation 
http://mospi.gov.in/mospi_nad_main.htm retrieved on 6 April 2008 
381 Ahluwalia (2002) 
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Table 8. Percentage of Population in Poverty 
 
        1983         1987-88               1993-94     1999-2000 
Orissa   65.29 (1st)      55.58 (1st)   48.56 (2nd)      47.15 (1st) 
Bihar   52.22 (3rd)      52.13 (2nd)            54.96 (1st)      42.60 (2nd) 
Tamil Nadu  3.87 (4th)      43.39 (4th)  35.03 (7th)      21.12 (7th) 
Gujarat   3.08 (11th)      31.54 (11th)  24.21 (12th)      14.07 (11th) 
Source: Planning Commission
382 
   
 From the above data, a clear picture emerged about the selected states in the scale of 
economic development in India. It was evident that Gujarat was the more developed, followed by 
Tamil Nadu. The other two states, Bihar figured at the bottom of the scale, with Orissa being the 
last in respect of having the largest population under poverty levels. It was an indication of 
greater disparities in income distribution than Bihar. 
 With respect to issues directly concerning the relationship between economic resources 
and disaster management capacities, several important concerns needed to be recognized. Given 
India’s overall economic position, shortage of resources was always a major indicator of 
inadequacies.383 The relative development of Gujarat and Tamil Nadu were only indicative of 
their place within India. It was not to be construed that these states had reached levels of 
development that enabled them to address all or most of their requirements. In the country as a 
whole, which also included the states of Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, there were serious weaknesses 
in several key areas. Shortcomings in infrastructure were noted in the manner in which they 
impacted distribution of relief as well as for providing medical assistance to those affected by 
disasters.384 Serious shortages were noted in recovery programs that relied on physical 
                                                 
382 Cited in Ibid, p. 99  
383 Pilgrim (1999) 
384 Relief Web (2006), http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/ACIO-6Q4BXU?OpenDocument      
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restoration of resources, facilities and infrastructure.385It was recognized that administrative 
response was seriously handicapped by unavailable early warning systems, and lack of resources, 
among other things.386 The enormous damage due to the 2004 tsunami was directly attributed to 
absence of preparedness measures.387 Inadequacy of mitigation measures had been highlighted as 
well as, insufficient capabilities in preparedness.388 
 Hitherto, funds for disaster management were provided by the Government of India, 
when it was determined that state capacities were overwhelmed. The amount of disaster relief 
disbursals depended largely on the scale of devastation. The mechanism for allocations was 
determined by a Finance Commission that was periodically set up to decide the revenue-sharing 
formula between center and states.389 The Finance Commission laid down a formula-based 
process for disbursal of funds. The federal government allocated resources through a Calamity 
Relief Fund (CRF) for each state, and the National Calamity Contingency Fund (NCCF), which 
augmented the former. The CRF was “created in each state for meeting the expenditure for 
providing immediate relief to the victims” of various disasters.390 The allocations were worked 
out on the basis of a ten year average of the period, 1982-1992, after adjusting for inflation.391 
The NCCF allocations augmented these funds, in case of severe natural calamities, with the same 
purpose. The Twelfth Finance Commission increased the total allocation from the earlier 
                                                 
385 Parasuraman and Unnikrishnan (2002); Provention Consortium (2005b)  highlighted a need for comprehensive 
recovery 
386 USAID http://www.usaid.gov/in/our_work/strategy/strategy6.htm  retrieved 22 June 2008  
387 UNDP (2005); Asian Development Bank, UN and World Bank (2005) noted a failure in recognizing 
vulnerability 
388 Government of India (2004b); Asian Development Bank, UN and World Bank (2005) noted the surprise factor of 
the 2004 tsunami. 
389 Government of India (2007a). Article 280 of the Indian Constitution mandated the setting up of a Finance 
Commission. 
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Rs.11007.59 crores ($2700 million appx.) to Rs. 21333.33 crores ($5200 million appx.) for the 
period 2005-06 to 2009-10. 392 
Table 9. Releases Under CRF and NCCF, 31 Dec 2006 (in Rs. Crores)
393
 
    Allocation           Center’s Share             Releases           
    Under CRF      of CRF Released      under NCCF 
Andhra Pradesh    361.28  335.48          203.06 
Assam      198.62    72.40          000.00 
Bihar          153.23       000.00***         000.00   
Chattisgarh     114.98  150.33          000.00 
Gujarat        258.30  246.87          545.69     
Haryana     130.60    58.31          000.00 
Jharkhand      129.71    48.64          000.00 
Karnataka     120.39  113.98          384.97 
Kerala       89.77    33.67          000.00 
Madhya Pradesh    261.58  246.67            30.85 
Maharashtra     234.05  220.00          589.90 
Orissa          310.24  291.34            25.00      
Punjab      153.33  112.26          000.00 
Rajasthan     436.42  413.66          100.00   
Tamil Nadu     219.53             000.00***         000.00 
Uttar Pradesh         304.48  114.18          000.00   
West Bengal     241.50  000.00*         000.00 
*** Not released for want of information regarding utilization certificate, etc. 
 States, on their part, expended the resources received from the center, and from their own 
revenues on a variety of tasks that provided a clear picture about their objectives. They included 
setting up organizations like the State Disaster Management Authorities, introduction of training 
for civil servants, conducting mock drills, establishing multiple communication networks, setting 
up specialist response teams, dog squads, trained search & rescue teams, mobile hospitals, 
Emergency Operation Centers, modernization of early warning systems, as well as providing 
better developmental infrastructure. However, all the above were not met from the fiscal 
transfers under CRF and NCCF because states were encouraged to cover them under long-term 
projects, through which disaster management was to be mainstreamed into developmental 
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planning. It had been a major objective of state policy as the Disaster Management Act, 2005 
wanted “…the concerned Ministries and Departments to draw up department-wise plans in 
accordance with the National Disaster Management Plan.”394 Thus, the states had different 
methods of meeting the investment requirements of disaster management. And the center played 
an important role in providing for immediate requirements of distributing relief and restoring 
infrastructure. It was left to the states, for the most part, to expend the resources from center as 
well, as to use their own revenues for investing in building capacities. 
 The test of the hypothesis depended on finding that policy reform was related to the 
state’s level of economic development. States which were more developed were expected to have 
invested in greater capacities. However, there was no strict correlation between the rank ordering 
of states on the dependent variable and their position on economic indicators. Such correlation 
may or may not have existed, and was not the object of the inquiry. The objective in this chapter 
was to seek confirmation of the systematic and significant, autonomous impact of the 
explanatory factor on the capacities of disaster management in the states. It was to see if the 
consequence would have been better or worse, but for a higher or lower level of economic 
development. This research relied on published data available in the public domain for 
information about the economic development of states. It depended on the responses of 
interviewees to understand the linkages, if any, between the two, and if it could be inferred that 
states policy reform to build their disaster capacities was dependent on their levels of economic 
development.  
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Most of the one hundred and seventy nine participants addressed the significance of this 
factor.395 The respondents were queried on two major concerns. First, they were asked to list the 
various activities carried out in the domain. It would have been consistent with expectations, if 
the more developed states were found carrying out a more comprehensive range of activities and 
policy measures, because their resources provided an enabling window. The second question was 
concerned about availability of funds. Stakeholders were asked if paucity of funds was a factor in 
disaster management. Responses from the poorer states would have conformed to predictions if 
they had expressed difficulties in providing public goods due to lack of fiscal resources. 
Conversely, the more developed states were expected to report a comfortable position on that 
count. Complaints about federal grants were also expected to be heard from the poorer states, 
which faced a shortage of resources. Issues concerning funds and allocations for disaster 
management were decided at state level, by elected and non-elected functionaries. Hence, the 
responses of state level respondents held greater significance, among others. Their responses, 
more than those in districts and below, were important because they had a better picture of the 
state’s finances. 
Bihar 
For a state that faced floods with unfailing regularity, it was not a surprise that people had 
developed their own coping mechanisms, apart from their dependence on state interventions. The 
second aspect that emerged was that the range of disaster management activities was mostly 
limited to the response stage. The traditional relief perspective appeared to prevail even in the 
new millennium. There was no comprehensive approach to work out the needs of disaster 
management. Compared to the wide ranging capacities and activities in Gujarat, or even Orissa, 
                                                 
395 A few, who were not in the federal government or the selected states, were not covered on these points. There 
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the wish list in Bihar was quite modest. Finally, and surprisingly, there were no complaints about 
paucity of funds. While, local leaders and civil servants, in the field, articulated a requirement for 
greater allocations and a need to take up more long-term mitigation programs, participants at key 
places at state level did not consider it a constraining factor. 
 In an earlier chapter, it was mentioned that Bihar had suffered fewer losses of life despite 
severe disasters, and identified coping mechanisms developed by people. It was seen as an 
example of people relying more on themselves, rather than state machinery. During field 
research, the first significant trend related to this development. Preparations for known hazards 
such as floods took place as a matter of routine, said all the local leaders and most civil servants 
in the field. More than relying unduly on the state, coping mechanisms were adopted at family 
and community levels. They spoke about storage of food grains, fodder and firewood in addition 
to locating higher grounds to stay. Some said that coping mechanisms extended to individual 
mitigation efforts, and pointed to the elevated plinth of residential structures. It emerged that 
there was far less reliance on the state, and that they depended on it for foodgrains, primarily. 
That also explained the high salience of relief distribution.  
 A second feature that was most prominent was the continuance of a ‘relief orientation’. 
From the list of activities undertaken, it was clear that there was no paradigm shift. An extremely 
large number of respondents highlighted the importance of providing relief. And by relief, they 
referred to free distribution of food grains to those affected by disasters. There were numerous 
references about how it shaped the nature of public discourse, after disaster events. Invariably, it 
occupied a central position, followed by provision of boats for evacuation, and polythene sheets 
for temporary shelter. Emergency rations, evacuation, and temporary shelter were identified by 
most respondents as principal activities of disaster management. The other important 
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responsibilities included provision of medicines, basic health care, safe drinking water, and 
sanitation facilities. The district level respondents also reiterated the overwhelming focus on 
immediate needs of the response phase. 
 Thereafter, requirements of the reconstruction phase were addressed such as restoration 
of road communications, power and other utilities. Compensation was also paid for loss of life 
and damages to property. For example in 2007, the state provided Rs.80.23 crores ($20 million 
appx.) as cash dole, and an agricultural input subsidy of Rs.350 crores ($85 million appx).396 
They also reported spending Rs.7.82 crores ($2 mn. appx.) for providing ex-gratia to families 
who lost 986 family members. Long-term requirements were also partially addressed in the 
construction of raised platforms, which proved critical for airdropping operations.  
 The requirements of disaster management in Bihar also reflected their overwhelming 
concern with immediate response activities and, to some extent, prevention, mitigation plans. 
Most field level officials spoke about shortage of vehicles. However, more than greater 
sensitivity to requirements of disaster management, it reflected their views on inadequate 
logistics that were used in routine work. Interestingly, only one respondent was emphatic about 
the need for a good road network, whereas another identified a requirement for better alerting 
systems. Reflecting an absence of a widely shared perspective for long-term plans, only one 
respondent mentioned the need to make a ten year estimate of requirements for boats, 
motorboats, and for road communications. Strengthening river embankments, improving 
education to increase awareness were also necessary tasks, he said. Similarly, a local leader 
referred to the unavailability of ambulances, and another spoke about a need for fire tenders. 
There were a couple more who pointed to the lack of ambulances, fire tenders, trained teams, 
rescue equipment, and inadequate boats, in addition to debris clearing machinery. The majority 
                                                 
396 Government of Bihar. (2007) 
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did not share these views, which seemed to be the opinions of a few sensitized and articulate 
individuals. These responses represented exceptions. As a result, or otherwise, the state took no 
initiative in building those capacities. It appeared that, like the large majority of respondents, 
state policy also focused on requirement of resources for distributing foodgrains. And once that 
was carried out satisfactorily, as in 2007, there were not many demands.397 It did appear to 
confirm the hypothesis that economically underdeveloped states were less inclined to take up 
comprehensive capacity building policies. However, a full confirmation depended on their 
articulation about the paucity of resources as the major constraint. 
 Importantly, there was greater awareness about long-term mitigation plans among leaders 
of local bodies. Long-term mitigation plants figured in their responses as much as response-
phase activities such as evacuation, shelter and emergency rations. Many articulated a need for 
constructing flood control, irrigation projects and hydroelectricity plants. A couple of them 
demanded high-investment projects such as raising river embankments and desilting rivers. A 
few officials talked about the need for mainstreaming disaster management into development 
plans for constructing dams in upstream Nepal, and interlinking rivers as a long-term solution. 
However, demands for these projects remained unfulfilled. The department of disaster 
management had no responsibility for these schemes as they were to be undertaken by other 
departments like those for irrigation, and energy under federal guidelines.398 The state, as a 
whole, did not take up these projects because it lacked resources. 
 Yet, constraints of resources did not sound credible, when juxtaposed with emphatic 
statements by state level functionaries that there were no shortage of funds for. Sadly, it was 
                                                 
397 It was agreed by every one, cutting across party lines, that food grains were distributed in adequate quantities, for 
the first time in 2007. 
398 Government of India (2007b). As per federal guidelines, such projects were to be taken up under the state’s 
normal development plans and not under the disaster management budget; Pande and Pande (2007) 
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evident that they had not considered the scope of the domain beyond the immediate requirements 
of relief. Consequently, critical respondents said that there was no lack of resources and no 
financial constraints for their disaster management policies. These responses were at the state 
level, and were critical due to their centrality in this domain. One state level participant, while 
admitting that Bihar had not pumped any of its resources beyond utilizing the federal allocation, 
contended that CRF funds were adequate. Therefore, the common refrain, at the state level, was 
that there were no constraints of resources.  
 The observations appeared to be in accordance with theoretical predictions. The range of 
activities was limited, and their focus revealed a ‘relief’ mind set. Bihar’s low level of economic 
growth appeared to explain the findings for the most part. As expected, there were demands for 
long-term mitigation projects, which implicitly pointed to Bihar’s poor resource position. But 
these were heard at lower levels, and the bureaucratic division of work placed them beyond the 
department of disaster management. The limited perspective on disaster management was also 
evident when it was found that many officials did not use the resources at their command, 
especially the non-financial ones. For example, a small minority reported utilizing the federal 
database for logistics, the India Disaster Resource Network (IDRN). Overall, the field reality of 
Bihar did appear to conform to its level of economic development, although it was expected that 
there would be greater complaints about requirements of funds. Instead, there was a 
complacency regarding availability of resources that belied expectations. Stakeholders in 
important positions did not perceive any shortage of funds, and expressed confidence about 
meeting fund requirements in the disaster domain. As stated earlier, respondents at the state level 
were central to questions about resource requirements, as they had a good picture about 
availability of finances. 
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Orissa 
In the preceding section, it was seen that Orissa had figured at the bottom of developmental 
scale, marginally above Bihar. Field research came up with several significant trends, some of 
which were not consistent with theoretical expectations from underdeveloped states. First, most 
respondents reported a variety of functions that addressed all phases of disaster management. 
Orissa carried out a wide range of activities and displayed an approach that reflected a 
comprehensive, all-hazards approach. The next important feature, after the experience of the 
1999 super cyclone, was that majority of the respondents were able to articulate demands for 
numerous long-term and short-term requirements. Finally, despite entailment of resources for 
comprehensive plans, there were no complaints on that count. 
 The first notable feature was that Orissa had embarked on a thoroughgoing, capacity 
building exercise and had undertaken a wide range of activities in disaster management. Elected 
and civil servant respondents, at all tiers of governance, related the policy components of the 
domain that went beyond a ‘relief orientation’. Respondents exuded confidence about Orissa’s 
better communication facilities, alerting systems, remote sensing applications, improved roads, 
increased number of cyclone shelters, and a greater number of brick and mortar houses for the 
poor. They were also proud of the fact that Orissa was the only state in the country to set up the 
Orissa Disaster Rapid Action Force, which was trained and equipped for disaster management.399 
The ODRAF was formed for specific search and rescue operations as well as “relief line 
clearance and overall disaster management” as the OSDMA website put it.400 Many respondents 
were enthusiastic about the materials available with them which included life jackets, buoys, 
                                                 
399 The Central Government had created a common trained manpower in the India Disaster Response Force for use 
of all states, whereas Orissa created the ODRAF from its resources.  
400 OSDMA, http://v3.osdma.org/ViewDetails.aspx?vchglinkid=GL011&vchplinkid=PL034 retrieved 10 October 
2008 
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ropes, tower lights, stretchers, and mechanical cutters. One sarpanch confidently stated that if a 
super cyclone hit them now, they were better prepared. Unlike 1999, now there were proper 
facilities, even for disposal of dead bodies, human and animal. 
 Long-term plans were also on the radar of state level officials. The state had also 
undertaken vulnerability mapping through high-resolution remote sensing. Disaster proofing by 
laying roads above high flood level, incorporating safety norms in construction of buildings, 
apart from ensuring environmental protection within the state in the National Cyclone Risk 
Mitigation Project (NCRMP) were priority areas, claimed an official respondent. Moreover, he 
pointed out that Orissa was the first state to set up a separate agency for disaster management, 
the Orissa State Disaster Mitigation Authority in 1999. In 2006-2007, Orissa spent over Rs.391 
crores ($95 million appx.) for repairing and restoring public infrastructure that had been 
damaged by floods.  
 In a joint program that began long before the super cyclone of 1999, Government of 
India, Government of Orissa, and the German Red Cross covered about 25000 community 
members in training.401 They were trained in search and rescue, first-aid, water and sanitation, 
health and hygiene and other aspects of Community Based Disaster Management. Thereafter, 
mock drills became an integral part of Orissa’s disaster management, and were being held twice 
every year. They included mandatory safety drills in industrial areas, and were monitored by 
OSDMA.  
 At the same time, the respondents informed that traditional concerns were not forgotten 
or overcome. Providing foodgrains remained a major responsibility of the state, in addition to 
arranging boats for evacuation, and search and rescue operations. In the 2006-07, government 
                                                 
401 Stated by officials of Indian Red Cross, Orissa Branch. 
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plied 1336 boats to evacuate 63776 people.402 Public hygiene was another important area. In 
2006-07, a total of 496 medical centers were set up, 220 medical teams were deployed, in 
addition to disinfecting over 50,000 drinking water sources. 403 An amount of Rs.32 crores ($8 
million appx.) was also paid for providing cash relief for damaged crops.404 
 In addition to the activities already taken up, the list of requirements that remained on the 
wish-list of panchayats was equally long and exemplified the second important feature of the 
responses. At panchayat level, the CBDMPs recorded most of the requirements. They included 
road repairs, deepening water bodies, drinking water sources, community halls, training centers, 
sanitation facilities, health centers, cyclone shelters, brick-and-concrete houses, roads, veterinary 
buildings, electricity connections, afforestation projects, and mangrove plantations. Respondents 
also identified a need to increase training in search and rescue as well as first-aid. In the 
preparedness phase, one functionary pointed out the need for a fail proof arrangement for 
stockpiling medicines, and for constructing rural godowns to store supplies. The need for 
strengthening first-responders was also understood, explained a state level official, who spoke 
about the need to provide inaccessible panchayats with Very High Frequency (VHF) radio sets 
for emergency communication. Another identified a need to have weather announcement centers 
in fishermen jetties, providing radios and life jackets in all fishing boats, and to establish marine 
police stations. Some demands included long-term requirements for river embankments that even 
required land acquisition. An example was the demand for a major irrigation project to address 
regular flooding by Subarnekha River.  
 Finally, when it came to perceptions of resource requirements, the response was 
revealing, despite the long list of needs. Except for the massive multi purpose irrigation projects, 
                                                 
402 Government of Orissa (2007) 
403 Ibid 
404 Ibid.  
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there were no complaints of fund shortages. More than problems of insufficient fiscal transfers, 
Orissa’s objection was more with the formula of the federal government, for dovetailing 
mitigation projects with mainstream development projects. Federal policy in all such cases was 
that “expenditure on restoration of infrastructure and capital assets, (except those intrinsically 
connected with immediate relief operations and connectivity with the affected areas and 
population) are required to be met from the Plan funds of the States.”405 Moreover, there were 
complaints about the subjective process of federal fiscal transfers. One state official opined that 
CRF guidelines and methodology were extremely opaque. Worse, he believed that NCCF 
devolutions were decided behind closed doors and were possibly influenced by partisan 
considerations.406 However, it was more of a grouse against the arbitrary and ambiguous criteria, 
although it did amount to a problem with adequate resources. 
 On the question of adequacy of funds, there were mixed responses at lower levels, 
whereas state level respondents conveyed no concerns. Conflicting views were found at local 
body levels, with some considering it an important issue and others saying that it was not. 
However, the few who complained about fund constraints mentioned them in the context of a 
need to take up capital-intensive river projects. Resources were not cited as constraints for other 
requirements. Altogether, every one agreed that fund requirement demands were never brushed 
under the carpet.  
 At the state level, respondents did not believe that there was any problem with accessing 
financial resources. A plurality of officials was of the opinion that CRF allocations were 
sufficient for completing ongoing projects. For a major disaster, one official guesstimated a 
                                                 
405 Government of India (2007b) 
406 Pande and Pande (2007). NCCF was managed by a sub-committee of the National Development Council (NDC), 
which was headed by the Agriculture Minister with the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission, two Union 
ministers and five Chief Ministers, nominated by the Prime Minister, as its members.  
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requirement of Rs 500 crores ($120 million appx.) It was also pointed out that preparedness 
systems, including Early Warning Systems and communication facilities, were being set up by 
Government of India. Meanwhile, Orissa had also acquired considerable experience in accessing 
multilateral sources such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and others. In the 
immediate aftermath, it received a loan of $150 million from the World Bank.407 It also received 
from the British Department for International Development (DFID), a sum of about $55 millions 
for various recovery programs. 
 The responses in Orissa were not according to expectations. To begin with, the wide 
scope of its activities was not predicted for an underdeveloped state. And, importantly, there 
were no reports about any of their plans being constrained by poor resource availabilities. Its 
ability to draw upon multilateral sources of funding helped Orissa overcome the constraints 
imposed by lower levels of development. Consequently, much against expectations, there was no 
complaint about shortage of resources.  
Gujarat 
The situation in Gujarat appeared to conform to the predictions of theory. Of the selected states it 
had the most elaborate administrative abilities to deal with disasters. And it was economically 
the most developed of the four. Data from the field appeared to support the hypothesis to a great 
extent. First, Gujarat had vastly developed its disaster management capacities and was a leader in 
the entire country, and not the sample alone. The second important aspect was that 
notwithstanding its comprehensive policy reform, there were important stakeholders who were 
seeking more capabilities. Finally, there was no concern of resource constraints. 
 A striking feature of Gujarat’s system was its comprehensiveness. They had undertaken a 
host of activities addressing all phases of disaster management. A majority of them spoke of the 
                                                 
407 Sinha, Anil K. (2002); State officials put the World Bank loan at $ 64 millions (appx.). 
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large procurement exercise for obtaining equipment that ranged from simple to advanced and 
heavy machinery, which were useful in emergencies. These ranged from life jackets, ropes, 
inflatable tubes, polythene sheets to heavy earth moving equipment, sophisticated steel- cutting 
and concrete-cutting machinery. Similarly, for urban and transportation accidents, they procured 
cranes, lifts, dumpers, gas cutters, etc. The capabilities of the fire services were exponentially 
increased with more fire tenders, water tankers, and ambulances. Importantly, the procurement 
list was prepared on the advice of personnel who received specialized training. 
  A very significant aspect of their progress was the development of systems for better 
utilization of resources. Respondents were grateful at the introduction of mobile emergency 
medical services, throughout the state. On the communications front, an electronic 
communications backbone was set up through the Gujarat State Wide Area Network (GSWAN) 
linking up all tiers of local government and state government offices. A state initiative in 
preparing an electronic database of suppliers was frequently used during disasters, and addressed 
logistics questions about suppliers.408 For example, a few respondents spoke about the 
experience in 2007 in Surat, when they were able to use the State Disaster Resource Network 
(SDRN) to requisition large numbers of earth moving equipment, and complete the task of 
clearing the streets of slush and debris in a very short time. 
 State level respondents also said that organizational reform was a major part of the 
reform agenda, as seen in the formation of the Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority 
(GSDMA), and Gujarat Institute of Disaster Management (GIDM). The focus was beyond relief 
and response, it was on building capacities. Further, they also built a trained force by earmarking 
one company in every battalion of the state’s reserve police as a disaster management team that 
                                                 
408 The Gujarat initiative was in addition to the federal electronic data base called the India Disaster Resource 
Network  
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was trained in search and rescue operations, as well as other emergency duties. As the 
respondents informed, these were only an illustrative list of measures that included capacity 
building of institutions, and personnel and their skill upgradation.409   
 A significant number of respondents spoke about massive state investments in the 
recovery phase after the 2001 earthquake. One local politician in Kutch mentioned that high 
schools were built, drains desilted and new drinking water pipelines laid in his panchayat. In a 
flood prone area, the river embankment abutting a panchayat was raised as per local demand.  
The government pumped in additional resources for seismic-resistant housing programs, 
rebuilding damaged buildings, retrofitting infrastructural public assets such as dams, highways, 
electricity lines, power substations, and water supply lines in vulnerable zones.410 Much like the 
Japanese,411 the state saw disasters as opportunities, such as town planning in quake-hit Kutch. 
They even acquired land to develop infrastructure.  
 In a situation where comprehensive reform was undertaken, fewer demands for more 
capacities would have been expected. The second significant pattern was that responses revealed 
articulation of more requirements, which included simple demands for boats too. One member of 
the state legislature wanted better alerting systems to warn of impending disasters. In other cases, 
field observations noted specific demands for a river embankment, raising the height of a bridge 
in a flood prone area, and desilting the local waterway, as well as constructing a raised causeway 
over it. Demands were more in industrial locations, where respondents complained about 
inadequate human resources and facilities for off-site plans and drills. Another district level 
official was unhappy about lack of personal protective equipment to deal with chemical disasters 
                                                 
409 Senior officials informed about creation of new posts in each district to man its Disaster Management Cell. New 
posts were created at state headquarters, too, for the Disaster Management Cell. 
410 Government of Gujarat (2005) 
411 Mileti (1983) 
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as well as shortage of transport arrangements. Yet, instead of mistaking these demands for weak 
capabilities, they exemplified a higher level of awareness and a progressive need to continue 
with capacity building. 
 On the subject of paucity of resources, there was an unambiguous response that indicated 
that it was not a concern. An overwhelming number of respondents agreed that it was not an 
issue in Gujarat. The vast procurements and the comprehensive programs were submitted as 
evidence against any shortfalls. Financial resources were never a constraint, stated senior state 
level functionaries. One of them estimated that a total of Rs. 7000crores ($1700mn. appx.) was 
likely to be incurred on post-earthquake reconstruction. Another pointed out that Rs. 700 crores 
($170mn. appx.) was spent in 2000, in addition to CRF allocation, only to combat drought. From 
the World Bank, Gujarat sought a total assistance package of more than $700 millions.412 In 
addition, another loan was secured from the Asian Development Bank for the sum of $ 350 
millions.413 Hence, it was not surprising that most respondents at gram panchayat, block and 
district levels also said that they did not have any problem with obtaining resources for disaster 
management requirements.   
 There was the occasional problem regarding shortage of funds for particular schemes at 
the local level, and in the industrial sector. There seemed to be complacency in the industrial 
domain, possibly due to an ability to rely on the sizeable resources of the private sector. In all the 
other cases, complaints were few, and appeared to be exceptions as most local respondents 
responded that funds were not a serious constraint. Similar was the issue with an official 
expressing his satisfaction over funds for long-term planning. 
                                                 
412 World Bank 
http://www.worldbank.org.in/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/SOUTHASIAEXT/INDIAEXTN/0,,contentMD
K:20041763~menuPK:295625~pagePK:2865066~piPK:2865079~theSitePK:295584,00.html retrieved 1 December 
2008 
413 Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority. 2002. 
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 The results on Gujarat were consistent with the predictions of theory, and appeared to be 
according to expectations. Minor deviations such as unmet requirements in a comparatively 
resource-rich had been seen as insignificant aberrations. However, several intervening factors 
also needed to be explained. It was stated by a legislator that Gujarat’s procurement of 
equipment took place only after policy makers saw the utility of such equipment when it was 
used by international agencies in the post-quake situation of 2001. It lead to the conclusion that 
Gujarat built its capacities because of its experiences in 1998 and 2001, and not due to a rational 
policy analysis that was enabled by a comfortable resource situation. Nearly every respondent 
referred to those defining moments to explain policy reform, rather than their own level of 
economic development. Moreover, the state’s fiscal strength was not the sole contributing factor 
as Gujarat had accessed large amounts of funds from international agencies. 
Tamil Nadu 
Tamil Nadu was always considered a comparatively developed state and it was expected that the 
disaster management system would have been suitably strengthened. One more reason for such 
outcomes was its known vulnerability to cyclones, floods and industrial hazards. Theoretical 
premises would have expected it to be a leader in the field due to its economic clout. Data on 
infrastructure development indicated its strong position, and it was contra-intuitive to find that 
disasters could disrupt its processes and expose its weaknesses as they did during the 2004 
tsunami.414 Their capacity building, under the new paradigm, began in real earnest after 2004. It 
was the first and most important finding. Second and equally important, it was seen that there 
was a marked stress on reconstruction, response, and, to some extent, on mitigation and 
preparedness. Third, their list of requirements was primarily aimed at tackling tsunamis more 
                                                 
414 Asian Development Bank, UN and World Bank (2005) 
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than other hazards. Finally, it was equally significant to note that the state was confident about 
arranging resources for disaster management.     
 Without doubt, it was remarkable to find that their system building, in terms of the new 
paradigm, started after 2004. It was surprising, considering its economic strength and past 
disaster experience. A very large majority of the respondents referred to the tsunami experience 
to relate all or any developments in disaster capacities, in recent times. The next notable feature 
was the great emphasis on reconstruction and response. Attention was also paid, to some extent, 
on mitigation and preparedness. Recovery, however, remained a special focus of Tamil Nadu’s 
disaster management. Priority was accorded to restoring road connectivity, power lines, damaged 
public services of drinking water, sanitation, and health services, said a respondent. A senior 
functionary informed that Special Implementation Units were set up in different departments to 
carry out the tasks of reconstruction. A state level institution was set up to coordinate different 
departments in post-tsunami, reconstruction activity.  
 Another state level official underlined their ambitious recovery program through which 
they attempted to address mitigation concerns. They laid great stress on reducing vulnerability by 
replacing thatched huts with proper houses. By the beginning of 2008, more than 40,000 houses 
were reconstructed and plans were taken up for another 77,000 units away from the sea coast.415 
The other major projects included construction of five new bridges, reconstruction of 1050kms 
of roads and drainages, restoration of 6 fishing harbors, 6 fish landing centers and 236 public 
buildings.416 Respondents also mentioned about installation of illumination facilities on the 
beaches, construction of more bridges, and setting up emergency operations centers, with fail-
                                                 
415 Government of Tamil Nadu (2008) 
416 Ibid 
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safe and redundant communication channels, monitoring facilities, computers, phones, satellite 
nodes and manpower.  
 Traditional concerns about relief distribution also remained with respondents at the block 
level. It was their main activity. However, they also spoke of increased capacities in terms of 
more cyclone shelters, and better warning systems, apart from emergency life saving equipment 
like life jackets, ropes, cutters, and medicinal kits. Even tents were stored. Respondents in urban 
locations listed the activities undertaken in those sites which included roads, sanitary complexes, 
cyclone shelters, drinking water supply projects and shelter belt plantations. Taking note of a 
recently constructed embankment, one sarpanch observed that flooding in his panchayat was no 
longer a problem. 
  Preparedness, in a limited way, was also stressed at some levels. One respondent spoke 
about wireless sets being given to sarpanches in panchayats on the sea coast. It began as a pilot 
project in early warning systems in 55 panchayats, and was being extended to more vulnerable 
panchayats in 13 coastal districts.417 They had installed loudspeakers in different parts of their 
panchayat, said one sarpanch. Another respondent in a popular pilgrim town spoke about mikes 
and loudspeakers being placed in different locations, for communicating emergency messages.  
 The last notable aspect concerned perceptions regarding resources. There was no dearth 
of funds. Respondents were emphatic that there were no resource constraints, especially at the 
state level. In the field, though there were the occasional complaints about not having earth-
moving equipment or reliable communication in fishing boats, it was not seen as an obstacle to 
capacity building. A significant number of senior functionaries who responded to this question 
maintained that there was no shortfall of resources. The problem was not with funds, as one of 
them explained, but with the capacity to execute projects and expend the huge amount of funds 
                                                 
417 Ibid 
    
121 
 
that was pumped in by government and international agencies. The federal government provided 
a liberal rehabilitation package of about Rs.2300crores ($560millions appx.) and the state had 
also obtained $423millions from the World Bank, $143millions from the ADB, and $30millions 
from the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD).418 Another district level 
respondent also agreed and said that at field level, there were constraints of trained manpower 
and equipment, rather than funds. The lone complaint was from a legislator who believed that his 
proposals for taking up a number of river embankment projects were not taken up due to paucity 
of funds. However, as noted in a preceding section, the problem was because of norms for 
funding developmental schemes. 
 The responses in Tamil Nadu were surprising. Even though there was no shortage of 
financial resources, and with its record of development, the state was expected to show greater 
competencies. Yet, it did not happen until the 2004 tsunami. Moreover, it did not fully adopt the 
paradigm shift in policy reform, not having undertaken institutional reform. Its focus on 
reconstruction and response activities were not fully indicative of a comprehensive concern for 
thorough change. 
IV. Conclusions 
The correlation of economic prosperity and disaster effectiveness was best seen in 
Gujarat and Bihar, although there were minor variations to expected responses. The respective 
positions of Orissa and Tamil Nadu did not fully conform to predictions, either. Overall, 
empirical data indicated that economic resources played a major role in the ability of states to be 
effective in disaster management. Virtually, no reform was possible without resources, and it was 
recognized by all stakeholders. Yet, levels of economic development were not the most crucial 
determinant of policy change and capacity building reform. 
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A comparison of the findings showed that Gujarat had taken up comprehensive, all-
hazards disaster management. Vast resources were pumped in the domain not only to ensure 
recovery and mitigation, but to enhance its capacities in preparedness and response phases. 
Bihar, which was the poorest of the selected states, had, expectedly, not invested in capacities 
beyond response and relief objectives. It was overtly concerned with providing relief to the 
affected, in addition to undertaking evacuation and distributing polythene sheets for temporary 
shelter. It remained stuck in the traditional mould of a ‘relief orientation’. On the other hand, an 
underdeveloped Orissa had undertaken substantive steps in comprehensively building up its 
capacities. Setting up the OSDMA as well as the ODRAF was indicative of its thoroughgoing 
nature. In the latter’s case, there was overwhelming attention on reconstruction and restoring 
societal capacities.  
 It was important to note that there was no perception of shortage of funds in any of the 
cases. In all the states, lack of economic resources was not seen as a constraint. While local 
leaders and field level officials did articulate requirements, it was necessary to recognize that it 
did not amount to admission of constraints of resources. And save an occasional state level 
political leader, no other respondent mentioned it. One reason why economic resources did not 
appear to be a critical variable, as one senior official mentioned, was because most of the funding 
was done by the federal government. Formula-based fiscal devolutions provided funds and, as 
one respondent in the federal government stated, no state had voiced any objections.419 Another 
major reason why it was not an important factor was because of the increasing role of 
international agencies. International agencies stepped in as major actors, since they saw disasters 
as humanitarian crises. They played an important role in providing succor, and became sources 
                                                 
419 There were a few respondents in the states who complained about lack of transparency and arbitrariness in the 
NCCF and were unhappy about the provisions of CRF. 
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for accessing funds. It was seen in Orissa, Tamil Nadu and Gujarat, where a number of national 
and international NGOs shouldered part of the response and reconstruction tasks. The last, 
significant feature was that states had recourse to financial resources from multilateral and 
international agencies like the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, USAID, and DFID. 
Consequently, the level of economic development ceased to be a determining factor, as states 
could access funds from federal government, and international agencies and organizations. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that while levels of economic development were important 
factors, they were not critical. With multilateral financing becoming available, economic 
development of a state was no longer a necessary condition, and certainly not the one that 
counted as the most significant. Hence, an Orissa that figured low in all socio-economic indices 
was also able to invest resources and develop its capacities, like the developed Tamil Nadu or 
Gujarat. Conversely, it also did not explain why a more developed state like Gujarat had no 
comprehensive disaster management strategy for responding to different disasters before 2001.420 
It became clear that the impetus for investing in disaster management did not depend on a state’s 
level of economic development, but that other factors proved critical for the change. 
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Chapter 5: Party Systems and Electoral Salience of Disaster Management  
 Of the different factors that impact disaster management outcomes, in particular, and 
public administration in general, the nature of the political party system merited serious 
consideration. Significant correlation with delivery of public goods was seen to depend on the 
party system in an electorally competitive context. Rational choice explanations, based on 
electoral calculations, were found to provide credible explanations about delivery of public 
goods in democracies. It had been noted that party systems played an important role in 
structuring incentives for political actors. Therefore, it was necessary to examine the impact of 
party cohesion and political calculations on administrative outcomes in the disaster domain. 
 In the literature on disaster research, there had been surprisingly few works that examined 
the relationship between the political system and disaster reform. More had explored the impact 
of disasters on the political system.421 An important part of this research was to examine if 
disaster management figured prominently in political calculations and if there was any 
imperative to improve its functioning. Disaster management was an appropriate example of 
public good,422 given the increasing costs of disasters in terms of losses of human life, and 
economic damages. It was incumbent on this research to test this political variable, which had 
not been attempted in scholarly literature on Indian disaster management. Rational choice 
explanations were studied for a correlation with foreign direct investment, growing lawlessness, 
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and problems in governability in Indian provinces,423 but not in emergency management. This 
research aimed to address this gap in disaster research. 
 The hypothesis that had been tested in this chapter, predicted that the nature of the 
political party system created electoral salience for the domain, and had an impact on disaster 
policy reform. At a general, cross-national level, the relationship between democracy and 
delivery of public goods had been the subject matter of a vast body of literature. A major part 
concerned the role of party systems and electoral rules. Cohesive party systems had an incentive 
in delivery of public goods that were considered important for people. The centrality of 
contestation generated pressures for policy outcomes, and delivery of public goods depended on 
the cohesion/fragmentation of the party system and its creation of electoral salience for the 
policy domain. As applied in this research, it tested the argument that the nature of the political 
party system and the measures of electoral salience it generated were primarily responsible for 
the capacity building undertaken by some states. It was predicted that more cohesive party 
systems had positive consequences for disaster management policy domain as they created 
higher electoral salience and a consequential imperative for policy reform.   
 This chapter has been organized in five parts. Literature on party systems and electoral 
compulsions are examined to understand the linkages with delivery of outcomes of public goods. 
It is predicated on the assumption that elected leaders are responsible for delivery outcomes by 
the permanent executive.424 The second section is devoted to describing measures of cohesion of 
political parties. Based on such indicators, the next section studies the selected cases in the 
Indian context. In both these parts, this research relies greatly on the work of Chhibber and 
Nooruddin, who applied the Laakso-Taagepera formula for studying effects of party cohesion on 
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delivery of public goods among Indian states.425 It also brings in literature on the political system 
in India, which deals with political parties. The fourth section comprehends responses obtained 
in field research. Theory is tested for a relationship between electoral salience in cohesive party 
systems and outcomes in disaster management. And finally, the last part analyzes the findings. 
I. Democracy and Delivery of Public Goods 
 The recognition of public administration as a political enterprise had been reinforced with 
the end of the politics-administration dichotomy debate.426 This relationship had been implicit in 
Lasswell’s definition of politics as “…who gets what, when, how.” The end goals of politics 
were to be attained through policies that decided, “…..who gets what”. Public policy, therefore, 
had clear political objectives and political leadership had responsibility for outcomes in 
administration. It found resonance in political science literature, in which rational choice 
theorists explained the actions of self-interest seeking, rational, political actors in terms of their 
calculations to gain or retain electoral power.427 It formed the basis for an inquiry into a 
correlation between electoral salience in cohesive/fragmented party systems and effective 
administration in disaster management. 
Despite extensive scholarly scrutiny, there had been no consensus on the outcomes of the 
relationship between democracy and development. The theoretical possibility for a positive 
correlation was questioned as was the direction of the causal arrow from the former, 
chronologically, to the latter.428 Some even argued that democracy was not conducive to 
economic development because it was not easier for the leadership to provide direction as in 
                                                 
425 Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004) 
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authoritarian regimes. Greater emphasis on immediate consumption rather than investment, 
capital growth constraining higher wages, and greater redistributive policies was said to work 
against growth and development in democracies.429 On the other hand, modernization theory 
reversed the causal arrow by postulating democracy to be the end point of a transition that began 
with economic development.430 Yet, doubts on democracy’s claims of superior socio-economic 
outcomes, were not supported by empirical evidence, but a negative correlation was not 
discovered either.431  
Advocates of democracy stressed its positive features as well as highlighted the negative 
effects of authoritarian regimes. Disputing charges that they constrained growth, democracies 
were seen to generate socio-economic development because of their strengths in “allocative 
efficiency”.432 At a political level, liberty of expression and association in democracies was 
found to work against arbitrariness in governance.433 It was found to be more responsive to 
public needs and aspirations because of strong bonds of responsibility towards citizens. Thereby, 
literature explained that democracies provided more public goods, improved welfare of the poor 
by being more responsive and spending more for such services, and having greater income 
redistribution policies.434 Similarly, it was noted that democracies have tended to spend more on 
social sectors that reflected priorities of a larger number of people.435 Given their broader support 
base, public policies were seen to be better focused at addressing needs and aimed at uplift of a 
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larger number than in other political systems.436 The famous example of famines bore repetition. 
Sen had noted that famines did not occur in democracies. His reasoning was that political 
leadership effectively addressed incipient famine conditions in order to avoid being punished in 
elections by poor voters, and that a full-blown crisis was averted through superior informational 
feedback about field conditions.437 It had been recorded that democracies resulted in superior 
outcomes in social sectors, although there had been complaints of selection bias and 
methodological weaknesses.438 However, a significant finding was that even those statistical 
models that found no correlation between development and regime type, admitted to superior 
distributive effects in democracies.439 
Notwithstanding the inconclusiveness of empirical studies, the theoretical significance of 
a vast theoretical literature necessitated an examination of some of the important processes 
involved. With increasing attention being paid to the role of good governance in development,440 
it was important to understand the institutional structures that determined the latter. The nature of 
the political party system played a major role in shaping the incentives for electoral gains. 
Political parties were the principal actors in the political system, and, to a significant extent, it 
was found that their interests and concerns determined the provision of public goods.441 A more 
cohesive system was expected to provide public goods and influence the discourse during 
elections.  
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For political actors and parties, the central feature of democracy was the element of 
contestation.442 Electoral contests provided a mechanism for operationalizing peaceful 
alternation of power.443 It was seen as the lynchpin in the democratic process, holding a promise 
of office as well as a threat of punishment, connecting the dots between accountability and 
governance.444 It was held that elections provided regular opportunities to “kick the rascals out”, 
while exercising electoral privilege.445 Contestation, through the party systems and the processes 
of elections, had provided a mechanism through which political actors maintained accountability.  
For voters, electoral contests were an issue of choice, and in the process enabled them to 
seek accountability in the political system. To begin with, electoral rules provided an opportunity 
to choose representatives, who reflected voter preferences in policy alternatives. Voters exerted 
their influence by choosing representatives who best mirrored their preferences or articulated 
them better.446 Incumbents, not in line with their voters on preferred outcomes or adopting 
preferred policy positions, were threatened with rejection. Thus, electoral contests became the 
forum through which voters determined and communicated their choices in public policy. As a 
result, it was also surmised that low rates of growth were unlikely in democracies because voters 
punished leaders who did not deliver.447 
Electoral systems, it was seen, went a long way in explaining political competition 
between political actors. Relating it to the number of parties, it had been axiomatically stated that 
certain electoral systems encouraged fewer number of parties. Duverger was credited for the 
postulate that a “simple-majority, single-ballot system favors the two-party system”, which came 
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closest to “a true sociological law”.448 Majoritarian electoral systems which facilitated first-past-
the-post winners through a single-ballot, simple-majority processes were more conducive to 
decisive government formation.449 Fewer parties in the electoral fray meant that they focused on 
programmatic agendas, and not particularistic ones, for they had to “build broad, cross-cleavage 
coalitions” in order to win elections.450 On the other hand, party fragmentation had the potential 
to reduce incentives for broad-based support, as parties only needed to focus on small 
constituencies to win power.   
The nature of the political party system was central to the relationship. Cohesion and 
fragmentation of the party system was a principal factor, on two counts. First, the nature of the 
party system largely determined whether public goods or private goods were provided. Cohesive 
systems, with fewer parties, catered to the needs of all sections and groups of the electorate. 
Fragmented party systems, with their limited constituencies, had an incentive to focus on the 
needs and interests of their support groups.451 Public goods, which were “policies that effect 
welfare of everyone in the state”,452 became the focus of discourse when there were fewer parties 
in the political system. Prospects in the next elections became major motivations for political 
actors to make them issues on the electoral agenda in case of cohesive systems. Electoral 
salience of public goods, in turn, laid down priorities in the governance agenda.453    
Second, it was also seen that cohesive systems were more likely to be positively 
correlated with outcomes of policy change and reform.454 Dealing with its converse, a vast body 
of literature had noted that a fragmented political system, represented by more number of parties, 
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had negative consequences for governance outcomes.455 Several factors were discussed in studies 
that largely focused on fiscal policies. While most talked about the size of the ruling coalition in 
their attempts to correlate with policy outcomes, it was also accepted that the same logic applied 
to the number of political parties in the system. Roubini and Sachs explained that governments 
were not solely responsible for governance outcomes and that the number of parties in a system 
also represented “dispersal” because of alternation of power.456 On a similar line, Chhibber and 
Nooruddin made the argument that the entire party system was a variable, and not merely a 
ruling party or coalition.457 It did not matter if the parties were in the government, as a part of the 
ruling coalition, or in opposition, as legislative rules allowed even smaller or individual players 
to be heard and to impact the policy making exercise. The party system, whether it was cohesive 
or fragmented, had significant consequences because political actors in competitive electoral 
systems always considered their competitor’s position while framing policy.458 Therefore greater 
number of political actors in a system meant that policy makers had to factor many positions, 
negatively impacting the possibilities of reform.  
Empirical studies had noted that a larger number of parties resulted in delayed decision 
making as there was distributional struggle among the different support groups.459 The empirical 
study of Roubini and Sachs confirmed that fragmented systems had sub optimal outcomes in the 
form of higher public debt as there was conflict among different groups.460 Larger coalitions 
were found to delay important policy decisions as there were problems in reaching agreement,461 
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until the concerns of all the groups were addressed.462 It was argued that legislatures were also 
responsible for policy distortions because of their large membership.463 There was a marked 
increase of ‘pork-barrel’ projects, which were unwarranted on purely efficiency considerations. 
A greater number of political parties in Parliament, which indicated fragmentation, resulted in 
poor policy outcomes.464 Political actors being decision makers, a larger number of them 
translated into greater reluctance to and avoidance of taking responsibility.465 Overall, it was held 
that party fragmentation had a negative correlation with policy change. Coalition governments 
were also expected to have shorter tenures,466 increasing the element of uncertainty. Therefore, 
fewer parties were seen to introduce and implement reform in a decisive manner, once the 
electoral imperative became clear.  
Thus, it was hypothesized that states with fewer political parties were more likely to 
stress public goods in elections and also successfully undertake policy reform. Disaster 
management, a good example of public good, was expected to be made an electorally salient 
issue in cohesive systems. Given the competitive context of the party system, it was 
hypothesized that they were most likely to highlight the provision of public goods during 
electoral contests. In turn, the voter salience of these issues became the basis for pursuing an 
active governance agenda that aimed to provide public goods. Conversely, private goods and 
identity concerns of divided constituents were more likely to be prominent in fragmented party 
systems, with lesser likelihood of disaster management being debated in electoral contests. 
Therefore, field research was likely to indicate higher voter salience and greater party cohesion 
in states that had superior outcomes in disaster management in India. In the states of Gujarat, 
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Orissa and, even, Tamil Nadu, there were expectations of better scores on these counts. 
Conversely, Bihar was likely to reveal greater fragmentation and poor electoral salience of 
disaster management, to prove the hypothesis. 
II. Party Cohesion 
The objective in this chapter had been to examine the impact of the party system and the 
electoral salience of the policy domain on outcomes in disaster management in the four states. 
Literature had noted a correlation between electoral processes in a democracy, and policy 
outcomes. It was held that organization of the system of political parties, which were an intrinsic 
part of the democratic process, had a significant impact on improving delivery of public goods. 
Electoral competitiveness of political parties created incentives to provide good governance. 
Policy issue salience with voters, mediated party cohesion and the delivery of public goods. 
Party cohesion was most important, as electoral salience by itself faced enormous hurdles for 
being translated to policy outcomes. 
The next important step was to determine levels of party cohesion and fragmentation in 
the selected states. This research adopted the model developed by Markku Laakso and Rein 
Taagepera for establishing the Effective Number of Parties (ENP).467 It was broadly based on the 
Herfindahl- Hirschman index that was used to establish concentration of industry.468 Their model 
had been applied to derive effective number of electoral or parliamentary parties, based on 
calculations of votes or seats that got in elections. The share of legislative seats was the basis for 
Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties, and votes received by each party enabled the 
calculation of the Effective Number of Electoral Parties. While the former indicated party 
cohesion inside the legislature, the highest body responsible for policy reform, the latter showed 
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party presence in the system as a whole. The basic formula remained the same, with variations 
for seats won or votes polled by each party. It was        
     n = 1/∑p1² 
‘n’ was the effective number of parties and p1 was the proportion of seats or votes of 
each party. A lower score of ENP indicated greater cohesion and concentration. This formulation 
had been widely used in literature, indicating its acceptance as a valid measure of party 
cohesion.469 In the context of India, Chhibber and Nooruddin had used it to explain variation 
across Indian states in delivery of public goods.470  
In addition to the usage of the Laakso-Taagepera model, this research also relied on 
Chhibber and Nooruddin’s theoretical framework for application in Indian disaster research. 
Equally important, their research design had incorporated a comparison among provinces, which 
was also the method adopted in this study. This research was in full agreement with Chhibber 
and Nooruddin for adopting a comparative approach between different provinces. Moreover, for 
the same reasons that they offered, this research also looked at the presence of parties within the 
state legislatures, instead of their share of votes, since state governments were being evaluated 
for effective policy outcomes.471 The Effective Number of (Parliamentary) Parties was a valid 
indicator of the abilities of the state’s highest body for policy deliberation, in bringing about 
reform and change in the delivery of public goods. Disaster management was a responsibility of 
state governments in India and, therefore, ENPs at federal level and in the local bodies were not 
examined. This research accepted their contention and used the framework to test for efficacy of 
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outcomes in disaster management in the four selected states in India. For these reasons, this work 
owes a debt of gratitude to Chhibber and Nooruddin. 
Party cohesion and fragmentation in the highest policy making bodies of Bihar, Gujarat, 
Orissa and Tamil Nadu was determined by the adoption of the Laakso-Taagepera formula. 
General elections to their state legislatures held since 1990 were studied. It was the same time 
period as was used to examine measures of the dependent variable. This research identified a 
political party as one that had been recognized by the Election Commission of India as a national 
party, or a state party recognized in the state in which elections were held, or a state party that 
was a recognized party in other states (and not the one in which elections were held), or a party 
that was classified as being unrecognized.472 The formulation also considered the large number 
of independents who belonged to no party, but whose numbers were significant enough to 
warrant consideration. Hence, to obviate errors of underestimation of fragmentation, small 
parties and independents were treated as separate entities and counted.473 
III. Party System in Indian States 
Most works on party systems included detailed explanations that traced their evolution 
over a long period of time.474 Development of political institutions, such as political parties, had 
been a cause for concern in new democracies for purposes of consolidation and stability.475 In 
comparison, a democratic India, which became independent in 1947, appeared to be a young 
nation without concerns about the stabilizing forces of established political institutions. 
Observers found that political institutions were well developed and that the party system played a 
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major role in ensuring stability in the fledgling democracy.476 In the process, it was found to 
disabuse popular notions about political institutions in newly democratic countries.477 It was seen 
that India’s dominant party helped mediate societal conflict, to a great extent, and enabled 
nation-building. Political decisions accommodated diverse interests, an example of which was 
the linguistic reorganization of provinces in the 1950s.478 
The Indian National Congress (INC), popularly called the Congress, which had 
spearheaded the freedom struggle, was the principal actor in a dominant party system in India’s 
early decades.479 Its centrality was accepted, given its success in addressing organizational issues 
as well as its ability to contain and accommodate sectional conflict.480 The Congress Party was 
also credited for preventing fissiparous tendencies from destabilizing the nation,481 although 
some considered it an anomaly due to the cleavages in Indian society.482 The situation changed 
only in the later decades, when it was noted that there was steady deinstitutionalization and 
increased populism, as well as capture of political parties by interest groups.483 An increase in 
the number of political parties since the 1970s was also recorded.484  
Notwithstanding, the role of Congress party in the nation’s politics, state level politics 
displayed a variety that defeated any attempt at treating party systems uniformly. The role of 
caste in Indian politics was a well known phenomenon.485 Yet, an ideology based party like the 
Communist Party of India (Marxist), established itself as a major force in the states of West 
Bengal, Kerala and Tripura, while religion was a major political force in the western state of 
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Punjab.486 Subsequently, growth of regional political parties became a noticeable trend.487 While 
identity politics had always existed in the form of regional parties in the South Indian state of 
Tamil Nadu, political associations based on other social cleavages arose in states like Bihar and 
Uttar Pradesh.488 In the welter of different party systems in the states, the results from the 
Laakso-Taagepera formulation were in broad conformity with expected outcomes about the 
nature of party cohesion. 489    
Bihar   
Even before 1947, Bihar was always considered a fractious state, where governance was 
difficult.490 The number of parties appeared to validate complaints of governance problems in 
this state.  
Table 10. Elections to Bihar Legislative Assembly, 1990 
491
 
 
PARTY       SEATS CONTESTED          WON          VOTES POLLED         % Votes 
BJP              237             39   3721392                         11.61 
CPI               109             23   2112887                           6.59 
CPM               31               6      427214                           1.33 
INC             323             71   7946635                         24.78  
JD             276          122         8212666                         25.61 
JNP(JP)            158    3     494717                           1.54 
JMM   82             19   1008174                           3.14                         
IPF    82    7     889068                           2.77 
JKD    28    1     134827                           0.42 
MCOR  11   2       70365                           0.22 
SOP(L)  47   1     109871                           0.34 
IND           4320             30   5907134                         18.42 
 
Total seats               324 
Effective Number of Political Parties       4.67 
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Bihar was known for social cleavages in the polity.492 From the table, it was evident that 
there was a high level of party fragmentation, which possibly mirrored societal divisions. The 
large number of legislative parties had serious implications for public administration. An 
important feature was that fragmentation was consistently high, although the number of parties 
declined in later elections.  
Elections were held regularly, at five-yearly intervals in 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005. 
However in February 2005, they did not throw up a decisive majority for any one political party 
or grouping, resulting in general elections after eight months. The 1990 elections marked the end 
of the Congress, ascent of the Janata Dal (JD), which remained in power till 2005, as Rashtriya 
Janata Dal (RJD).  
Table 11. Elections to Bihar Legislative Assembly, 1995 
 
PARTY    SEATS CONTESTED      WON       VOTES POLLED     % Votes 
BJP   315    41   4480363                    12.96 
CPI     61     26   1645765             4.76 
CPM     31       6    497570             1.44 
INC              320    29   5622952           16.27 
JD              264              167   9669589                    27.98 
SAP              310       7   2440275             7.06 
BSP              161       2     462291                      1.34 
JMM    63     10     803132                      2.32 
JPP    33       2     116936                      0.34 
SP             176       2     577067                      1.67 
BPP             259       1   1050557                      3.04 
CPI(ML)(L)             89      6    814034                      2.36 
CVP              15       1       95935                      0.28 
JKP              29       1      63780                      0.18 
JMM(M)            58       3     331821                      0.96 
JMM(S)             22       6     436102                      1.26  
MCOR   5       2       100992                      0.29 
IND         5674     12   4772494                    13.81 
 
Total seats      324 
Effective Number of Political Parties         3.345 
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 Despite more parties, an important result of this election was that the JD gained a simple 
majority on its own strength. In the earlier 1990 elections, it had to depend on other parties for its 
survival, not having a simple majority on its own strength.   
 
Table 12. Elections to Bihar Legislative Assembly, 2000 
 
PARTY    SEATS CONTESTED    WON   VOTES POLLED          % Votes 
BJP   168    67   5424687                    14.64 
BSP    249    5   701936                        1.89 
CPI    153   5  1334386                      3.60 
CPM    21   2   338198                        0.91 
INC    324    23   409646                      11.06 
JD(U)    87    21   239667                        3.47  
CPI(ML)(L)   107    6   925253                        2.50 
JMM    85   12   1306152                      3.53 
RJD    293    124   10500361                  28.34 
SAP    120    34  3205746                      8.65 
UGDP   6    2   9629                            0.26 
KSP    7    2   132835                        0.36 
MCO    9    1   104450                        0.28 
IND                 1482    20   4211341                    11.37 
 
Total seats      324 
Effective Number of Political Parties 4.717 
  
  
 The JD underwent splits and emerged as the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD). The RJD was 
able to retain power by taking the support of other parties, including its one-time rival, the 
Congress. A coalition government came to power after the elections, and included the Congress. 
After the 2000 election, a new province, Jharkhand, was carved out of Bihar. Consequently, the 
number of legislative seats came down from 324 to 243. The BJP which had won more seats in 
south Bihar went on to form the government in the newly constituted state of Jharkhand. The 
creation of the new state had important ramifications for Bihar, as the new state retained an 
overwhelming majority of mineral resources and the main sources of revenue. The state that 
remained was predominantly agrarian. 
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Table 13. Elections to Bihar Legislative Assembly, February 2005 
PARTY    SEATS CONTESTED       WON   VOTES POLLED            %Votes 
BJP    103    37   2686290                    10.97 
BSP    238    2   1080745                      4.47 
CPI    17    3   386236             1.58 
CPM    12    1   156656              0.64 
INC     84     10   1223835              5.00  
NCP    31    3   240862              0.98 
CPI(ML)(L)    109     7   610345                         2.49 
JD(U)    138    55   3564930                     14.55 
RJD     215    75   6140223                      25.07 
SP    142    4   658791                          2.69 
LJP     178    29   3091173                      12.62 
IND    1493    17   3957945                      16.16 
 
Total seats      243 
Effective Number of Political Parties 5.201 
 
 The state went through a political crisis for eight months as no political grouping had 
won enough seats for a simple majority. Finally, elections were held again in October 2005 and 
they provided a clear majority for a center-right wing coalition.   
Table 14. Elections to Bihar Legislative Assembly, October 2005 
 
PARTY  SEATS CONTESTED     WON    VOTES POLLED           % Votes 
 
BJP   102    55   3686720                             15.65 
BSP   212    4      981464                               4.17 
CPI   35     3     491689                               2.06 
CPM                10    1     159906                       0.68 
INC   51    9   1435449                       6.09 
NCP     8    1     186936                       0.79 
CPI(ML)(L)  85    5     559326                               2.37 
JD(U)            139             88   4819759                             20.46 
LJP            203             10   2615901                             11.10 
RJD            175             54   5525081                             23.45 
SP            158   2     594266                               2.52 
AJVD     7    1             49869                               0.71 
IND             746              10    2065744                               8.77 
 
Total seats      243 
 
Effective Number of Political Parties  4.238 
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 It was evident from the above that there were a large number of actors inside the state legislature. 
By averaging all the results, Bihar had an Effective number of 4.434 political parties since 1990. 
Even when the October 2005 election results were not counted, if considered a runoff, the effective 
number of political parties, remained higher at 4.483. Among the four selected cases, it had the 
highest score on fragmentation, which gave a fair indication of the difficulties in bringing about 
much needed policy reform in disaster management. A discussion of the dependent variable had 
already indicated the state’s weak performance, and the above data provided prima facie 
confirmation. 
Gujarat 
On the western coast of India, Gujarat had been a part of the Bombay province, until it became a 
separate state in 1960 as a result of linguistic reorganization. The Congress Party held sway over the 
state till 1995, relying on its vote banks and coalitions.493 Thereafter, the right wing Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) had won every election in the state in 1995, 1998, 2002 and 2007. 
Table 15. Elections to Gujarat Legislative Assembly, 1990
494
 
PARTY     SEATS CONTESTED      WON     VOTES POLLED           % Votes 
 
BJP            143    67   3386256                       26.69 
INC            181    33   3899159                       30.64 
JD            147    70   3725148                       29.36 
YVP             61     1   107220                         0.85 
IND           980     11   1323790                      10.44  
 
Total seats      182 
Effective Number of Political Parties         3.158 
 
After 1995, the contest was mainly between two parties, BJP and the Congress Party. And as the 
following tables revealed, the BJP was successful in winning a majority of seats in all the 
                                                 
493 Yagnik and Sud. (2004) 
494 These included political parties that won seats in the state legislature. They had been indicated in an abbreviated 
form here and their complete names had been provided in Appendix B. Independents had been indicated as a 
separate category. 
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subsequent elections. The 1995 elections saw only these two parties win seats, in addition to a 
number of independent candidates.  
Table 16. Elections to Gujarat Legislative Assembly, 1995 
 
PARTY    SEATS CONTESTED      WON    VOTES POLLED          % Votes 
BJP    182    121   7672401                     42.51 
INC    181     45   5930216                     32.86 
IND    1617     16   3376637                     18.71 
 
Total seats      182 
Effective Number of Political Parties 1.985 
 
 Factional politics had occupied center stage after 1995, as there was a split in the BJP and 
a breakaway faction came to power, supported by arch rival Congress. Nevertheless, it did not 
last long. Long before the expiry of the Assembly’s tenure, the incumbent government lost 
majority.  
Table 17. Elections to Gujarat Legislative Assembly, 1998 
PARTY    SEATS CONTESTED         WON          VOTES POLLED      % Votes 
BJP    182    117   7300826                       44.81 
INC    179     53   5677386               34.85 
JD      91      4     429283                 2.63  
AIRJP   168        4   1902171                       11.68 
SP    33      1       64913                          0.40 
IND    415      3    854142                          5.24 
 
Total seats      182 
Effective Number of Political Parties  2.003 
 
 The next elections were held after the 2001 earthquake that devastated large parts of 
Gujarat. The results of the 2002 elections, therefore, held great significance for this research. As 
the results showed, the incumbent party was able to retain power, with an increase in the number 
of its seats. Not only did the BJP gain more seats, it also gained in terms of votes. Another 
significant feature of the 2002 election was that despite a reduction in the number of seats, the 
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opposition Congress also received more number of votes than the previous election. Both the 
main parties gained at the expense of smaller political parties.   
Table 18. Elections to Gujarat Legislative Assembly, 2002 
PARTY    SEATS CONTESTED        WON        VOTES POLLED      % Votes 
 
BJP    182    127   10194353         49.85 
INC    180    51     8033104         39.28 
JD(U)      29     2       175024                  0.86 
IND   344     2       1169711                  5.72 
 
Total seats      182 
Effective Number of Political Parties  1.768 
 
 The 2007 elections returned the BJP to power again, although with a slightly reduced 
majority. It won the same number of seats as in 1998, though it received nearly 5% more votes. 
  Table 19. Elections to Gujarat Legislative Assembly, 2007 
 
PARTY    SEATS CONTESTED        WON         VOTES POLLED      % Votes 
 
BJP    182   117   10739972                49.12 
INC    173    59     8309449          38.00 
JD(U)     35      1       144062                  0.66 
IND    480     2      1444605                  6.61 
NCP                              10                                3                         230517                  1.05 
Total seats      182 
 
Effective Number of Political Parties 1.928 
 
 
 The results demonstrated a high level of cohesiveness of the party system in Gujarat. For 
all elections since 1990, the effective number of political parties in Gujarat closely approximated 
a two-party system, with a score 2.168 parties.  It was dominated by one party, the BJP, although 
it was evident that the main opposition party had also received a significant number of votes. 
Party cohesion was consistent with the policy reform that was taken up. The results provided a 
credible explanation to the scale of reform. 
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Orissa 
The eastern state of Orissa had never been a consistent support base for the Congress. The 1990 
elections were an electoral debacle for the Congress, due to a landslide victory for the Janata Dal. 
The latter won a mind boggling 83% of the assembly seats, in one of the most one-sided election 
results. The performance of the Congress Party was dismal, winning less than a fourteenth of all 
seats. 
Table 20. Elections to Orissa Legislative Assembly, 1990 
495
 
 
PARTY      SEATS CONTESTED      WON      VOTES POLLED         % Votes 
BJP      63       2   390060                           3.56 
CPI       9       5   326364                           2.98 
CPM       3       1     91767                           0.84 
INC   145     10            3264000                          29.78 
JD   139   123            5884443                          53.69 
IND    389       6   807000                           7.36 
 
Total seats     147 
Effective Number of Political Parties 1.416 
 
 Despite its earlier majority, the JD lost power to the Congress in 1995. The Congress 
wrested victory, even though it received only 4% more votes than its incumbent rival. 
Table 21. Elections to Orissa Legislative Assembly, 1995 
 
PARTY    SEATS CONTESTED      WON     VOTES POLLED         % Votes 
BJP           144    9   1245996                      7.88 
CPI             21    1     271199                      1.71 
INC           146   80   6180237             39.08           
JD           146    46   5600853             35.41 
JMM            16    4     307517                       1.94 
JPP             4    1       27494                       0.17 
IND         682    6   1661485                      10.51 
 
Total seats      147 
Effective Number of Political Parties 2.507 
 
                                                 
495 These included only those political parties that won seats in the state legislature. They have been indicated in an 
abbreviated form here and their complete names have been provided in Appendix D. Independents have been 
indicated as a separate category. 
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 The next elections were held in 2000, after the 1999 super cyclone. The incumbent 
Congress Party was routed by the winning coalition of Biju Janata Dal (BJD) and BJP. An 
increase in the number of parliamentary parties was evident.  
Table 22. Elections to Orissa Legislative Assembly, 2000 
 
PARTY    SEATS CONTESTED     WON    VOTES POLLED             % Votes 
BJP    63    38            2570074                        18.20  
CPI    29     1   172398                          1.22 
CPM    15     1   109256                          0.77 
INC             145    26            4770654                        33.78 
JD(S)    24     1   118978                          0.84 
AITC    36      1   110056                          0.78 
BJD    84    68            4151895                         29.40 
JMM    21     3    301729                           2.14 
IND             236     8            1506216                         10.66 
 
Total seats     147 
Effective Number of Political Parties 3.194 
 
 The performance in the 2000 elections was repeated in 2004, and the ruling coalition 
retained power, although the Congress improved its tally of seats as well as the polled votes. 
Importantly, the number of parties increased from before. 
Table 23. Elections to Orissa Legislative Assembly, 2004 
 
PARTY    SEATS  CONTESTED      WON    VOTES POLLED         % Votes 
 
BJP          63    32   2898105                    17.11 
CPI           6                   1     129989                      0.77 
CPM           3                  1       93159                      0.55 
INC       133                38   5896713                    34.82 
BJD         84                61   4632280                    27.36 
JMM         12                 4     301777                      1.78 
OGP          4                 2     217998                      1.29 
IND       295                   8    2065650                    12.20 
 
Total seats      147 
Effective Number of Political Parties 3.475 
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 Largely on the basis of a highly skewed 1990 result, the effective number of political 
parties averaged over four general elections, stood at 2.64. An important feature was an 
increasing trend towards growing fragmentation in the last three elections. Yet, overall it 
continued to have a higher score on cohesion, with fewer effective political parties. A notable 
feature was that the policy reform process began after 1999, even though the 1990 elections had 
produced the most cohesive result. Apart from that significant point, there was a neat correlation 
between the high level of party cohesion and the policy reform in capacity building.  
Tamil Nadu  
This southern state was long considered as the flag bearer of regional politics. Regional parties 
had held sway in Tamil Nadu since the 1960s.The Congress party, which had been the dominant 
party in the country, had not headed a government in the state since 1967. Even national parties 
underwent a regional transformation in the state.496 The issues and the parties in this state had a 
consistent, regional orientation. While they entered into alliances with national parties for federal 
politics, only the regional parties retained power at state level. Scholars had termed it the closest 
to a two party system, given the alternation of power between two major regional parties.497 A 
striking feature of election results in this state had been the regularity with which the two 
regional rivals, Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the Anna Dravida Munnetra 
Kazhagam (ADMK)498 replaced each other in government. In most cases, they replaced each 
other with nearly the same margin of victory in terms of seats or votes. The details in the 
following tables made it clear.  
                                                 
496 Hart (1988); Weiner and Field (1975); Kothari (1975) 
497 Weiner and Field (1975) 
498 It was known as the ADK (JL) in 1989, ADK in 1991, and AIADMK in 2006  
    
147 
 
Table 24. Elections to Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, 1989
499
 
PARTY     SEATS CONTESTED      WON       VOTES POLLED       % Votes  
CPI    13    3   295170                        1.22 
CPM    21   15   851351                        3.53 
INC             214   26  4780714                     19.83 
ADK     4    2   148630                        0.62 
DMK            202           150            8001222                      33.18 
ADK(JL)           198             27            5098687                      21.25 
ADK(JR)           175    2            2214965                        9.19 
JNP              10    4              282647                        1.17 
IND           2123    5            2164484                        8.98 
 
Total seats      234 
Effective Number of Political Parties 2.266 
 
 Federal politics, the death of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991, and perceptions of the ruling DMK as 
a party favorable to his killers, led to an invocation of Article 356 of the constitution to dismiss 
the government and bring the state under central rule.500 Thereafter, elections had been held 
every five years, in due course. 
Table 25. Elections to Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, 1991 
 
PARTY    SEATS CONTESTED      WON       VOTES POLLED        % Votes 
CPI       10      1     305143                         1.24 
CPM       22      1     777532                         3.15 
ICS(SCS)       13      1       57249                         0.23 
INC       65    60   3743859                       15.19 
JD      15      1     415947                         1.69 
ADK     168    164  10940966                      44.39 
DMK     176      2    5535668                      22.46 
PMK     194      1    1452982                        5.89 
TMK       11      2      371645                        1.51 
IND    1771      1      390227                        1.58 
 
Total seats      234 
Effective Number of Political Parties 1.795 
                                                 
499 These include only those political parties that won seats in the state legislature. They have been indicated in an 
abbreviated form here and their complete names have been provided in Appendix E. Independents had been 
indicated as a separate category. 
500 Government of India (2007). Article 356 of the Indian Constitution enabled the federal government to dismiss the 
state government for failure of constitutional machinery. 
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 Having lost power in 1991 to its regional rival, the DMK staged a come back with an 
emphatic majority of seats and votes. 
Table 26. Elections to Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, 1996 
 
PARTY    SEATS CONTESTED      WON      VOTES POLLED         % Votes 
 
BJP    143    1    490453                           1.81 
CPI    11    8   575570                           2.12 
CPM    40    1   456172                           1.68 
JD    16    1   117801                           0.43 
JP    50    1   150134                           0.55 
ADMK   168    4   5831383                       21.47 
DMK    182    173   11423380                     42.07 
FBL    1    1   75324                            0.28 
PMK    116    4   1042333                        3.84 
TMC(M)   40    39   2526474                        9.30 
IND    3857     1   1022339                        3.76 
 
Total seats      234 
Effective Number of Political Parties        1.736 
 
 The pattern of anti-incumbency sentiment was evident in the loss of the incumbent DMK. 
The difference in the number of seats was disproportionate to the votes received, and the ADMK 
gained a hundred seats more than its rival. 
Table 27. Elections to Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, 2001 
PARTY    SEATS CONTESTED      WON     VOTES POLLED        % Votes 
BJP                21    4   895352                        3.19 
CPI            8    5   444710                        1.59 
CPM            8    6   470736                        1.68 
INC          14    7   696205                        2.48 
ADMK       141           132            8815387                       31.44 
DMK        183             31            8669864                       30.92 
FBL            1    1     39248                         0.14 
PMK          27             20            1557500                         5.56 
TMC(M)         32             23            1885726                         6.73 
MADMK          3               2              129474                         0.46  
IND       978               3            1728440                         6.16 
 
Total seats      234 
Effective Number of Political Parties 2.816         
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 After the South Asian tsunami of December 2004, elections were held in early 2006. 
Conforming to the pattern of anti-incumbency, the ruling AIADMK gave way to a coalition, led 
by the DMK party. 
Table 28. Elections to Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly, 2006 
PARTY    SEATS CONTESTED      WON      VOTES POLLED        % Votes 
CPI      10      6     531740                      1.61 
CPI(M)     13      9     872674                      2.65 
INC      48    34   2765768                      8.38 
AIADMK   188    61  10768559                    32.64 
DMK    132    96    8728716                    26.46 
MDMK     35      6    1971565                      5.98 
PMK      31    18    1863749                      5.65 
DMDK   232      1    2764223                      8.38 
VCK       9      2      426321                      1.29 
IND            1222      1       995345                      3.02 
 
Total seats      234 
Effective Number of Political Parties         3.757        
 
 The predominance of the two regional parties was evident, as was the eclipse of national 
players. The effective number in Tamil Nadu was 2.47 political parties, when all the five 
elections since 1989 were counted. And if only the last four were considered, in which the 
legislature completed its full term of five years, the effective number increased marginally to 
2.53 parties. The remarkable feature of Tamil Nadu was the unfailing regularity with which 
incumbent governments were voted out. However, the higher levels of party cohesion provided a 
plausible explanation to the reform process that was begun after 2004. 
IV. Electoral Salience of Disaster Management 
 The governance implications of party cohesion were expected to result in electoral 
salience of policy issues. Political parties created voter salience of public goods and, thereafter, 
pursued them in governance agendas. The First-Past-The-Post electoral system, which was 
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followed in India, encouraged parties to advocate programmatic issues that appealed across 
cleavages and divisions in society.501 The Laakso-Taagepera formulation provided a scale of 
party cohesion within state legislatures, with higher scores indicating greater fragmentation. 
While a score of two represented a perfect two-party system, it indicated the predominance of a 
single party if it was less than two. Accordingly, it was found that that party cohesion was 
highest in Gujarat, followed by Tamil Nadu and Orissa, with Bihar being the most fragmented. 
 At a fundamental level, a positive correlation was found between party cohesion and 
policy reform. It was noted that Gujarat, Orissa and Tamil Nadu, which had relatively cohesive 
systems, had undertaken significant capacity building in disaster management. Yet, it was 
necessary to derive a direct relationship between the two and, hence, one hundred and seventy 
nine stakeholders in the domain were interviewed in field research. However, it was not possible 
to ask about party cohesion or fragmentation, and its relationship with policy outcomes. It was 
explained in an earlier section that party systems impacted voter salience of issues by 
emphasizing the public or private nature of goods in elections. Hence, the respondents were 
asked about the electoral salience, which was the intervening variable, of disaster management. 
Controlling for the timing of disasters, as far as possible, by considering the time gap between 
their occurrence and elections, the interviewees were asked about the role played by disaster 
management in electoral contests to the state legislature. Electoral resonance of the policy issue 
was tested, with the expectation that it would have higher salience with voters in states with 
cohesive party systems. In the process, they would have proved to be significant and powerful 
drivers of reform. 
 Respondents were asked if disaster management was an important public issue. Second, 
they were asked to recollect if it had played an important role in party agendas during elections. 
                                                 
501 Chhibber and Nooruddin (2004) 
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The third query was more a follow-up to the second, and participants were asked to give details 
if there was electoral salience or provide reasons if there was none. It was presumed that 
incumbent parties, in cohesive party systems, would have made it an issue if they had been able 
to deliver favorable outcomes, and the challenger was expected to mount attacks if they had not. 
The common feature of vulnerability to hazards was presumed to render it an important public 
good in all states.  
 The respondents were political functionaries who took part in elections to the state 
legislature as well as the local bodies. Being political activists, they were expected to be 
knowledgeable about contentious issues that dominated elections. Local body leaders were also 
included because they formed the grass roots support base for all elections, whether it was to the 
state legislature or federal Parliament. On the other hand, bureaucratic personnel at different 
levels of governance were interviewed as they were associated with the conduct of elections. 
Their constant interaction with political leaders during and after elections made them relevant 
stakeholders. 
Bihar 
All the respondents in Bihar, without exception, accepted that disaster management was an 
important and relevant public good.  However, they were equally emphatic that it was not an 
issue that dominated or even figured in election agendas. They were nearly unanimous about the 
absence of electoral salience of this issue. It was not an issue that figured in the list of 
contentious items that decided electoral fortunes. These responses were same at all levels, from 
both elected officials and civil servants.  
 All of them claimed that it was the case in all elections, and not merely to the state 
assembly, with one exception. One case was mentioned by a block level official, in which an 
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incumbent candidate affiliated to a prominent national party did lose in the elections to gram 
panchayat, due to poor performance in tackling disasters. It was an exception rather than a 
significant observation for two reasons. As pointed out, this research was considering elections 
only to the state legislature whereas this case related to a gram panchayat. States had primary 
accountability and local body leadership did not bear ultimate responsibility for disaster 
management. Electoral salience appeared to have been attributed wrongly. And such conclusions 
found support from another respondent who made no mention of the incident, despite belonging 
to the party that lost. 
 The lack of electoral salience did not remain a puzzle either. A couple of elected leaders 
replied that good governance was never forgotten by people during elections for it created 
goodwill and support for the incumbent party. Yet, the fact that it did not actually play a role was 
answered in terms of greater salience of other and more contentious issues. An extremely large 
section of respondents pointed out that the issue of caste mattered most in elections. It 
overwhelmed all other issues, including good governance. The centrality of social cleavages had 
long been recognized in Bihar.502 Political actors, at state and local levels, were near unanimous 
in saying that elections were decided on the basis of primordial affinities. One public 
representative elaborated that caste, group loyalties, money, and muscle power were the 
determinants of electoral victory, and not issues of governance.  
 Some rationalized that the time gap between disaster occurrence and elections as well as 
the short span of public memory affected issue salience. Another significant reason put forward 
by a few respondents, was that political divisions were subsumed to the immediate task of 
disaster response. A few interviewees proffered the reason of low levels of education as a result 
                                                 
502 Frankel (2006) 
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of which people continued to associate natural disasters with divine will. Consequently, it was 
rationalized that the incumbent government was not held responsible for poor disaster 
administration, to a great extent.  
 As a result, despite recognizing its importance, disaster management never became a 
salient issue during elections. The responses were according to expectations, since a fragmented 
party system, as in Bihar, was predicted to be providing private goods that addressed limited 
support groups. Hence, despite the recognized importance as a public good, it never entered 
electoral discourse. 
Orissa   
Disaster governance in Orissa had stood out for its pioneering, capacity building reform. A 
political party system explanation was consistent with the low scores on the Laakso-Taagepera 
formulation on fragmentation. The ENP gave a good indication of the fewer obstacles that were 
likely to hamper reform.  
 The party cohesion variable was reflected through the factor of electoral salience. 
Disaster management was seen to be an important issue that resonated with voters. It was found 
to be especially salient in the 2000 elections. They took place soon after the super cyclone in 
1999, leading to a significant number of respondents attributing the loss of the incumbent 
Congress party to its handling of the disaster. A significant section of participants, some of 
whom had contested the 2000 elections, were of the opinion that the perceived failure in 
providing public goods in the context of the 1999 super cyclone had led to the defeat of the 
incumbent Congress Party. There were a few respondents who believed, instead, that dissidence 
and infighting in the ruling party were responsible. Conceding that the latter scenario was partly 
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true, as one member of that party admitted, he still highlighted the salience of the policy issue 
during elections.  
 There were a good number of respondents, who believed otherwise. They felt that voters 
had not considered disaster management performances or promises during elections. Even in the 
2000 elections, they disputed its central role on two counts. First, as one legislator said, it was 
erroneous to conflate political sentiments in a few districts with the whole state. In his opinion, 
the 1999 cyclone affected only a couple of coastal districts. While conceding that the politics of 
Orissa was controlled by coastal districts, he did not believe that it figured on the political 
agenda. Moreover, he subscribed to the argument that the loss was due to dissidence and 
factional politics in the party. A volunteer working with an NGO was of the firm opinion that 
governance in disaster management never became an election issue.  
 A second line of reasoning was followed by another legislator, although it went against 
the assumption of political responsibility and control of administrative actions. He drew a subtle, 
but important distinction between administrative machinery and its political leadership. He 
believed that the former were held responsible for public goods in disaster management and that 
the political actors were not penalized because they had no role to play in the top-down, 
bureaucratic exercise. 
 Overall, based on the significant number of those who believed that it was salient, it was 
fair to accept its importance as an explanatory factor, at least in the 2000 election. Importantly, 
those who highlighted its significance, however, did not mention a role for the disaster domain in 
subsequent elections. A possible explanation was the proximity of elections to the disaster event. 
It, therefore, became clear that the issue salience of disaster management in the 2000 elections 
appeared to have been an important driver of policy reform in Orissa and that the incumbent 
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party lost power for a variety of reasons, one of which was its poor performance in the super 
cyclone.  
Gujarat 
Of all the selected cases in this study, Gujarat had reported the highest score in party cohesion. 
Its performances in disaster management were also consistent with predictions. Yet, on the issue 
of electoral salience, the results were curiously inconsistent with expectations. One of the 
elections was held in 2002, after the Kutch earthquake in 2001. The incumbent BJP party came 
back to power, returning with an even higher tally of legislative seats than before. It would have 
been entirely consistent with the hypothesis if the incumbent party had used its record in disaster 
governance to seek votes. The responses in the field, however, indicated a medium level of 
salience for the issue during the elections. 
 The responses regarding lack of electoral salience fell into two broad categories. First, a 
larger group held a seemingly atheoretical opinion that governance and development were 
beyond politics and political divisiveness. Therefore, they concluded, it never became a 
contentious issue on which elections were fought. Many of them believed that disasters presented 
an opportunity to undertake thorough and far-reaching developmental reforms. They saw no 
electoral considerations for the delivery of public goods. Another explanation relied on their 
strong tradition of community organization during crises. In several village panchayats, there 
were examples of community mobilization and consensus building among all political groupings, 
when it came to disaster management. They came together, overcoming partisan divisions. As a 
surprising example, they pointed out to Gujarat’s conflict with the center for more funds, after 
the 2001 earthquake. It was significant to note that the state did not hesitate to clash with the 
center, even though the same political party was in power at both places. 
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 A significant group of respondents, however, believed that election contests did have 
disaster management on their agendas. Especially at the level of state politics, these respondents 
considered it to be an important political issue. There were political leaders who mentioned that, 
in the past, opposition parties had tried to make it an election issue. Yet, it emerged that the 
ruling party was not pro-active in making it electorally salient. Instead, it preferred to respond to 
challenger’s attacks, rather than highlight its own performance.  
 The findings did not provide clarity to the theoretical premises. Especially, considering 
the greater party cohesion that co-varied with better capacities, there were expectations of higher 
electoral salience too. However, field level findings were equivocal with respect to the 
expectations of voter salience. The reluctance of the ruling party to reap electoral rewards was 
difficult to explain, while the factor of party cohesion appeared to be a significant predictor. The 
tendency of subsuming political differences to tackle disaster policy reform appeared to 
strengthen the expectation from cohesive party systems even without the expected salience 
during elections. 
Tamil Nadu  
The 2006 elections took place in Tamil Nadu, shortly after a major disaster event, as had 
happened in Orissa and Gujarat. Less than a year and a half after the disastrous South Asian 
tsunami of December 2004, elections were held. Considering its proximity to general elections in 
May 2006, disaster management had the potential to become a major election plank. Tamil 
Nadu’s reputation as being closest to a two party system, as well as its lower scores on the 
Laakso-Taagepera scale, indicated greater party cohesion. A finding of higher voter salience of 
the disaster domain would have been entirely consistent with the hypothesis.  
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 The results, however, were not according to expectations. Disaster management was not 
considered a major electoral issue, by a large number of respondents. Considering its higher level 
of cohesion and its record in policy reform, it was a surprising finding. One respondent 
rationalized by saying that the affected area and its population was not large, and was limited to 
the coastal zone abutting the sea. However, it did appear to be an important issue in local body 
elections, even though it was the state that was responsible for disaster management. There were 
a few who pointed to its impact on local body elections. One political functionary pointed out 
that good work in disaster management had brought them electoral rewards, albeit in local 
elections to the municipal body. Another also said that his good work had helped him win local 
body elections.  
 The most important unit of governance for disaster management was the state, and it was 
reported by some that disaster management never became an important agenda in the state 
assembly elections. Elections at this level were decided by regional considerations and coalition 
politics, believed one legislator. It was said that despite the ruling ADMK having done a good 
job after the tsunami, it could not derive political capital of it since it appeared that people 
appreciated individual efforts, and not the party plank. As mentioned by one of the respondents, 
other issues gained predominance during electoral contests, and governance outcomes in disaster 
management were outside the pale of significance. 
 The incumbent party in 2004, the ADMK, had taken up policy reform in the post-tsunami 
period. Yet, only a few respondents believed that provision of public goods provided electoral 
rewards at the state level. A political functionary said that disaster policy was not used as an 
election issue. Interestingly, he admitted that the AIADMK had done good work in the post-
tsunami phase, as a result of which they did get many votes. But it was not sufficient to win 
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seats.  Its policy achievements did not figure in the election contest and it could not prevent its 
rival from returning to power. The conclusion that seemed obvious was that elections were 
decided not on disaster management performance, despite experiencing an once-in-a-lifetime 
tsunami, and despite the government being seen to have done good work.  
 The answer seemed to lie in Tamil Nadu’s regional politics. Not only were national 
agendas determined by regional priorities, the contests also exhibited a significant anti-
incumbency trend. While, such rationale did not preclude policy domains from dominating 
electoral contests, in this case the answer seemed to be a regular, overriding, anti-incumbency 
sentiment that unseated ruling government every five years, irrespective of their policy and 
performance.503 As many respondents explained there were other issues that took precedence 
over disaster management, and the incumbent party paid the price. The effects on local politics 
were clear cut and revealed the explanatory power of rational choice theorization. It raised 
important questions that necessitate a study of local body politics and disaster management. Yet, 
at the state level, where this study was undertaken, the impact was not unequivocal. 
Nevertheless, even when the disaster domain lacked electoral salience, the state took up and 
strengthened policy reform, which proved consistent with formulation about the impact of the 
political party system.               
      V. Conclusion 
 This chapter tested the hypothesis which predicted superior outcomes as functions of 
party cohesion, and mediated by voter salience of the policy issue. It had been argued that 
fragmented systems were suited to promote private goods, to pay off support groups. Therefore, 
greater party cohesion created electoral salience for broad-based programmatic policies resulting 
                                                 
503 Guruswamy, Baitha and Mohanty (2006) noted that there was economic progress in the state in the 1980s, as well 
as alternation of power between the two regional parties. 
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in provision of public goods. Voter salience was a function of party cohesion as political actors 
created interest in services and goods that appealed across all divides. Disaster management was 
considered as one of the important concerns, although it was never the sole issue on which 
elections were fought. Conversely, fragmented party systems only needed to cater to limited 
constituencies and their demands for private goods.  
 In this chapter, data revealed that party cohesion was the highest in Gujarat, followed by 
Tamil Nadu, Orissa, and Bihar. The last named was highest in party fragmentation with the 
highest effective number of parties. Expectations of the hypothesis lay in the direction of policy 
outcomes being impacted by greater electoral salience of the domain, which in turn was a 
consequence of greater party cohesion. Empirical data revealed that the issue was most salient in 
Orissa and to some extent in Gujarat and Tamil Nadu. In Bihar, while its importance was 
recognized, it never reached the agenda plate of elections. In the first three states, while there 
were other issues too, disaster management appeared as one of the important issues of electoral 
contention.504 
 There was evidence of party cohesion and electoral salience in Orissa that lent credence 
to the hypothesis. Respondents believed that disaster management was an important item on the 
agenda that played a role in swaying votes in Orissa. The incumbent government lost elections in 
2000, and its performance in disaster management appeared to be a major contributory factor. 
Voter salience indicated that it was a prime motivator of policy reform with parties getting 
punished for poor disaster administration. Bihar exemplified the hypothesis in which disaster 
management was not treated as electorally important due to party fragmentation. Despite 
recognizing its relevance for the state and evidence of poor governance results, no political party 
paid a penalty for such neglect. The same political party continued to win elections, three times 
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in a row. In the 15 long years that it was in power, it was not held accountable for its disaster 
administration. In a pattern that agreed with the hypothesis, absence of electoral salience was 
indicative of concerns for private goods to specific, constituent groups. 
 In the case of Tamil Nadu, while the policy domain was recognized as relevant, 
traditional political trends prevailed. Despite claiming to have responded well, the ruling party 
did not seek to make it an overriding item on the electoral agenda. And the challenger group 
seemed to have acquiesced by not criticizing incumbents’ performance. The overriding factor 
appeared to be traditional two party rivalries that crowded out policy concerns. A significant 
level of party cohesion translated into competitive electoral contests, which resulted in 
alternation of power due to anti-incumbency sentiments, more than performance in disaster 
management. The cohesion in the party system appeared to explain policy reform on its own 
without the intervening variable of electoral salience. 
 Gujarat was consistent with the expectation about party cohesion and administrative 
outcomes. However, this cohesion was not translated into electoral salience for disaster 
management to the expected extent. It was explained that community mobilization and a positive 
approach to deal with policy issues prevented it from become an electorally contentious issue. 
However, the minority who did speak about its salience for voters supported the prediction of the 
hypothesis. On the whole, Gujarat appeared more to bear out the predictions concerning party 
cohesion and its impact on governance.  
 On the whole, empirical evidence only lent partial support to a causal relationship with 
policy outcomes in disaster management. An important feature of the responses was regarding 
non-partisan sentiments during disasters. It was explicitly stated in Bihar, Gujarat and Orissa, 
and appeared to provide a justification for lack of electoral salience. The respondents in these 
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three states, especially at the local level, emphasized that all political differences were forgotten 
during crises, and that everyone came together in responding to disasters. However, there seemed 
to be more to it. In Orissa, given the electoral salience of the issue, the lack of political 
divisiveness during the disaster did not last during state assembly elections. In Gujarat, it seemed 
to support the argument of those who viewed emergencies as opportunities to come together and 
take up better policies. To some extent it explained the subdued salience during elections, while 
party cohesion provided a convincing reason for capacity building reform. In the case of Bihar, 
which did not take up any reform, the absence of partisan differences appeared to support the 
contention that public goods had no electoral salience and also amounted to a complacent 
acceptance of status quo.   
 The factor of party cohesion and electoral salience proved to be significant predictors in 
the case of Bihar and Orissa. In their cases, there was a significant and systematic impact on 
capacity reform. However, issues such as traditional two-party rivalries and even community 
mobilization in crises prevented an emphatic causal correlation in other states. Party cohesion in 
itself correlated well with the changes in the dependent variable. 
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Chapter 6: Double-Loop Learning from Focusing Events 
 Organizational learning had been considered a major factor in administrative behavior 
and change.505 Scholars had recognized its significance for understanding policy reform. 
Researches about factors that lead to organizational learning went a long way in explaining 
policy outcomes. Major disasters were focusing events, and were seen to lead to double-loop 
learning, leading to major policy reform.506 The underlying assumption regarded policy reform 
as a positive and desirable change brought about by the process of double-loop learning in 
organizations.507 This research identified policy reform outcomes as evidence of organizational 
learning and examined the compelling role of major disasters as focusing events. The 
relationship between organizational learning and focusing events provided a stable platform for 
undertaking a detailed analysis into reasons for policy reform.  
 This chapter examined the correlation between focusing events, organizational learning 
and disaster management. The hypothesis was that focusing events lead to policy reform. The 
experience of severe calamitous events lead to “double-loop learning”508 in organizations which 
was seen in policy change as a result of experience of such events. It was found that they had a 
significant impact with consequences of a paradigm shift in policy. Normal events that were not 
perceived as focusing events also had the potential to change, although it was likely to be in the 
form of smaller adjustments to behavior or correction of errors. On the other hand, major 
disasters were found to have consequences in double-loop learning, in which policy objectives 
were reframed, as well as the strategy to attain them. Change was not limited to evaluation of 
                                                 
505 Sabatier (1988); May (1992); Dodgson (1993) 
506 Kingdon (1984) 
507 Cobb, Ross and Ross (1976) mentioned that all policy change was assumed to be important since there were 
always issues competing for attention, more than available capabilities; Birkland (1997); Carley and Harrald (1997)  
508 Argyris and Schon (1978), p. 22 
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policy implementation with a view to find errors and make adjustments. Instead, in double-loop 
learning, it led to questioning the objective and its construction. Importantly, it was consistent 
with findings in field research that major disasters led to fundamental changes in policy, which 
amounted to a paradigm shift. In the context of Indian disaster management, it was seen when a 
traditional relief orientation gave way to comprehensive capacity building, after ‘focusing event’ 
disasters. Hence, this research considered organizational learning from focusing events to be a 
significant predictor of reform and capacity building in the disaster domain. 
 The causal process of this change involved a different perspective on organizations and 
their autonomous impact. Traditionally, literature had seen institutions as representing societal 
cleavages or as an arena for resolving conflicting interests.509 They did not have an autonomous 
presence. The New Institutionalism literature created analytical space for an independent and 
autonomous impact of organizations. They were capable of learning from experiences and 
having an autonomous effect, independent of the social groups that supported the institutions. In 
the field of disaster management, the scope for learning arose from largely ineffectual efforts that 
led to a huge gap between expectation and actual delivery of public goods.510 
 The first section of this chapter elaborates on organizational learning, and related 
concepts, that figured in administrative organizations.511 The concept of “Potential Focusing 
Events”512 is also explained to understand their relationship with policy outcomes. The 
relationship between focusing events and disaster management reform is covered in the second 
section. The next part examines the independent and autonomous impact of the experience of 
focusing events, as evidence of change. The empirical feedback from the field informs the 
                                                 
509 March and Olsen (1984), proposed a theory of sociological institutionalism, adding to existing perspectives on 
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510 May (1982); Comfort (1988); Rose (1991); Tierney, Lindell and Perry (2001) 
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research about stakeholder perceptions as well as their explanations of a causal relationship in 
the fourth part of the chapter. Their opinions on the magnitude of disaster and evidence of 
learning are important inputs in this analysis. The last and fifth section concludes the discussion 
by analyzing the findings.  
I. Focusing Events and Organizational Learning 
 This section explained the fundamental assumption that guided this research, in addition 
to explaining the important concepts that were relevant for understanding the impact of focusing 
events on disaster administration. It relied on an implicit process of organizational learning. An 
assumption of autonomy of institutions was vital to understand how and why organizations learnt 
from experience, events or any other exogenous occurrence. Thereby, the process of 
organizational learning from experience, and initiating change, would not be mistaken as a 
mirror image of the views, interests and activities of societal sections. Scholarship, in recent 
times, treated institutions as analytically autonomous instead of being reflections of societal 
cleavages and interests.513 Similarly, policy change was no longer only seen as the consequence 
of conflict among different groups in society.514 Institutions were found to be independently 
capable of responding to developments and making changes, through a process of organizational 
learning. They were capable of influencing policy change on the basis of their understanding of 
events and experience. This was the fundamental assumption of this research about institutions, 
while examining their relationship with learning and disaster management. The process of 
organizational change appeared to be seamless, if only inputs and output were taken into 
consideration. Several of its component processes were not identifiable, although they played an 
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important role. The process of organizational learning was implicit in understanding how they 
undertook change, and its consequences were seen in policy outputs.  
 A vast body of literature had studied organizational learning from different 
perspectives.515 However, its application in empirical studies was found to be much less in 
comparison, presumably because the concept was not known for precision.516 There was a broad 
consensus about its main features, although difficulties had been noted in defining and 
identifying it, as well as in delineating the process by which it took place.517 Heclo defined 
learning to mean “a relatively enduring alteration in behavior that results from experience”, 
conceptualizing it as a “change in response made in reaction to some perceived stimulus.”518 It 
enabled effective information processing, interpretation and adoption of appropriate responses.519 
Commonly, its results were seen in policy change, although, theoretically, it could be argued that 
absence of change could also be an outcome of learning.520 
 There were difficulties in identifying who learns, how and what, and many scholars 
avoided them by focusing on its results. A marked bias towards outcomes was found in the 
literature on organizational learning. Most scholars considered them as evidence of learning 
having taken place, instead of attempting to isolate or differentiate the processes involved.521 The 
learning experience was seen to comprise of processes that included seeking information, 
obtaining feedback and adjusting behavior.522 Literature identified information storing and 
                                                 
515 Dodgson (1993) reviewed literature on organizational learning 
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processing as key processes that played an important role in enabling learning and adaptive 
behavior in organizations.523 On the other hand, questions had been raised about who learns, 
despite a bias towards identifying individuals as the objects of learning. 524 However, this 
research had assumed analytical autonomy of organizations, choosing to view them as active 
participants in the learning process, and found support from those who did not consider 
organizational behavior as only an aggregation of individual learning.525 Organizations, as 
opposed to individuals were seen to be capable of learning, while treating agencies of 
government, or the state itself as institutions for the purpose. 
 The concept of learning provided a perspective to understand policy change, although 
there was no certainty regarding the types of outcomes or the nature of change.526 To a great 
extent, it also depended on the type of learning.  Detection of error that lead to corrective, 
adaptive behavior was seen as single-loop learning in which “members of the organization carry 
out a collaborative inquiry through which they discover sources of error, invent new strategies 
designed to correct error, produce those strategies, and evaluate and generalize the results.”527 On 
the other hand, double-loop learning was a process of fundamental reorganization that consisted 
of a “double feedback loop which connects the detection of error not only to strategies and 
assumptions for effective performance but to the very norms which define effective 
performance.”528 A similar distinction was evident in policy learning literature that talked of 
                                                 
523 Corbacioglu and Kapucu (2006); Comfort (1999) 
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528 Ibid, p.22 
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instrumental policy learning and social policy learning.529 Importantly, learning consisted of both 
processes in its relationship with change. 
 The most common reason that was seen to initiate the learning process was the factor of 
experience.530 Experience of policy implementation, was seen as an important part of the 
process, initiating a process of change through the mechanism of feedback. Importantly, 
shortcomings in delivery of public goods and negative experiences had been seen to play a 
greater role in shaping policy outcomes.531 At the same time it was noted that there was no 
certainty about lessons being drawn, or the right ones being learnt.532 Nevertheless, this chapter 
was concerned with experiences that lead to double-loop learning, signifying a paradigm shift 
and fundamental changes in adaptive behavior.533 This research examined the factor of focusing 
events for providing a credible explanation for double-loop consequences. It used Birkland’s 
concept of “Potential Focusing Events” to explain the causal link between experience of disasters 
and fundamental policy change. Birkland refined Kingdon’s ‘focusing events’ to imbue them 
with a potential to become defining moments, as all of them did not invariably reach the agenda 
plate.534 Major changes in organizational behavior, in terms of policy reform and capacity 
building, were caused by events that were distinctly different from minor adjustments. Apart 
from the impact of the disaster agent, scholars had also stressed the importance of symbolism 
more than the event itself.535 Public perceptions of the event were influenced by the symbolic 
value of the occurrence. 
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II. Focusing Events and Policy Reform in Disaster Management 
 Literature had noted that experience of disasters was a significant predictor of policy 
change.536 Scholars who studied the phenomenon of prior disaster experience, especially 
shortcomings in outcomes, agreed that it was a potential source of change and improvement in 
policy.537 It also suited practitioners, who found actual experience, and not abstract rational 
analysis, to be a more reliable basis for planning change.538 Thereby, experience became 
instrumental in detection of errors or shortcomings and resulting in changes in policies and their 
implementation.539 Each focusing event provided a window of opportunity for policy attention, 
with the domain becoming salient after each disaster. 540 However, even after they reached the 
agenda stage, it was recognized that there was overwhelming concern with the last major disaster 
event and type. On the whole, it was understood that disaster experience provided a short-lived 
window for policy change, before other issues took priority in policy agenda amid fading 
memories of past events.541 Nevertheless, literature did not find an unequivocal positive 
correlation between prior disaster experience and improved policy outcomes due to a variety of 
reasons such as complacency, subjectivity of experience, varied lesson-drawing experience and 
other factors.542 
 Birkland’s concept of “Potential Focusing Events” explained the greater likelihood of 
change after such events.  A Potential Focusing Event, as defined by Birkland, “is a rare, 
harmful, sudden event that becomes known to the mass public and policy elites virtually 
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simultaneously” leading to important policy change.543 Implicit was a stress on consequences of 
a more serious nature, indicating a disaster that had greater potential of damage. It provided 
credible, causal reasoning why issues gained policy attention, unlike the unpredictability of the 
‘Garbage Can Model’ of policy preferences.544 Birkland based his proposition on two concepts. 
First, he used Kingdon’s concept of “Focusing Events”, which was explained as a “coupling” of 
problems, policies and politics that resulted in agenda-setting with disasters being a good 
example of such events.545 Second, he combined it with an Advocacy Coalition Framework in 
promoting policy change with variation on count of advocacy groups among different types of 
disaster events. 546 Together, he explained how focusing events, which were major disasters, had 
the potential to result in policy change, with the involvement of advocacy coalitions which were 
specific to policy domains.   
 Focusing events served a major purpose of providing an analytical basis for 
differentiating policy outcomes, between minor adjustments and major change. Major disasters 
had ‘symmetry-breaking’ consequences.547 It was the hypothesis of this research that potential 
focusing events lead to major reform and change in disaster management policy. Accordingly, 
less consequential disasters resulted only in error correction or a behavior pattern that reinforced 
the prevailing rule-guided behavior, although even that was not entirely inconsequential.548 
Routine or regular occurrence of disaster events, which were not significant enough to fall into 
the category of focusing events, resulted only in minor adjustments. In such cases, existing 
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policy mechanisms were evaluated for undertaking error correction in achieving the same 
objectives.549 In contrast, major calamitous incidents became focusing events due to greater 
impact. They served as examples of policy failure, and an opportunity to undertake thorough 
going reform.550 Major catastrophic events were different and their experience had consequences 
for double-loop learning.551 It was hypothesized that mega disasters created conditions in which 
fundamental questions were raised about the strategies to deal with disasters as well as the 
understanding of the objective itself. Consequently, they lead to questions about the very 
construction of the problem, the objectives of policy, as well as the strategies that needed to be 
adopted. In the process, there was greater likelihood of large-scale reform in the form of new 
policies and development of greater capacities.  
 In the experience of Indian states, focusing events proved to be highly significant 
predictors of a paradigm shift from a relief orientation to a risk reduction approach. States were 
more likely to adopt a comprehensive outlook towards disaster management, drawing from the 
comprehensive reform of the federal policy. Since the IDNDR in 1990s, there had been a 
paradigm shift and Indian disaster policy at the federal level had radically changed from its relief 
orientation. Not only was a new policy promulgated, a new statutory framework was brought 
into the picture, funding was increased, and greater scientific resources were deployed in 
support. Disaster risk reduction became the objective and the strategy included capacity building 
in an all-hazards model. Notwithstanding changes in the federal policy, many state governments 
continued without notable change.  
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 It is thus significant that despite a common federal resource, state institutions differed in 
their ability and timing to undertake double-loop learning and build their capacities for disaster 
risk reduction. The few that had done it before, as Andhra Pradesh after 1977, or Maharashtra 
after 1993, had undergone calamitous tragedies. Evidence of double-loop learning in 
administrative organizations was found in the reform undertaken in these states and their massive 
capacity building reform. Consequently, it was hypothesized, that states undertook a paradigm 
shift only after they suffered the traumatic experience of a major disaster. Those states that 
underwent such disasters drastically reformed their policies and enhanced capabilities.  
 Empirical research was expected to find credible evidence of change after major disasters 
for confirming the hypothesis. In contrast, states that did not undertake a paradigm shift were 
likely to be ones where major disaster events had not occurred. Gaps in the causal linkages were 
likely to be filled from responses of stakeholders, who were expected to explain the when and 
why of double-loop learning. They were likely to identify major disaster events as turning points 
that became the most compelling factors for reform. In the event, empirical research provided 
conclusive evidence of a significant and systematic causal link between the experiences of mega 
disasters and an imperative for drastic reform. 
III. Experiences of Focusing Events  
 Experience, in general, was found to be a very significant factor in explaining policy 
reform. To begin with, the role of historical experience was noted to explain the manner in which 
states adopted and implemented disaster management policies. They developed expertise in 
dealing with disasters with which they had experience. Practitioners, especially, were emphatic 
about its utility, and identified it as a significant driver for reform. A senior bureaucrat 
mentioned that the erstwhile Bombay presidency, that included the present states of Maharashtra 
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and Gujarat, was good at drought management, whereas the erstwhile Madras presidency, that 
included the present states of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, was better at cyclone management. 
And the reason was greater vulnerability to and experience of those disaster types. Another 
policy maker explained how prior disaster experience had built into reform by leading to better 
policy and improved implementation. Their responses exemplified the operationalization of 
single-loop learning, in which experience accumulated over a long period of time, resulted in 
incremental improvements to policy and its implementation. 
 On the other hand, there were others who spoke about mega disasters and double-loop 
learning. A federal official, who was closely associated with capacity building, was of the firm 
belief that occurrence of mega disasters played a very significant role in redrawing the contours 
of policy. Interestingly, drought did not seem to figure as a major game changer. This may have 
been due to a couple of reasons.  First, after 1960s there had been no major drought. Second, it 
was a slow onset disaster which was now addressed by governments through superior technology 
and scientific resources. Third, great strides in agriculture led to a safety net in food grain 
availability. Therefore, it was not difficult for government to prevent starvation and ensure 
minimum employment opportunities in the countryside through employment schemes and 
provision of food grains.552 
 Mega disasters achieved a focusing event status after being recognized as a major cause 
for change. Official documents duly noted them as the motivation for policy reform. Public 
perceptions also viewed particular disasters as focusing events that were sudden and harmful, 
and confirmed their significance. On the other hand, when interview responses did not mention 
particular events that were specific in time and space, it was reasonably accurate to infer that 
there had been no major disasters that served as defining moments. For example, respondents in 
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one state spoke about general vulnerability to floods without the experience of any particular 
focusing event. Lack of a defining catastrophic disaster was construed from such responses. 
 Therefore, on the basis of government publications as well as responses of relevant 
stakeholders, it was found that focusing events occurred in Orissa, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu. 
Literature of federal and state governments recognized the severity of the 1999 super cyclone in 
Orissa.553 It was a turning point for the state’s disaster management.554 Although it affected the 
coastal districts only, the event acquired the status of a calamity for the entire state since they 
controlled the politics, and the voice of Orissa. All the respondents in this research accepted the 
centrality of the event with civil servants and elected leaders correlating it with changes in 
policy, notwithstanding Orissa’s traditional susceptibility to cyclones.  
 Similarly, the 2001 earthquake,555 preceded by a major cyclone that devastated Kandla in 
1998, was viewed as a turning point in the state of Gujarat. The earthquake in 2001 was a 
colossal tragedy for Gujarat.556 Occurring on the anniversary of India’s Republic Day,557 it 
devastated several districts. Coming as it did after a severe cyclone had devastated Kandla in 
1998, Gujarat embarked on a massive revamp of its disaster management policy and machinery. 
Government documents as well as people’s perceptions confirmed its role as a focusing event.  
 On Boxing Day in 2004, the South Asian tsunami, a hitherto unknown disaster type, 
devastated coastal Tamil Nadu. Tsunamis had been unknown in India, at least in recent times. 
The last recorded one was in 1945, even before the eradication of small pox. Consequently, when 
the Great Indian Ocean tsunami struck in 2004, entire villages on the sea coast were washed 
away. While other states were also affected, Tamil Nadu bore the brunt in mainland India. 
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Thousands lost their lives. For government and the public, it proved to be a focusing event that 
attracted policy makers’ attention.  
 On the other hand, Bihar had always been considered vulnerable to floods without 
reference to any specific event. Respondents in Bihar uniformly bemoaned their problems of 
floods. Notwithstanding the benefits to the top soil, annual floods caused severe hardship due to 
large-scale evacuation of people from flood hit areas. Arrangements for their shelter and food 
being unsatisfactory, their living conditions were often criticized as being sub minimal.558 From 
state level politicians to local body leaders, and from policy making bureaucrats to field-level 
implementing personnel, everybody recognized a vulnerability to floods. There were mentions of 
severe floods in 1987, 2003, 2004 and 2007 and so on. Interestingly, no single event stood out as 
having been a game changer. In the year 1988, northern districts of Bihar were jolted by a major 
earthquake. However, it happened long before the paradigm shift at the center, and there was no 
fundamental change in the state’s disaster management.  
IV. Adaptive Behavior from Focusing Events  
 In the theoretical section it was noted that there were enormous difficulties in isolating 
the various processes in the relationship between focusing events, organizational learning and 
policy outcomes. However, responses of relevant stakeholders provided significant information 
about their causal linkages. Information obtained in the field proved conclusively that without 
major disasters, there was little likelihood of thoroughgoing, policy reform. There was evident 
correlation of policy change in states which had suffered such disasters. An overwhelming 
majority of the one hundred and seventy nine respondents provided the rationale for such 
changes and identified focusing events as the critical variable that led to change. Its converse was 
                                                 
558 Those who defended the state’s record said that fewer human casualties in floods were indicative of better coping 
mechanisms. However, a senior bureaucrat in the center dismissed such claims by pointing to the subhuman living 
conditions of the displaced masses. 
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also found to be true with no double-loop learning in Bihar where there was no defining disaster. 
As expected, respondents in Bihar were not able to pinpoint any particular major disaster, despite 
a seeming awareness of vulnerabilities. In other states, participants pointed to the turning points 
in their state’s disaster management, and related it to important changes in the domain.  
Bihar  
The most striking thing about responses in Bihar was a preoccupation with floods.559 While 
respondents did acknowledge vulnerability to earthquakes and fire accidents, in addition to 
drought-like conditions, their main concern was flooding by the tempestuous rivers rising in the 
mountains of Nepal. Floods were a regular occurrence in the northern part of Bihar that bordered 
Nepal. There was unanimity, among all respondents, that floods were the most important source 
of devastation in north Bihar.560 
 However, no singular disaster event had been recognized as a major or mega disaster in 
Bihar.561 A high ranking public servant was specific that Bihar had escaped the experience of 
mega disasters. Unlike other states like Orissa, Gujarat and TN, he thought that Bihar did not 
suffer any calamitous disaster, and consequently there was no focusing event. People in the state 
also had no consensus about any focusing event, which only indicated that there was no single 
disaster event that remained etched in collective memory. A senior political functionary 
described their exposure to floods as, using the expression, “niyyati” which indicated that people 
had become habituated to the disaster agent. Consequently, he said that no extraordinary 
measures were undertaken by administrative machinery nor were any demanded by people. Most 
                                                 
559 Government of Bihar (2007a). It spoke about a “historic” response in the 2007 floods, but did not identify any 
particular disaster event 
560 Field research in February 2008 covered this area 
561 The 2008 Kosi Floods that occurred in August-September 2008 were a focusing event. However, they were not 
covered in this study as field research was completed in February 2008. For more information about the Kosi floods, 
see Government of Bihar http;//disastermgmt.bih.nic.in/Downloads/Koshi-Floods-2008.pdf  
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local functionaries and public officials recounted that due to the routine nature of the occurrence, 
advance preparations were made every year and most people stored foodgrains, fire wood, 
fodder and boats. There was another aspect to it. Floods, in themselves, did not constitute a 
disaster for many. A local leader explained that it was considered a disaster only when standing 
crops were lost. If they weren’t, annual flooding replenished the nutritive value of their soil by 
bringing mineral-rich, loamy silt. On the whole, it was evident that no particular disaster event 
stood out, and in its absence there was no urgency or imperative for massive policy change.  
 Past experience with floods was the guiding factor in disaster management among official 
and non-official respondents. None of the respondents felt that there was any paradigm shift in 
Bihar’s disaster management and, at best, spoke of marginal improvements. Notwithstanding the 
federal government stress on a paradigm shift, none was evidenced in Bihar.562 Relief 
considerations continued to be paramount, although there was occasional talk of undertaking 
mitigation and recovery efforts. Improvement in preparedness was not evident at all. 
Organizational learning was, in the absence of focusing events, incremental and adaptive 
behavior was marginal. The impact of this factor was also seen in outcomes, or the absence of 
fundamental change. It was seen in the issue of local demands for addressing disasters. 
Importantly, the people were concerned about long-term measures to address floods. Many 
respondents highlighted a demand for construction of dams and multipurpose flood control-
irrigation projects-cum-hydroelectric power stations. Maintenance of river embankments was 
seen as a priority. However, as it was found during research, they remained unfulfilled. The 
projects remained on the wish list only due to a multiplicity of reasons. Lack of resources was an 
oft-quoted excuse, along with the priority of other projects. However, it seemed that there was no 
urgency in their demands as the respondents appeared to have adjusted to the status quo. The 
                                                 
562 Government of Bihar (2007b). It identified that the entire program needed to be thoroughly revamped 
    
177 
 
only significant change that was evidenced was an increase in amount of food grains, and a 
greater sensitivity towards requirements of the flood victims.563 The outlook remained oriented 
towards providing adequate relief in an efficient manner. There was no paradigm shift. 
 It was also seen in respondents’ reactions towards the risks posed by other hazards like 
fire accidents. Despite being a regular occurrence in most districts of Bihar, there was no policy 
attention towards the risks of fire accidents that burnt down thousands of huts every year in 
Bihar. There was no single, momentous event that captured the attention of policy makers and 
public simultaneously. The situation was worse than in floods, with hardly any fire fighting 
equipment, beyond the few fire tenders. Similarly, there was no capacity building to address the 
hazard of earthquakes, despite parts of North Bihar being in a highly, vulnerable seismic zone. 
The last major earthquake having been in 1988, most people had fading memories of its damage 
and devastation.564 Earthquakes, as one respondent thought, were not important because they had 
occurred long back and the long gap in time had dimmed memories. With respect to manmade 
hazards, respondents admitted to lack of preparation for industrial and transportation accidents, 
with scant development of capacities even in major industrial hubs and major rail transportation 
centers. They were not equipped with heavy machinery, cranes, lifts, dumpers, gas cutters or 
other essential equipment. The few capacities that were available to deal with industrial hazards 
were in place because of statutory industrial safety plans.565 
 It became evident that despite Bihar’s vulnerabilities to floods and earthquakes, there was 
no capacity building. It was because there was no single and specific incident that provided a 
compelling context to undertake capacity building. Hence despite awareness of vulnerabilities, 
                                                 
563 Government of Bihar (2007b). In 2007, the amount of food grains was increased to one quintal (=100 kilo grams) 
per family in addition to compensation for loss of life and property 
564 District Muzaffarpur http;//Muzaffarpur,nic.in/muz_drmp.htm retrieved 4 November 2008, noted an earthquake 
in the district in 1998 
565 Jasanoff (1994). The 1984 Bhopal Gas Tragedy was responsible for sweeping reform in industrial safety 
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and the federal encouragement there was no major policy reform in Bihar, proving the 
hypothetical importance of focusing events.  
Orissa 
As one of the states on India’s eastern coast, Orissa had always been vulnerable to cyclonic 
storms that formed in the Bay of Bengal. Together with floods, cyclones formed the most 
common natural hazard that imperiled Orissa. There was consensus about the threats posed by 
cyclones and floods. As far as other hazards were concerned, there was a varied response with 
some respondents highlighting dangers posed by tsunamis, or drought. Despite some parts of the 
state being in a seismic vulnerable zone, there was a significant absence of sensitivity in that 
respect.  
 Notwithstanding a stress on floods, there was an overriding concern about cyclones. In 
particular, the super cyclone of 1999 was unanimously perceived as a focusing event, whose 
scale of devastation exposed the feeble capacities of the state. 566 It was a turning point in 
Orissa’s history. The cyclone struck the entire Orissa coast, impacting 12 districts along with 
parts of neighboring West Bengal.567 The 223 mph winds left a trail of devastation in a 250 km 
stretch of the coast. Thousands of people died and many more left in distress. More than two and 
a half lakh houses were damaged.568 Everybody, politician, bureaucrat, non-profit member and 
volunteer activist, were emphatic about its importance in Orissa’s massive reform in disaster 
management. Its policy towards handling disasters underwent a massive change, and evidence of 
organizational learning was clear in the tectonic shifts in adaptive behavior.  
                                                 
566 Gandhigram Rural University (2008). Researchers found that Orissa’s disaster management machinery before 
1999 lacked contingency plans, operating guidelines for non-state participants, and reliable communications 
facilities 
567 Sinha, Anil K. (2002) 
568 Gandhigram Rural University (2008) 
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 The foreword to the state’s disaster management policy recognized that “the traumatic 
experience of the Super Cyclone 1999 has brought in a sea change in approach and strategy to 
deal with disasters.”569 A senior official spoke about Orissa’s path-breaking initiative in 
institutionalization of disaster management. Significantly, for the first time in India, an exclusive 
agency was formed for improving capacities. The Orissa State Disaster Mitigation Authority 
(OSDMA) was set up in 1999, long before any such body was conceived at any level in India.570 
Even the federal government set up a National Disaster Management Authority only after federal 
legislation was enacted in December 2005.571 Orissa was the first state, therefore, that gave an 
institutional form to disaster management.572 Importantly, the official website of OSDMA makes 
a specific mention of the focusing event, declaring that “Orissa State Disaster Mitigation 
Authority (OSDMA) was set up by the Government of Orissa as an autonomous organization 
vide Finance Department Resolution No. IFC- 74/99-51779/F dated the 28th December 1999 (in 
the immediate aftermath of the Super-cyclone in 1999).”573 Importantly, it also served as a model 
for others states like Gujarat,574 in a clearly evident case of “lesson-learning”.575 
 The double-loop learning was also admitted in official documentation. While speaking 
about the other major institutional reform that was undertaken in setting up an Orissa Disaster 
Rapid Action Force (ODRAF), the official website admitted that the 1999 super cyclone 
experience was responsible for its formation. It said that “the Super Cyclone of 1999 had left the 
                                                 
569 OSDMA. 2005. State Disaster Management Policy. Bhubaneswar: Orissa State Disaster Mitigation Authority 
570 OSDMA http://v3.osdma.org/ViewDetails.aspx?vchglinkid=GL000&vchplinkid=PL000&vchslinkid=SL000 
retrieved 28 November 2008 
571 NDMA http://ndma.gov.in retrieved 28 November 2008 
572 Comfort (1988) noted the importance of having exclusive institutions for emergency management because they 
reduced complexity, increased consistency and interpreted the environment continuously 
573 OSDMA http://v3.osdma.org/ViewDetails.aspx?vchglinkid=GL000&vchplinkid=PL000vchslinkid=SL000 
retrieved 28 November 2008. Italics added 
574 Gujarat had sent a team after the earthquake in 2001, to study Orissa’s Disaster Management reform and 
institutional arrangements 
575 Rose (1991) termed ‘lesson-drawing’, in the form of borrowing ideas from successful examples, as an example of 
learning 
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roads and transportation networks of the coastal Orissa in shambles. A responsible and 
responsive system could not deliver the goods in time due to lack of necessary equipment and 
trained manpower despite strong empathy for the fellow brethren. It was a very harsh lesson that 
the state learnt from the apocalypse. The Govt. thus created Orissa Disaster Rapid Action Force 
(ODRAF) to assist the civil administration in search and rescue operations, relief line clearance 
and overall disaster management.”576 Five battalions of the ODRAF were raised and located in 
different parts of the state. An elaborate and dedicated VHF communication network was 
established only for this purpose, emergency operations centers were set up and massive 
awareness campaigns taken up.577 
 There was also a marked difference in their attitude towards construction of cyclone 
shelters. Before 1999, as one representative of an international agency mentioned, there was little 
demand for cyclone shelters. They were being constructed under the Orissa Disaster Mitigation 
Program that began in 1995 as a joint program of Government of India, Federal Republic of 
Germany and International Committee of Red Cross.578 Under that program, 23 cyclone shelters 
were built in 6 districts in the first phase. They proved to be very useful when the super cyclone 
struck in 1999.579 The important point that emerged was that prior to 1999, it was found to be 
difficult to establish a need for cyclone shelters.580  
                                                 
576 OSDMA http://v3.osdma.org/ViewDetails.aspx?vchglinkid=GL011&vchplinkid=PL034 retrieved 28 November 
2008. 
577 OSDMA http://v3.osdma.org/ViewDetails.aspx?vchglinkid=GL000&vchplinkid=PL042 retrieved 28 November 
2008; Comfort and Kapucu (2006) underscored the importance of information infrastructure for improved inter-
governmental coordination after disasters, as it increased the capacity to anticipate and respond 
578 IRCS http://www.indianredcross.org/newsstories1.html retrieved 28 November 2008 
579 Interview with a senior representative of German Red Cross. He spoke about 40,000 people finding safety during 
the 1999 super cyclone in cyclone shelters. 
580 Gandhigram Rural University (2008) 
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 A systematic vulnerability assessment was undertaken to cover all hazards, and detailed 
plans were prepared for each district.581 Further, satellite imaging technology was used to create 
a GIS database for the entire state.582 Evidence of a new strategy was also found in the state’s 
policy towards NGOs. The latter became an important part of disaster management, as all the 
respondents admitted, and the government identified the need to coordinate with them, only after 
1999.583 While the focus of this research was institutional learning, there were significant 
changes at individuals’ levels too.584   
As evidence of the paradigm shift, it also became evident from most respondents that 
policy reform was aimed at generic disaster management rather than a focus on addressing 
cyclones or floods only. As an example, they pointed to policy reform that addressed the hazards 
of heat waves. Generic disaster management capabilities were created to handle all sorts of 
disasters and hazards. An official respondent said that they had also factored manmade hazards 
such as industrial accidents, communal riots, transportation accidents and others. He spoke about 
annually scheduled mock drills in the state’s industrial belt in Jharsuguda.  
 While the changes did reflect their intentions, it was nevertheless found that there was a 
glaring lack of sensitivity towards the risks posed by earthquakes, as one bureaucrat admitted. 
Placing the issue in perspective, he pointed out that the 1993 Latur earthquake, which killed over 
9000 people, was also in a similar vulnerable seismic zone.585 In developments that were 
consistent with literature there was an evident lack of threat perception about earthquakes. It 
served to support the contention that policy making was still overwhelmingly concerned with the 
                                                 
581 OSDMA http://v3.osdma.org/ViewDetails.aspx?vchglinkid=GL000&vchplinkid=PL042 retrieved 28 November 
2008 
582 Ibid 
583 OSDMA http://v3.osdma.org/ViewDetails.aspx?vchglinkid=GL000&vchplinkid=PL000vchslinkid=SL000 
retrieved 28 November 2008; Mitchell (1999) saw involvement of NGOs as recognition of governments’ limitations  
584 A government engineer, who had entered service 17 years ago, gave his own example of individual learning. He 
admitted that his perception of disaster management changed after 1999  
585  NIDM http://www.nidm.gov.in/Earthquakes3_ii.asp retrieved 6 May 2008 
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last disaster. Moreover, in direct reference to the window of opportunity, several respondents 
sounded apprehensive about the lessons of disaster management being transmitted to the next 
generation. One field level official was skeptical about the next generation being similarly 
sensitized towards disaster management, as they would have long forgotten the super cyclone of 
1999. A volunteer activist noted a growing apathy towards disaster management, in the absence 
of a major calamity in recent times.   
 Discussion on double-loop learning, however, should not deter students from ignoring the 
role of incremental, single-loop learning. It continued to play an important part. One sarpanch 
spoke about the changes their panchayat had made in CBDMPs, on the basis of their experience. 
An official of the Red Cross informed that they changed the design of their cyclone shelter after 
1999, having learnt about its drawbacks. While the paradigm shift was apparent, incremental 
changes to behavior continued due to normal, feedback processes. 
Gujarat 
There was unanimity among the respondents, regarding the focusing event in 2001. Without 
doubt, every one of the respondents agreed that the massive earthquake on 26 January 2001 was 
a turning point in their disaster management. A total of 13,805 lives were lost. While 21 of the 
state’s 25 districts were affected, six of them suffered extensive damages, 15 million people in 
7633 villages were affected, 222,035 houses destroyed and more than a million damaged.586 
Kutch district was the worst affected with about 70%-90% of all housing and service 
infrastructure destroyed and in one of its towns, Bhachau, more than 80% of all buildings 
warranted demolition.587 
                                                 
586 Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (2001); Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (2005) 
587 Wahlstrom and Harland (2001) 
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  Adaptive behavior included a massive capacity building program and greater 
sensitization towards generic disaster management, in all phases and for addressing different 
hazards. Second, to some extent there was limited awareness about the criticality of the cyclone 
that hit Kandla port area in 1998. As a senior official stated, the Kandla cyclone in 1998 was 
considered a major disaster, which started a process of policy reform. However, it did not 
fructify and had to be revived after the 2001 earthquake. A third important trend that became 
evident was that Gujarat’s disaster management developed all-hazards capabilities after the 
second event. Finally, it was also seen that despite a generic, disaster policy reform, respondents 
in the field, especially at the panchayat, block and district levels, displayed a distinct concern for 
floods as their primary threat, which served to reinforce literature’s focus on experience being a 
very significant influence.   
 All the respondents recognized 2001 Republic Day earthquake as the turning point in 
Gujarat’s policy towards disaster management.588 It led to a paradigm shift from a relief-oriented 
perspective to an emphasis on all-hazards approach. The focus shifted firmly towards Disaster 
Risk Reduction, from the earlier attention to relief and rehabilitation. A senior official pointed 
out that earlier policy was limited to pre-monsoon preparedness meetings, contingency plans for 
cyclones and monsoons, with no attempt at undertaking a systematic vulnerability and risk 
assessment. Before 2001, there were no city level plans, block plans were extremely 
rudimentary, and communication facilities were grossly inadequate. Even the state level control 
room, for monitoring disasters, functioned only between June and October, reflecting the lack of 
a comprehensive approach. 
                                                 
588 Gandhigram Rural University (2008). It was found that Gujarat before 2001 had not accorded significance for 
improving disaster management systems 
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 The Republic Day earthquake became an opportunity for development and reconstruction 
in a “Build Back Better” approach, using it as a window of opportunity.589 This was confirmed 
by official documentation and field responses about the capacity building that ensued. It included 
both structural and non-structural measures. A total of 197091 houses were reconstructed and 
908710 dwelling units repaired, by August 2005.590 The structural measures also included 
formation of Emergency Operation Centers at state headquarters and districts, strengthening 
irrigation projects, bridges, roads, electricity lines, power sub stations, water supply lines with 
seismic resistant features.591 By August 2005, 245 dams were strengthened and 222 were 
undergoing repairs in the second phase, 2456 public building were reconstructed and 8890 of 
them repaired, 178 bridges and communications infrastructure were repaired, 3600kms out of 
4970 km of highways and roads were strengthened, and about 50,000 classrooms reconstructed 
or repaired.592 Urban infrastructure such as sewer lines was strengthened, especially in Kutch. By 
the end of 2006, 200,218 houses were reconstructed and 908751 repaired, 8903 km of power 
lines strengthened, 4134 kms of highways repaired, 181 dams strengthened in the second phase, 
retrofitting of 3534 public buildings taken up, apart from creating new urban infrastructure by 
laying 333kms of sewerage lines, 700kms of water supply pipelines and constructing 171 
municipal buildings.593 And, equally important, as one official said, they placed seismic monitors 
in 22 locations in the state. Capacities in telecommunication infrastructure were upgraded in a 
big way and the state’s own wide area network was extended up to intermediate levels of local 
bodies.594 Satellite phones were provided to districts in addition to existing channels like VHF 
                                                 
589 Kishore (2006) 
590 Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority (2005) 
591 Ibid 
592 Ibid 
593 Kishore (2006). The author was the CEO of GSDMA. 
594 Comfort and Kapucu (2006) underscored the importance of information infrastructure for improved inter-
governmental coordination after disasters, as it increased the capacity to anticipate and respond 
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network, and hotlines on the telephone network. Even with regard to the response phase, a 
couple of elected representatives mentioned that Gujarat procured a lot of equipment after seeing 
their deployment in 2001 by international agencies. Fire services were strengthened all over the 
state.595 
 Non-structural measures comprised of institutional reform and town planning. Less than a 
fortnight after the earthquake, the Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority was set up in 
February 2001.596 Thereafter a new Disaster Management Policy was framed in 2002 and 
Gujarat enacted its Disaster Management Act in 2003. It was the first legislation of its kind in 
India.597 The Gujarat Development and Control Rules in Town Planning were reinforced to 
incorporate multi-hazard resistance features, including structural strengthening. Building codes 
were upgraded, although their implementation was lax, as in rest of the country. Human resource 
development was a major component of capacity building with an institutionalized role for 
NGOs. Awareness creation received emphasis, and civil engineers, teachers and students were 
trained, among others. Mock drills became a regular fixture in the disaster management calendar, 
and were held twice a year. 
 The second important finding concerned another major disaster and its significance. A 
couple of high ranking political functionaries and civil servant respondents at the state level 
mentioned that the Kandla cyclone in1998 was a major milestone in the state’s disaster 
management. They spoke about the reform exercise that was begun, although serious gaps had 
remained. One official said that the 2001 earthquake led to revival of interest in the exercise that 
                                                 
595 Official respondents informed that each of the 160 municipalities was provided a fire tender, water bowser and 
water tanker as a measure of strengthening fire services. Staff in these bodies was also given training 
596 GSDMA http;//www.gsdma.org/profile.htm; Waugh (1996); Comfort (1988) explained that institutions for 
emergency management reduced complexity, increased consistency and interpreted the environment continuously. 
Thus, setting up GSDMA represented a move towards greater professionalization 
597 Government of Gujarat (2003). The federal DM act was passed by the Indian Parliament only in December 2005 
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had begun three years back. Another said that it had prompted a reconsideration of its policy, 
which had not worked out earlier. In terms of public perception, there appeared to be insufficient 
recognition and acceptance of its significance as a focusing event outside the area of impact. It 
was possible to surmise, as one high ranking respondent did about the 1979 Morvi dam burst that 
killed 15,000 people, that it served as a wake up call only for the district in which it occurred. 
 In a generic way, capacities were developed to address hazards and their risks after 2001. 
A high ranking state level respondent explained the significance of the change, saying that public 
policy and machinery were geared to tackling cyclones in coastal areas, earthquakes and drought 
all over Gujarat, and chemical disasters in industrial belts like Vadodara. The last important 
conclusion was about people’s perceptions about common hazards. While state disaster 
management policy displayed sensitivity towards generic all-hazards reform, field level 
respondents were preoccupied by hazards with which they had regular experience. In zones of 
high seismic vulnerability, as in the districts of Kutch, earthquakes were the biggest concern. 
Similarly, most respondents located near industrial centers, displayed sensitivity towards the 
risks posed by factories. However, floods were the most common risk perceived by local 
officials.  
 Thus the experience of Gujarat proved consistent with predictions that major disasters 
influenced policy reform in a fundamental way. As seen in this section, the 2001 earthquake 
proved to be a defining moment and the state reformulated its policy and re-strategized about the 
concept and objectives of disaster management. It moved from relief management to disaster risk 
reduction and undertook pioneering reform. The consequences of double-loop learning were 
evident in its comprehensive capacities to deal with disasters. 
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Tamil Nadu 
The southern most state of India, Tamil Nadu was a major transportation hub with access to one 
of India’s busiest seaports. It was also a relatively industrialized state, with all the accompanying 
hazards. Traditionally, it had been seen as a well governed state, with greater vulnerability to 
cyclones and floods.598 Respondents in Tamil Nadu were united in their perception of the South 
Asian tsunami of 26 December 2004 as a major disaster that led to drastic changes in their 
disaster management capacities. The total loss of life was 7995, and more than a million people 
were impacted in 230 villages.599 The total dwelling units that were affected were about 118,000. 
The fishing community was the worst hit. Interestingly, the 2004 tsunami had affected only areas 
abutting the sea coast in thirteen districts.600 Yet, it was seen as a focusing event for two main 
reasons. While the devastation of property and loss of lives was one major cause, a total 
unfamiliarity with tsunamis seemed an equally valid reason for its impact on the public mind.  
 All elected and civil servant respondents regarded it as a turning point. One field official 
highlighted their utter lack of knowledge of the disaster agent, while refuting charges of 
complacency and neglect. However, even he accepted that awareness had increased in the post-
2004 era. Notwithstanding implementation of the GOI-UNDP program from 2002, it was 
accepted by all that they were unprepared for the Indian Ocean tsunami, and that the state’s 
Community Based Disaster Management Plan started in real earnest only after its occurrence. 601 
 They agreed that until 2004, their disaster management was focused on relief and 
rehabilitation. A cataclysmic change took place thereafter, according to an activist belonging to 
                                                 
598 UNDP (2005) recorded that Disaster Reduction Plans for Tamil Nadu included contingency plans for floods and 
cyclones 
599 Ibid 
600 Government of Tamil Nadu (2005) 
601 Gandhigram Rural University (2008). Researchers agreed that there was no permanent institutional structure 
before the 2004 tsunami 
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an international NGO.  Thereafter, as officials in the state headquarters, districts as well as 
panchayats, and locally elected functionaries stated, there was overriding emphasis on recovery 
as well as long-term mitigation. Importantly, the federal government undertook preparedness 
steps in setting up an advanced tsunami warning system in the Bay of Bengal, apart from 
improving cyclone forecasting facilities. For its part, the state government undertook massive 
investments for recovery, by obtaining finances from the Government of India, World Bank, 
Asian Development Bank and other agencies.  
 The respondents pointed to a massive housing program as evidence of the state’s changed 
policy to reduce risk and vulnerability on the coast. The government, instead of rebuilding on the 
coast, also encouraged vulnerable sections of people living on the coast to move inland. Safer 
housing with better sanitation amenities was provided, said one official. It was stated by 
respondents that the focus on recovery and restoration was also evident from the development 
works such as sand dunes and shelter belt Palmyra plantations that were taken up to mitigate 
future risks. Some others mentioned that CBDMPs were accorded importance as a measure of 
long-term mitigation. Further, after the 2004 tsunami, it was stated that preparedness activities 
got a boost in the form of regular mock drills. It was another area that underwent change, with 
the state providing radio communication facilities to vulnerable panchayats. A couple of field 
level respondents also spoke about increased training opportunities in disaster management to 
different stakeholders.  It was also reported that there was large-scale involvement of NGOs in 
various disaster management activities, such as construction of houses, providing psycho-social 
help, and empowering the community to play a role in post-disaster and livelihood support 
activities.  
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 The second important pattern that emerged was that the policy reform was still over-
concentrated on measures that dealt with tsunamis, in particular. It was not generic capacity 
building for disaster management. A high ranking respondent supported this statement by 
pointing to the different units set up in different departments to deal with post-tsunami 
reconstruction. The projects were exclusively concerned with post-tsunami reconstruction, 
though they were being carried out by different departments. The main coordinating office of the 
recovery effort was tellingly called the office of the Officer on Special Duty (OSD), Relief and 
Rehabilitation and Project Director, Emergency Tsunami Reconstruction Program/Tsunami 
Emergency Assistance Project (ETRP/TEAP), both tsunami related projects.602 
 The third important trend was that respondents in the field, especially those who were 
outside the narrow tsunami vulnerable zones, expressed their concern for traditional hazards such 
as floods and cyclones. It provided an indication that people and lower level functionaries were 
influenced by regularly occurring hazards, whereas tsunamis were the prime objective of policy 
attention at the state headquarters. A number of such respondents identified the threats of floods 
and cyclones. Respondents in an inland district displayed none of the sensitivity towards disaster 
management, not having experienced any major event.  
 It was admitted by several important respondents that while the policy underwent radical 
change, it did not represent a complete paradigm shift. As one respondent said, the shift was 
incomplete. While it could be inferred as the subjective opinion of one person only, it could also 
be explained in terms of the impact of the disaster. The area affected was a sliver of coastal land, 
albeit in a number of districts. There was no damage in areas which were even a couple of miles 
away from the coast. Moreover, the social composition of the victims also revealed that the 
                                                 
602 Government of Tamil Nadu (2008) 
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fishermen community was the worst affected.603 So while unfamiliarity with a new devastating 
disaster type made it a focusing event, its limited spatial effect may have been reason for the 
incomplete change in orientation. Importantly, no new organization was set up in the state nor a 
new disaster policy formulated, although it did change from its relief orientation and undertook 
massive investments in capacity building. Overall, while the range of disaster management-
related reforms and activities increased tremendously, it did not compare with Gujarat and Orissa 
as far as a coherent institutional design was concerned. 
V. Conclusion 
 Empirical data had provided conclusive and unmistakable evidence of the impact of 
focusing events on capacity building. Not only was fundamental policy reform correlated to 
occurrence of major disasters in most states, but there was absence of change and double-loop 
learning, when none happened. While the extent of reform may have varied, it was seen that 
there was massive reform to enhance capabilities in all the three states that experienced focusing 
events.  
 Respondents clearly identified the 1999 super cyclone in Orissa, the January 2001 
Republic Day earthquake in Gujarat and the South Asian tsunami of December 2004 in Tamil 
Nadu as turning points. These events drastically changed government perceptions about the 
policy domain. They proved to be examples of double-loop learning, as a result of which states 
moved away from a relief and rehabilitation orientation that had guided their orientation for a 
long time. Instead, they undertook capacity building, in varying proportions, to address disaster 
risk reduction.  
                                                 
603 Members of an international NGO opined that the administration had neglected other communities, by focusing 
exclusively on recovery and restoration needs of the fishermen 
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 The case of Bihar lent further support to the hypothesis. Without any particular sudden, 
harmful event that became simultaneously known to the policy makers and public, there was 
only incremental reform. Error correction was undertaken to rectify perceived shortcomings and 
the most visible result was increased distribution of food grains as emergency rations for the 
affected. Respondents referred to floods of many years, but there was no agreement about 
identifying any particular event among them as a calamity. Further the perception of floods being 
beneficial may have also worked against any of them being seen as a focusing event. However, 
this logic did not preclude an occurrence in future.      
 An important aspect of the impact was the indeterminacy about the impact and extent of 
reform. As seen in the cases of Tamil Nadu’s tsunami experience as well as the 1998 Kandla 
cyclone of Gujarat, there was no certainty about the extent of paradigm shift. A couple of issues 
deserved mention. First, despite admissions of insufficient reform, it was seen that there had 
been enormous policy change in all these cases. The states took up capacity building massively 
in a way that clearly improved their abilities to deal with disasters. Thus compared to their 
capacities before the focusing events, the change was remarkable and clearly exemplified 
double-loop learning. Second, it was possible to derive inferences on the extent of change from 
the extent of devastation as well as perceptions about the disaster. Therefore, it was possible that 
the 1998 Kandla cyclone and the 2004 tsunami, which affected limited areas and populations, did 
not have the same impact as the 1999 super cyclone or the 2001 earthquake. However, at this 
point, this research did not venture to pass judgment on those issues. It restricted itself to 
recognizing the double-loop learning impact of focusing events and how they resulted in massive 
capacity building programs in selected states.  
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 In the field, the role of experience was underscored when many non-official respondents 
expressed concerns for the most common type of hazards, despite multiple vulnerabilities. It 
continued to influence perceptions. At another level, single-loop learning and incremental reform 
continued to be adopted.604 Feedback from normal experience led to minor changes in 
organizational behavior in an incremental manner, and continued to be relevant from a learning 
perspective. 
                                                 
604 It resonated with similar experiences elsewhere. Rosenthal (1988) in his description of the situation in 
Netherlands, also noted incremental change. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 Over the preceding chapters, this research had examined the role of different variables to 
establish their individual impact on capacity building and effectiveness of disaster management. 
Several of them emerged significant, in varying degrees. It can be said with a fair degree of 
confidence that interviewee responses had been of immense benefit in explaining reasons for or 
the lack of correlation. Theory guided the interaction with field level respondents, and provided 
invaluable insights into the domain of disaster management. Unlike the previous chapters, where 
explanatory variables were examined for their independent and systematic impact on the variable 
of interest, the objective here was to assess their relative significance. 
 It is accepted that statistical analysis had the tools for a neat and mathematically precise 
correlation. Yet, nagging doubts always remained about being able to derive causal linkages, 
with confidence. Qualitative research, while lacking in precision and an ability to manipulate 
data, nevertheless, provided valuable details about perceived correlations. Thereby, they enabled 
causal explanations, and strengthened theory building with empirically observed and explained 
linkages.  
Development Levels 
It was perfectly logical to consider economic resources as a reason for variation among different 
states for a commonsensical understanding of disaster management. They offered prima facie 
explanations for a state’s policies and capacities.605 A state that was more developed had more 
resources, and had the ability to invest in developing its capabilities. Notwithstanding the fact 
that development of individual states was also a result of unequal and disproportionate 
                                                 
605 Ware (1996) 
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investments among states,606 it was logical to correlate levels of economic development with 
superior capacities. Superior abilities and infrastructure enabled states to tackle disasters in the 
immediate short term of preparedness and response as well as the long-term requirements of 
mitigation and recovery. Its corollary was that states that were economically less developed had 
difficulties in investing in the disaster management domain, and would perform less ably than 
their affluent counterparts. However, literature had cautioned against mechanically assuming 
such consequences. Financial well being did not necessarily lead to better outcomes and the lack 
of resources did not condemn a state to ineffective administration. Empirical data provided 
crucial answers.  
 Economic resources were important for disaster management. Yet, it was recognized that 
economic resources did not necessarily translate into greater investment in this domain, as there 
was no dearth of issues that demanded governments’ attention and resources. At the same time, it 
was seen that disaster management did not have a constituency for support, unlike other policy 
domains. Moreover, there were difficulties in receiving budgetary allotments in the absence of 
recent disasters. As noted in the agenda-setting and policy change literature, there was greater 
likelihood of receiving government attention and support immediately after the occurrence of 
disaster. It was also seen that there were a number of disaster management reforms and programs 
that did not require large investments, and still had positive results.607 
 The factor of economic resources was seen to be valuable in building disaster 
infrastructure, both structural and non-structural. States with better resources performed better 
and those without, lagged behind for the most part. Gujarat was the most capable of the states 
and was also, comparatively, the most developed. It was able to make budgetary investments 
                                                 
606 Guruswamy, Baitha and Mohanty (2006) 
607 Sakamura (2001) 
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without any difficulty and also undertake ambitious programs.608 Conversely, Bihar lagged far 
behind in building its systems, and its evident underdevelopment seemed to provide reasons. A 
developed Tamil Nadu had also invested large amounts of resources in a massive recovery 
program. The reconstruction program was essentially structural as the state undertook long-term 
mitigation programs of safer houses, cyclone shelters, shelter belt vegetation and other measures.  
 Yet, in the case of Orissa, the logic did not hold. Its economic indicators had placed it not 
far from Bihar, at the bottom of the scale. It would have been consistent if its capabilities were 
on par or proximate to the latter’s. However, it was seen that Orissa had developed impressive 
capacities. Both structural and non-structural improvements were evident as it built cyclone 
shelters, laid roads, improved dissemination systems, involved the community in preparing 
plans, carried out large-scale training programs, and conducted mock drills on a regular basis. 
The efficacy of its capacities was evident during the Kandhamal riots in December 2007. Its 
machinery swung into action and took up remedial measures in a prompt and effective manner. 
The expectation from its level of economic development did not explain its disaster capabilities. 
 As field research revealed, there was another important feature that affected the 
relationship between levels of economic development and policy outcomes in disaster 
management. Even in the case of Gujarat and Tamil Nadu, it was found that capacity building 
never relied on the state’s financial capabilities. States could access funds from the federal center 
and international sources. As mentioned federal fiscal transfers consisted of the formula based 
CRF and a more subjective NCCF. States were able to rely on the center for financial resources. 
Equally important was their recourse to international sources of funding from the World Bank, 
Asian Development Bank (ADB), Department for International Development (DFID) and others. 
                                                 
608 Interviews with senior officials in Gujarat, provided the information that disaster management domain got 
budgetary allocations as per requirement. They spoke about taking up micro-zoning as a part of policy reform. 
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Irrespective of states’ own resources, national and international resources offset a handicap that 
they may have had. Consequently, it also explained Orissa’s ability to invest heavily, despite 
intrinsically weak, development levels. Moreover, the human tragedy aspect of disasters brought 
in a lot of assistance, cash and in-kind contributions. International agencies, multilateral and not-
for-profit organizations, lent a helping hand in the immediate aftermath of the disaster and 
recovery.609  
 The role of international financial organizations had been crucial as all the three states 
that undertook capacity building, sought funds from them. The large overseas borrowings 
appeared to be evidence of insufficient central transfers. Tamil Nadu, despite having received 
large amounts for its post-tsunami reconstruction from the Government of India, also turned to 
the World Bank and ADB for its ambitious, capacity building plans. An important consideration 
that proved significant was the timing of these overseas transactions. Invariably, they happened 
after mega disasters in those states, strengthening the likelihood of focusing events as the critical 
factor that provided impetus.  
 Hence, levels of economic development did not adequately explain the difference in state 
behavior, especially with regard to the timing of the decision to invest in capacity building. For 
example, it did not explain why a more developed state like Gujarat had no comprehensive 
disaster management strategy for responding to different disasters in 2001.610 Moreover, it was 
not able to explain why and how reform was undertaken by less developed states. There was an 
imperative to go beyond this factor, from a normative point of view too. Failure to do so would 
condemn less-developed states, and even countries by extension, to a state of ill preparedness 
and weak capacity building. Moreover, many non-structural measures required strong 
                                                 
609 Smillie and Linear (2004) 
610 UNDP (2001) 
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governance rather than economic resources. Unless economic resources were correlated with 
strong governance, such arguments were likely to create more complications than provide 
answers. It was concluded that it was an enabling factor that was important whenever the 
decision to undertake change is taken. 
Role of  Democratic Decentralized Institutions 
Among alternate explanations, the role of institutions appeared to have important pointers to 
explaining outcomes. Democratic decentralized institutions appealed to this study because 
disasters were seen as local events and because local employees or volunteers were always first 
on the scene. Therefore, it was necessary to study an explanation drawn from the institutional 
structure of local institutions. Yet, it was necessary to recognize important features in the 
framework. As Indian states were the unit of analysis already, it was necessary to identify other 
institutional arrangements that were related to disaster management. This study undertook, 
therefore, to study the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs), which were a three-tiered 
organizational framework.  
 As the empirical data showed, local self-governing bodies showed tremendous potential 
to impact positive outcomes in disaster management. It was noticed that the lowest tier, at the 
gram panchayat level,611 was associated with the domain, for the most part. In the limited sphere 
of their activities, such as distribution of relief, assessment of damages, and other functions, they 
played a vital role. Most respondents were effusive in their appreciation for the role of these 
functionaries. Though they functioned as agencies of government, they played an invaluable role 
in assisting the state. 
                                                 
611 In Gujarat, it was the village panchayat, as there was no institution at the gram panchayat level, which was a 
group of villages. 
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 Across all states, their contribution was recognized as being vital. In Bihar, their role was 
primarily limited to ensuring distribution of food grains and estimation of damages. While there 
were individual contributions in search and rescue as well as evacuation, the extent of their 
involvement was limited to a few activities in the response phase. With respect to those activities 
too, local bodies and their elected functionaries were found to have played a positive and 
enabling role. In contrast, PRIs had a much larger responsibility to discharge in Orissa that 
included community based plans, training, cyclone shelter management, dissemination of 
warnings, evacuation, search and rescue and the tasks of relief distribution and damage 
assessments. Notwithstanding the strong presence of NGOs in the preparation of plans and 
organizing community response, PRIs played an important role and contributed to the inherent 
strength of the system in Orissa. In Tamil Nadu too, they figured prominently in the policy 
domain with an active role in dissemination and reconstruction in addition to the traditional 
responsibilities for relief. Gujarat, as the state which was the most decentralized of the four, also 
involved its PRIs in disaster management. Its respondents clearly articulated the importance of 
their role in planning, and dissemination and relief activities. Thus, despite, variation among the 
states regarding the extent of their participation, it was recognized that they contributed 
immensely to the outcomes in the domain.   
 Also important was the confidence that local institutions had in their own strengths. 
Having seen the effectiveness of their involvement in a limited sphere, its leaders were emphatic 
about being able to do equally well even if more responsibilities were entrusted to them. As 
many of them said, they were closer to the scene, had better knowledge of local resources as well 
as weaknesses and were perceived to derive political advantages from good performances. 
Moreover, they had a direct stake as the effect of the disaster was direct and immediate, in 
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relation to those affected in their panchayat. Considering these factors, local leaders were 
confident about being able to improve outcomes if they were given additional responsibilities. 
 The weakness of this explanatory factor also became evident in their statement. PRIs in 
India were functioning as executing agencies of government programs and priorities. They did 
not act as autonomous bodies and, thereby, did not realize the full potential. Such conclusions 
found support in PRIs reluctance to raise their own resources through taxes and other 
mechanisms.612 In the absence of decision making at that level, PRIs were more of locally 
elected agencies that carried out government directions.613 They were not the “little republics” 
that they were conceived to be. The full extent of their potential did not come into play. They did 
not have any independent capacities of their own, beyond the advantages of information and 
proximity to the scene of disaster. Therefore, it was not possible to view them as being 
responsible for the improvements in capacity building for dealing with disasters. 
 Consequently, PRIs did not prove to be a conclusively significant variable that were 
responsible for explaining differential outcomes in disaster administration for the following 
reasons. First, democratic decentralization in India had not become a third and autonomous level 
of governance. Instead, it was an avenue for limited local representation in a rigidly 
circumscribed sphere of activities. As noted in literature, state level political leaders and civil 
servants were reluctant to cede powers and responsibilities.614 Local self-government, even 
where it had a larger role, had other responsibilities that did not cover the domain of disaster 
management. Second, these institutions were functioning more like agencies of state government 
rather than as autonomous self-governing institutions. Their approach seemed to be that they can 
                                                 
612 PRIs showed no inclination to tax and raise revenues, bearing out some of the pathologies mentioned in literature. 
Mathew (2000) 
613 World Bank (2000) 
614 Shah and Thompson (2004) 
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carry out disaster management, if asked to or allowed by the state government, and when 
provided adequate resources. It never amounted to taking on responsibility out of constituency 
concerns even when they were uniquely positioned to discharge it. Third, an obvious 
shortcoming of these institutions was inadequacy of resources. They had to rely on fiscal 
transfers, from the federal and state governments. Despite having the authority to raise resources, 
few of them exercised it to become self-reliant.  
 On the whole, the limited role of PRIs in India did not provide any conclusive evidence 
of having been the explanatory factor for capacity building in the different states. Their limited 
role and capacities did not allow such conclusions. Nevertheless, it was not a judgment on their 
capacities and their potential for being critical variables in effective disaster management. 
Instead of holding democratic decentralized institutions as an inadequate explanatory factor, it 
can be justifiably argued that the Indian case was not an appropriate one to adjudge their 
efficacy.   
 On the basis of evidence obtained in the field, democratic decentralization did not emerge 
as a significant predictor of disaster management outcomes in India. Local bodies functioned as 
executing agencies of government rather than autonomous tiers of governance. Their role as first 
responders was truncated as policemen and medical personnel were state employees. Uniformly, 
across all the four selected cases, there was no evidence of local bodies making policy or taking 
up disaster management concerns because they were deemed important by its inhabitants. In the 
long run, PRIs were unlikely to succeed as autonomous organizations, if there were no 
advantages in being accountable to its residents.615 While the strength of these institutions was 
visible, they did not play a meaningful role that impacted capacities for dealing with disasters in 
India. At best, they eased the situation for the state, by handling some important functions during 
                                                 
615 Shah and Thompson (2004) 
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the immediate aftermath. Whether they can contribute more effectively in an all-phases approach 
of disaster management and be a critical factor, or whether they will become victims of the 
numerous pathologies that had been outlined in theory, remains unresolved. However, all 
indications appeared to point that they would prove significant, if they had greater 
responsibilities. In the Indian context, the situation did not warrant positive conclusions. At the 
same time, it can be argued that it did not disconfirm either. Yet, since it failed to conclusively 
indicate a positive relationship, it was not considered as a significant variable in this research.  
Party System and Electoral Salience 
Another variable was the prism of electoral politics. Greater party cohesion and higher electoral 
salience were considered to drive policy reform. Abiding self-interest of rational, calculating, 
political actors was deemed to provide a rationale to explain policy developments. Hence, factors 
that played a role in electoral dynamics such as party cohesion and issue salience were examined 
for their impact on the dependent variable. Literature had noted that party cohesion was a good 
predictor of policy reform and superior delivery of public goods. It was also seen that disaster 
management, while not being the lone agenda in any elections, was one of the important ones.616 
 It was forcefully argued that the presence of political parties in the political system, 
allowed for superior outcomes for a couple of reasons. First, fewer parties reflected a system in 
which political actors had to appeal to the electorate at large, and not select groups that formed 
the base in a fragmented system. Also relevant to the context was a competitive electoral system 
of First-Past-The-Post, long regarded as a causal factor for a two-party system. Therefore, greater 
party cohesion created electoral salience for the policy domain resulting in provision of public 
goods. Voter salience was a function of party cohesion, as political actors became interested in 
services and goods that appealed across societal divides. Conversely, fragmented party systems 
                                                 
616 Morena and Ilcheva (2007) 
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only needed to cater to limited constituencies and their demands for private goods.  Second, it 
was easier to introduce reform when there were fewer players because of the reduced number of 
‘veto players’,617 who could each impact the agenda of change.618 Therefore, it was hypothesized 
that states that had lower scores on party fragmentation would also have disaster management 
high on their electoral agendas. Consequently, it was expected to lead to progress in the 
provision of public goods in the disaster domain in the form of capacity enhancement and other 
reforms. 
 To place the issues in their context, it was noted that the Indian electoral system was a 
First-Past-The-Post single-ballot, plural majority system that engendered more competition. The 
situation in the field provided significant evidence about the utility of this variable in explaining 
outcomes in disaster management. Empirical research revealed that Gujarat had the most 
cohesive party system with its ENP score being closer to two. However, on closer examination it 
revealed characteristics of a dominant party framework than a two party system. It explained a 
correlation with superior outcomes in terms of fewer veto players. However, there was no 
unequivocal recognition of issue salience during elections. The evidence was mixed with a 
significant number of respondents talking about factors that militated against making it an issue 
in electoral contests. The conclusion was unclear with explanations for policy outcomes due to 
party cohesion only, without a clear picture on the intervening variable of electoral salience.  
 On the other hand, Bihar represented a perfect example of the hypothesis. Party 
fragmentation was highest and there was no issue salience during elections. Consequently, the 
ruling party faced no threat on account of the state’s performance in disaster management. 
Respondents cutting across party lines, political-administrative divide, and at all levels of 
                                                 
617 Tsebelis (2002) 
618 Chhibber and Kollman (2004) 
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governance said that there was no issue salience during elections. Despite recognizing its 
relevance for the state and evidence of poor governance, no political party paid a penalty for 
such neglect. The same political party continued to win elections, and remained in power for 
three terms until 2005. In a pattern that agreed with the hypothesis, absence of electoral salience 
was indicative of concerns for private goods for specific constituent groups. The electoral issues 
were also related to identity issues, arising out of social cleavages. It explained the absence of 
public goods in electoral discourse. 
 Tamil Nadu, known for having the closest to a two party system, also exhibited a high 
degree of party cohesion. While there was significant party cohesion score in the state, the more 
important thing was the regular alternation of power between the two parties.619 A logical 
expectation would have been high electoral salience, especially after the 2004 tsunami disaster. 
Field responses did not reveal it. The overriding factor appeared to be traditional two party 
rivalries that crowded out policy concerns. A significant level of party cohesion translated into 
competitive electoral contests, which resulted in alternation of power due to anti-incumbency 
sentiments more than performance in disaster management. 
 Orissa conformed to expectations. There was evidence of party cohesion and electoral 
salience in Orissa that lent credence to the hypothesis. Respondents did believe that disaster 
management was an important item on the agenda that played a role in swaying people’s votes in 
Orissa. The incumbent government lost elections, and it appeared that its performance in this 
policy domain was a contributory factor. Voter salience indicated that governance issues were 
important, and that parties were punished on that count.  
                                                 
619 In Gujarat, the same party, BJP, dominated in successive elections, whereas in Tamil Nadu, the ADMK (also 
known as ADK and AIADMK) in 1991 and the DMK in 1996, registered landslide victories. 
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 On the whole, empirical evidence only lent partial support to a causal relationship with 
policy outcomes in disaster management. Electoral salience did prove important in two of four 
cases, in Orissa, Bihar, and Gujarat, to some extent. In Tamil Nadu its impact was subsumed in 
traditional two-party rivalries. In Gujarat’s case, its dominant party system appeared to have the 
expected impact without the intervention of electoral salience. Party cohesion and electoral 
salience appeared to be significant indicators of administrative behavior and policy outcomes, 
only in part. The factor of uncertainty associated with disasters and a short public memory, 
appeared to have limited the influence of this political variable.  
Focusing Events and Organizational Learning 
Lastly, the role of Focusing Events and Organizational Learning was found to be significant in 
explaining outcomes. It was the most tenuous of variables and it was found to be difficult to 
precisely isolate the impact of focusing events through a process of organizational learning. 
Literature spoke about the learning consequences and the policy results of the major disasters. It 
was seen that experience of major disasters as focusing events was a double-loop learning 
experience, resulting in major policy reform and capacity building. The disaster and devastation 
suffered in these events was the trigger that led states to take up policy overhaul in disaster 
management. 
 The evidence proved to be consistent with expectations in all the cases. For example, 
Bihar with its weak capacities did not have the traumatic experience of a focusing event to lead 
to capacity building. Floods were annual tragedies without any particular disaster event standing 
out as a particularly devastating one. All the states in this study that took up reform, Gujarat, 
Orissa and Tamil Nadu, had experienced mega disaster events. Public perceptions clearly 
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confirmed the occurrence of these events. And evidence of change thereafter clearly suggested 
the causal relationship. 
 From the above, it became clear that perception of potential focusing events as well as its 
impact on thoroughgoing reform was abundantly evident in Gujarat and Orissa. All the 
respondents were able to identify the events as well as their impact on policy change, with a 
paradigm shift that was indicative of double-loop learning. Every one of the respondents across 
different districts, at various levels of governance organizations, was unanimous about it. Even in 
Tamil Nadu, which had suffered an unprecedented tsunami, there was a massive capacity 
building effort. The focus on CBDMPs and the evidence of learning in the coastal areas did 
provide a significant indication of double-loop learning that was a consequence of the 2004 
tsunami 
 In addition, focusing events were also instrumental in intervening in the impact of other 
factors. Resource-rich states also undertook reform after the experience of a focusing event. 
States fortunate enough to escape calamities felt less compelled to take up reform, irrespective of 
the presence of other compelling factors. They also served to highlight the deficiencies of 
disaster management abilities of the state, encouraging normally reluctant state level leaders to 
involve PRIs in the domain. Finally, known vulnerabilities of states never reached the agenda 
plate of electoral contests in the normal course. Focusing events had the potential to highlight 
their importance and direct attention to their strengths and weaknesses in providing public goods.  
 There was immense potential for disaster research to seek more specific answers than the 
broad causal relationship identified in this study. While the potential of focusing events for 
organizational learning was good at providing significantly consistent explanations, there was 
scope for further refinement. At this point, it was not established clearly how disasters become 
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focusing events, because all of them did not. Reliance had to be placed on subjective perceptions 
of the event, which were difficult to define or describe or predict. Second, the extent of policy 
change was also not predictable with great accuracy. It was seen that of all the selected states, 
Gujarat undertook the most comprehensive reform and capacity building in all phases. On the 
other hand, Orissa laid greater stress on preparedness and response in building its capacities, 
whereas Tamil Nadu mostly focused on reconstruction and mitigation activities. It remained to 
be seen whether Bihar will also embark on capacity building, having suffered a major calamity in 
2008, with the Kosi River breaching its embankments. At last count, there were reports about 
massive policy changes and enormous spending programs. It was not clear how and to what 
extent focusing events had consequences, and this research was only drawing inferences about 
the strong possibility of its consequences in policy reform. It nevertheless recognized that 
focusing events had been the most consistently significant predictors of capacity building in 
states.   
Generalizability and Implications 
 Literature had noted the increasing importance of the interaction between disasters and 
urban settings.620 The cases of Kolkata and Ahmedabad also supported the hypothesis about 
focusing events. Officials of both cities were interviewed during field research. Kolkata is a 
mega city located in the eastern part of India, and Ahmedabad in its west. Both are capitals of 
their respective states, West Bengal and Gujarat, and had similar structures of bureaucracy and 
elected leadership. Kolkata had not suffered a major disaster event, whereas Ahmedabad had 
suffered the earthquake in 2001, major communal riots in 2002, and terrorist attacks in 2008. 
Importantly, there was no complaint about paucity of resources in both cities. On the contrary, in 
one city there were concerns about a lack of capacities to expend resources. Further, both cities 
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had locally elected municipal bodies, which were similarly handicapped in terms of functions 
and control over functionaries.  
 It was found that Kolkata was relatively less prepared for facing a natural or manmade 
emergency. Respondents were candid in admitting the city’s numerous weaknesses. First and 
foremost, while infrastructure investments had increased, it had not developed a comprehensive 
and generic disaster management plan. The city’s machinery was geared towards dealing with 
fire accidents, collapse of high-rise buildings, terrorist attacks and, to an extent, epidemics only. 
Respondents accepted that their state of preparedness was weak. Second and the most worrisome 
aspect was confusion in inter-agency coordination. The lines of authority and decision-making 
were unclear and there was no attempt to integrate the roles of different agencies. Bureaucratic 
politics and lack of a clear incident command system were recognized. An unfortunate 
consequence was that the few agencies that had mock drills, held them alone. Third, there was a 
significant gap in human resource development with limited avenues of training in disaster 
management. Overall, a low level of sensitization towards disasters was evident. 
 On the other hand, Ahmedabad with its experience of natural and manmade disasters 
clearly showed evidence of learning. First, there was a clear perspective plan on tackling 
disasters that was not limited to one or two types of disaster agents. Second, there was no 
confusion about inter-agency coordination, which was worked out in great detail. There was 
absolute clarity about the decision-making apparatus. Third, after the 2001 earthquake, the city 
had acquired a large amount of equipment to deal with different types of crises. Importantly, 
respondents identified the 2001 earthquake as the main reason for a heightened level of 
sensitization. On the whole, in comparison with Kolkata, it appeared that Ahmedabad was better 
prepared for handling emergencies because of its experience of focusing events. 
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 The findings of this research are significant beyond the examples. They are useful for 
theoretical development of policy reform in the disaster domain. Mid-level theorization becomes 
easier for fleshing out the relationship that had only been broadly established in this research. It 
contributes to the literature for enabling research about the distinctive characteristics of ‘focusing 
events’ in a manner that reduces the subjective appreciation of the phenomena. This research 
also directs attention on the need to examine linkages between the type and impact of disasters 
and the extent of policy change. In addition to the concerns of public administration that had 
been primarily addressed in this research, other disciplines could use the cross-provincial 
framework of this research. A research design based on a comparison of states is a major 
contribution to disaster research that can yield valuable results. While a focus on episodic 
inquiries or particular types of disaster agents provides rich insights, it is necessary to go beyond 
case studies. 
 As mentioned earlier, this work has significant implications for policy makers. It 
reinforces the need to undertake a vulnerability analysis and undertake all-hazards planning to 
develop generic capacities. Second, for Indian policy makers, all the signs seem to indicate that 
local self-governments need to be entrusted a larger role in governance, especially in disaster 
management. Finally, developing countries need to undertake planning without waiting for a 
major disaster, and without feeling constrained by a lack of resources. It is never too late to make 
fruitful investments in developing capacities to deal with disasters. 
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Appendix A. Physical Progress of States in GOI-UNDP Program 
Output
Total up to      
Apr-2008
Expected 
Achievement  
% of 
completion 
Total up to      
Apr-2008
Expected 
Achievement  
% of 
completion 
Senior Officers and policy makers (including 
legislators) oriented
1003 1300 77 139 200 70
State Disaster Management Policy approved 1 1 100 1 1 100
State Disaster Management Act Enacted 1 1 100 1 1 100
State Disaster Management Authority set up 1 1 100 1 1 100
Redesignation of Nodal department as department 
for DM
0 1 0 1 1 100
State Disaster Management plan finalized 1 1 100 0 1 0
State Search & Rescue teams formed and members 
trained
1 1 100 1 1 100
Emergency Operation Centre strengthened and 
equipped
1 1 100 1 1 100
State Relief Code amended 0 1 0 0 1 0
S
ta
te Building bylaws amended to include provisions as 
per BIS Codes
0 1 0 0 1 0
Funds available under ongoing schemes for 
mitigation
1 1 100 0 1 0
DM included in curriculum of Civil Servants training 
(ATI, Police,)
1 1 100 1 1 100
DM included in School and University curricula 1 1 100 1 1 100
DM included in Engineers' curriculum 1 1 100 0 1 0
DM included in Architects' curriculum 0 1 0 0 1 0
Strengthening of a State Training Institute in DM 1 1 100 1 1 100
Master trainers trained at State level 2645 900 294 370 300 123
Professional bodies and corporate executives 
sensitized
502 100 502 845 750 113
Manuals and SOPs finalized and approved 54 70 77 23 23 100
Massive awareness campaigns conducted (TV, 
Radio, newspaper)
14 0 - 1 1 100
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Disaster Management Committees formed 14 14 100 16 16 100
DMC Members trained 2509 850 295 446 400 112
Other officials trained (Govt Officials, local 
functionaries…)
5358 1460 367 423 350 121
Disaster Management Plans finalized 14 14 100 16 16 100
DMT Members trained in First Aid 659 240 275 1711 765 224
DMT Members trained in Search and rescue 1029 250 412 726 673 108
Emergency Operation Centres equipped 14 14 100 16 16 100
D
is
tr
ic
t
Emergency kits/search and rescue kits distributed 0 14 0 16 16 100
PRIs trained in Disaster Management 1505 450 334 662 200 331
  Of whom Women trained 512 148 346 185 58 320
Teachers trained in Disaster Management 18048 1500 1203 8339 850 981
NSS & NYKS (or other institution) Volunteers trained 
in DM
5695 1500 380 10960 3000 365
Architects trained in disaster resistant technologies 134 80 168 7 32 22
Engineers trained (DM & disaster resistance 
technologies)
409 300 136 1356 900 151
Disaster resistant demonstration units constructed 18 14 129 16 16 100
Mock drills conducted 107 56 191 28 16 175
District having entered data to the IDRN 14 14 100 16 16 100
District DM Plans updated by DMC 56 56 100 16 16 100
Gujarat Orissa
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Output
Total up to      
Apr-2008
Expected 
Achievement  
% of 
completion 
Total up to      
Apr-2008
Expected 
Achievement  
% of 
completion 
DMCs formed 142 142 100 155 155 100
DMC Members trained 8867 2130 416 4466 1550 288
Other officials trained (Govt. Officials, local 
functionaries…)
12362 1860 665 1581 1550 102
Disaster Management Plans finalized 142 142 100 155 155 100
DMT Members trained in First Aid 5187 1500 346 4971 765 650
DMT Members trained in Search and rescue 3121 280 1115 708 673 105
B
lo
c
k PRIs trained in Disaster Management 9144 5000 183 9459 6000 158
  Of whom Women trained 2286 1600 143 2459 1680 146
Village Volunteers trained at Block level 8440 1800 469 7016 6000 117
  Of whom Women volunteers trained 2532 558 454 1964 1680 117
Data base (of volunteers trained discipline wise) 
created
286 200 143 16 16 100
Masons trained 1284 1000 128 2042 1500 136
Mock drills conducted 296 142 208 62 155 40
Block DM plans updated by DMC 380 284 134 126 155 81
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
DMCs formed 0 0 - 3127 3210 97
DMC Members trained 0 0 - 52257 32100 163
  Of whom women DMC members trained 0 0 - 13064 6420 203
G
P Disaster Management Plans finalized 0 0 - 2816 3210 88
DMT Members trained in First Aid 0 0 - 9870 9630 102
  Of whom Women trained in First Aid 0 0 - 2369 3177 75
DMT Members trained in Search and rescue 0 0 - 9406 9630 98
  Of whom Women trained in Search and rescue 0 0 - 1599 3177 50
Mock drills conducted 0 0 - 502 2000 25
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Villages DMC formed 11513 11342 102 21542 23263 93
DMC Members trained 117155 113420 103 257690 232630 111
Of whom Women DMC Members trained 38661 22684 170 72153 23263 310
Disaster Management Plans finalized 10375 11342 91 21107 23263 91
Village DMT trained in First Aid 38404 22000 175 54844 46526 118
V
il
la
g
e Of whom Women trained in First Aid 15362 7260 212 19744 23263 85
Village DMT trained in Search and Rescue 28167 20000 141 45325 46526 97
  Of whom Women trained in Search and Rescue 5070 6400 79 10425 23263 45
Villages with contingency fund for emergency 
response
32 4000 1 2305 23263 10
Awareness sensitization meetings 14034 12000 17 22574 23263 97
Number of wall paintings 8234 8000 103 3165 0 -
IEC distributed (posters, leaflets, etc…) 11917 11342 105 52426 23263 225
Mock drills conducted 1681 4174 40 4023 23263 17
Village DM plan updated by DMC 8846 4174 212 6356 20000 32
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
DMC formed 96 87 110 58 58 100
U
L
B DMC Members trained 3066 1000 307 993 580 171
Disaster Management Plans finalized 92 87 106 0 58 0
Mock drills conducted 164 87 189 0 58 0
Gujarat Orissa
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Output
Total up to      
Sep-2007
Expected 
Achievement   
% of 
completion 
Total up to      
Sep-2007
Expected 
Achievement   
% of 
completion 
Senior Officers and policy makers (including 
legislators) oriented
128 350 37 679 290 234
State Disaster Management Policy approved 0 1 0 1 1 100
State Disaster Management Act Enacted 1 1 100 1 1 100
State Disaster Management Authority set up 1 1 100 1 1 100
Redesignation of Nodal department as department 
for DM
0 1 0 1 1 100
State Disaster Management plan finalized 0 1 0 0 1 0
State Search & Rescue teams formed and members 
trained
0 1 0 1 1 100
Emergency Operation Centre strengthened and 
equipped
1 1 100 1 1 100
State Relief Code amended 0 1 0 1 0
S
ta
te Building bylaws amended to include provisions as 
per BIS Codes
1 1 100 0 1 0
Funds available under ongoing schemes for 
mitigation
0 1 0 1 1 100
DM included in curriculum of Civil Servants training 
(ATI, Police,)
1 1 100 1 1 100
DM included in School and University curricula 1 1 100 1 1 100
DM included in Engineers' curriculum 0 1 0 1 1 100
DM included in Architects' curriculum 1 1 100 1 1 100
Strengthening of a State Training Institute in DM 1 1 100 1 1 100
Master trainers trained at State level 352 200 176 236 50 472
Professional bodies and corporate executives 
sensitized
1 30 3 6 10 60
Manuals and SOPs finalized and approved 10 15 67 8 10 80
Massive awareness campaigns conducted (TV, 
Radio, newspaper)
1 25 4 8 10 80
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Disaster Management Committees formed 14 14 100 6 6 100
DMC Members trained 1110 543 204 478 240 199
Other officials trained (Govt Officials, local 
functionaries…)
1048 700 150 444 60 740
Disaster Management Plans finalized 14 14 100 6 6 100
DMT Members trained in First Aid 710 280 254 144 60 240
DMT Members trained in Search and rescue 447 280 160 126 60 210
Emergency Operation Centres equipped 14 14 100 6 6 100
Emergency kits/search and rescue kits distributed 0 14 0 6 6 100
D
is
tr
ic
t
PRIs trained in Disaster Management 4279 700 611 165 120 138
  Of whom Women trained 1551 210 739 38 60 105
Teachers trained in Disaster Management 2329 1200 194 4152 60 6920
NSS & NYKS (or other institution) Volunteers trained 
in DM
2857 1400 204 8416 60 14027
Architects trained in disaster resistant technologies 261 260 100 0 30 0
Engineers trained (DM & disaster resistance 
technologies)
780 400 195 53 30 177
Disaster resistant demonstration units constructed 119 14 850 6 12 50
Mock drills conducted 8 94 9 28 24 117
District having entered data to the IDRN 14 14 100 6 6 100
District DM Plans updated by DMC 9 43 21 0 6 0
Bihar Tamil Nadu
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Output
Total up to      
Sep-2007
Expected 
Achievement   
% of 
completion 
Total up to      
Sep-2007
Expected 
Achievement   
% of 
completion 
DMCs formed 199 201 99 64 64 100
DMC Members trained 8035 4000 201 2643 1280 206
Other officials trained (Govt. Officials, local 
functionaries…)
3008 2000 150 3045 640 476
Disaster Management Plans finalized 156 201 78 56 64 88
DMT Members trained in First Aid 3156 2000 158 1736 640 271
DMT Members trained in Search and rescue 2104 2000 105 1736 640 271
B
lo
c
k PRIs trained in Disaster Management 28694 5380 533 5272 1920 275
  Of whom Women trained 3113 1614 193 1634 595 275
Village Volunteers trained at Block level 16363 20000 82 11919 6400 186
  Of whom Women volunteers trained 2813 6000 47 3337 1920 174
Data base (of volunteers trained discipline wise) 
created
61 14 436 774 64 1209
Masons trained 5118 10500 49 26 1280 2
Mock drills conducted 69 1360 5 111 192 58
Block DM plans updated by DMC 38 652 6 30 64 47
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
DMCs formed 3061 3438 89 8565 5616 327
DMC Members trained 51664 68100 76 14943 26160 57
  Of whom women DMC members trained 14912 21430 73 4035 7848 51
G
P Disaster Management Plans finalized 2185 3438 64 2173 2616 83
DMT Members trained in First Aid 3542 13752 26 627 26160 2
  Of whom Women trained in First Aid 1092 4126 26 288 7848 4
DMT Members trained in Search and rescue 3974 13752 29 634 26160 2
  Of whom Women trained in Search and rescue 1135 4126 28 247 7848 3
Mock drills conducted 545 21218 3 771 5232 15
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Villages DMC formed 9867 12856 77 5204 3397 153
DMC Members trained 149872 128560 117 4842 33970 14
Of whom Women DMC Members trained 35926 19284 186 1695 10191 17
Disaster Management Plans finalized 6896 12856 54 4649 3397 137
Village DMT trained in First Aid 8090 25712 31 21653 33970 64
Of whom Women trained in First Aid 1802 12856 14 7362 10191 72
Village DMT trained in Search and Rescue 7619 25712 30 18053 33970 53
  Of whom Women trained in Search and Rescue 1609 12856 13 2888 10191 28
V
il
la
g
e Villages with contingency fund for emergency 
response
1240 12856 10 0 3397 0
Awareness sensitization meetings 9661 25712 39 2521 3397 74
Number of wall paintings 1374 0 - 366 3397 11
IEC distributed (posters, leaflets, etc…) 9854 12856 77 42100 3397 1239
Mock drills conducted 1586 78311 2 1867 3397 55
Village DM plan updated by DMC 1193 40055 3 2042 3397 60
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
DMC formed 30 42 71 167 17 982
U
L
B DMC Members trained 656 1050 62 3019 340 888
Disaster Management Plans finalized 6 42 14 45 17 265
Mock drills conducted 0 126 0 31 51 61
Bihar Tamil Nadu
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Appendix B: List of Political Parties in Bihar 
 
I. 1990 Elections 
 
NATIONAL PARTIES 
BJP BHARTIYA JANATA PARTY  
CPI COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA  
CPM COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MARXIST)  
INC INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS  
JD JANATA DAL  
JNP (JP) JANATA PARTY (JP)  
 
STATE PARTY 
JMM JHARKHAND MUKTI MORCHA  
 
REGISTERED (Unrecognized) PARTIES 
IPF INDIAN PEOPLES FRONT  
JKD JHARKHAND DAL  
MCOR MARXIST CO-ORDINATION  
SOP (L) SOCIALIST PARTY (LOHIA)  
 
INDEPENDENTS 
IND INDEPENDENTS 
 
 
II. 1995 Elections 
 
NATIONAL PARTIES 
BJP BHARTIYA JANATA PARTY  
CPI COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA  
CPM COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MARXIST)  
INC INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS  
JD JANATA DAL  
SAP SAMATA PARTY 
 
STATE PARTIES 
BSP BAHUJAN SAMAJ PARTY 
JMM JHARKHAND MUKTI MORCHA  
JPP JHARKHAND PEOPLE'S PARTY  
SP SAMAJWADI PARTY 
 
REGISTERED(Unrecognized ) PARTIES 
BPP BHARTIYA PRAGATISHEEL PARTY 
CPI (ML) (L) COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MARXIST-LENNINIST)(LIBERATION) 
CVP CHAMPARAN VIKAS PARTY 
IPF INDIAN PEOPLES FRONT  
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JKP JHARKHAND PARTY  
JMM (M) JHARKHAND MUKTI MORCHA (MARDI) 
JMM(S) JHARKHAND MUKTI MORCHA (SOREN) 
MCOR MARXIST CO-ORDINATION  
 
INDEPENDENTS 
IND INDEPENDENTS 
 
 
III. 2000 Elections 
 
NATIONAL PARTIES 
BJP BHARTIYA JANATA PARTY  
BSP BAHUJAN SAMAJ PARTY 
CPI COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA  
CPM COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MARXIST)  
INC INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS  
JD (U) JANATA DAL (United)  
SAP SAMATA PARTY 
 
STATE PARTIES 
CPI (ML) (L) COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MARXIST-LENNINIST)(LIBERATION) 
JMM JHARKHAND MUKTI MORCHA  
RJD RASHTRIYA JANATA DAL  
SAP SAMATA PARTY 
UGDP UNITED GOANS DEMOCRATIC PARTY 
 
REGISTERED (Unrecognized) PARTIES 
KSP KOSAL PARTY 
MCO MARXIST CO-ORDINATION  
 
INDEPENDENTS 
IND INDEPENDENTS 
 
 
IV. February 2005 Elections 
 
NATIONAL PARTIES 
BJP BHARTIYA JANATA PARTY  
BSP BAHUJAN SAMAJ PARTY 
CPI COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA  
CPM COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MARXIST)  
INC INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS  
NCP NATIONALIST CONGRESS PARTY 
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STATE PARTIES 
JD (U) JANATA DAL (United) 
JMM JHARKHAND MUKTI MORCHA  
RJD RASHTRIYA JANATA DAL  
 
STATE PARTIES – (Recognized in) OTHER STATES 
CPI (ML) (L) COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MARXIST-LENNINIST) 
SP SAMAJWADI PARTY 
 
REGISTERED (Unrecognized ) PARTY 
LJP LOK JAN SHAKTI PARTY  
 
INDEPENDENTS 
IND INDEPENDENTS 
 
 
V. October 2005 Elections 
 
 NATIONAL PARTIES 
BJP BHARTIYA JANATA PARTY  
BSP BAHUJAN SAMAJ PARTY 
CPI COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA  
CPM COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MARXIST)  
INC INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS  
NCP NATIONALIST CONGRESS PARTY 
 
STATE PARTIES 
CPI(ML)(L) COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation) 
JD(U) JANATA DAL (United) 
LJP LOK JAN SHAKTI PARTY  
RJD RASHTRIYA JANATA DAL  
 
STATE PARTY – (Recognized in )OTHER STATES 
SP SAMAJWADI PARTY 
 
REGISTERED (Unrecognized) PARTY 
AJVD AKHIL JAN VIKAS DAL  
 
INDEPENDENTS 
IND INDEPENDENTS 
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Appendix C: List of Political Parties in Gujarat 
 
I. 1990 Elections 
 
NATIONAL PARTIES 
BJP BHARTIYA JANATA PARTY  
INC INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS  
JD JANATA DAL  
 
REGISTERED (Unrecognized) PARTY 
YVP YUVA VIKAS PARTY 
 
INDEPENDENTS 
IND INDEPENDENTS 
 
 
 
II. 1995 Elections 
 
NATIONAL PARTIES 
BJP BHARTIYA JANATA PARTY  
INC INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS  
 
INDEPENDENTS 
IND INDEPENDENTS 
 
 
 
 
III.1998 Elections 
 
NATIONAL PARTIES 
BJP BHARTIYA JANATA PARTY  
INC INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS  
JD JANATA DAL   
 
STATE PARTIES 
AIRJP ALL INDIA RASHTRIYA JANATA PARTY  
SP SAMAJWADI PARTY  
 
 
INDEPENDENTS 
IND INDEPENDENTS 
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IV. 2002 Elections 
 
NATIONAL PARTIES 
BJP BHARTIYA JANATA PARTY  
INC INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS  
 
STATE PARTY – (Recognized in) OTHER STATES 
JD (U) JANATA DAL (United) 
 
INDEPENDENTS 
IND INDEPENDENTS 
 
 
 
 
V. 2007 Elections 
 
NATIONAL PARTIES 
BJP BHARTIYA JANATA PARTY  
INC INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS  
 
STATE PARTY 
JD (U) JANATA DAL (United) 
 
INDEPENDENTS 
IND INDEPENDENTS 
    
242 
 
Appendix D: List of Political Parties in Orissa 
 
 
I. 1990 Elections 
 
NATIONAL PARTIES 
BJP BHARTIYA JANATA PARTY  
CPI COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA  
CPM COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MARXIST)  
INC INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS  
JD JANATA DAL  
 
INDEPENDENTS 
IND INDEPENDENTS 
 
 
 
 
II. 1995 Elections 
 
NATIONAL PARTIES 
BJP BHARTIYA JANATA PARTY  
CPI COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA  
INC INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS  
JD JANATA DAL  
 
STATE PARTIES 
JMM JHARKHAND MUKTI MORCHA  
JPP JHARKHAND PEOPLE'S PARTY  
 
INDEPENDENTS 
IND INDEPENDENTS 
 
 
 
 
III. 2000 Elections 
 
NATIONAL PARTIES 
BJP BHARTIYA JANATA PARTY  
CPI COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA  
CPM COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MARXIST)  
INC INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS  
JD(S) JANATA DAL (Secular) 
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STATE PARTIES 
AITC ALL INDIA TRINAMOOL CONGRESS 
BJD BIJU JANATA DAL 
JMM JHARKHAND MUKTI MORCHA  
 
INDEPENDENTS 
IND INDEPENDENTS 
 
 
 
IV. 2004 Elections  
 
NATIONAL PARTIES 
BJP BHARTIYA JANATA PARTY  
CPI COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA  
CPM COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MARXIST)  
INC INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS  
 
STATE PARTY 
BJD BIJU JANATA DAL 
 
 
STATE PARTY – (Recognized in) OTHER STATES  
JMM JHARKHAND MUKTI MORCHA  
 
REGISTERED (Unrecognized) PARTY 
OGP ORISSA GANA PARISHAD 
 
 
INDEPENDENTS 
      IND INDEPENDENTS 
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Appendix E: List of Political Parties in Tamil Nadu 
 
I. 1989 Elections 
 
NATIONAL PARTIES 
CPI COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA  
CPM COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MARXIST)  
INC INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS  
 
 
STATE PARTIES 
ADK ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 
DMK DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 
 
 
REGISTERED Unrecognized) PARTIES 
ADK (JL) ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM (JAYALALITA 
GROUP)  
ADK (JR) ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM (JANAKI 
RAMACHANDRAN)  
JNP JANTA PARTY 
 
INDEPENDENTS 
IND INDEPENDENTS 
 
 
II. 1991 Elections 
 
NATIONAL PARTIES 
CPI COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA  
CPM COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MARXIST)  
ICS (SCS) INDIAN CONGRESS (SOCIALIST - SARAT CHANDRA SINHA  
INC INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS  
JD JANATA DAL  
 
STATE PARTIES 
ADK ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 
DMK DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 
PMK PATTALI MAKKAL KATCHI 
 
REGISTERED (Unrecognized) PARTY 
TMK THAYAKA MARUMALARCHI KAZHAGAM 
 
INDEPENDENTS 
IND INDEPENDENTS 
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III. 1996 Elections 
 
NATIONAL PARTIES 
BJP BHARTIYA JANATA PARTY  
CPI COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA  
CPM COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MARXIST)  
JD JANATA DAL  
JP JANATA PARTY 
 
 
STATE PARTIES 
ADMK ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 
DMK DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 
FBL ALL INDIA FORWARD BLOC  
PMK PATTALI MAKKAL KATCHI 
TMC (M) TAMIL MAANILA CONGRESS (MOOPANAR) 
 
 
INDEPENDENTS 
IND INDEPENDENTS 
 
 
 
IV. 2001 Elections  
 
NATIONAL PARTIES 
BJP BHARTIYA JANATA PARTY  
CPI COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA  
CPM COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MARXIST)  
INC INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS  
 
STATE PARTIES 
ADMK ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 
DMK DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 
FBL ALL INDIA FORWARD BLOC  
PMK PATTALI MAKKAL KATCHI 
TMC (M) TAMIL MAANILA CONGRESS (MOOPANAR) 
 
 
REGISTERED (Unrecognized) PARTY 
MADMK M.G.R.ANNA D.M. KAZHAGAM 
 
 
INDEPENDENTS 
IND INDEPENDENTS 
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V. 2006 Elections 
 
NATIONAL PARTIES 
CPI COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA  
CPI (M) COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDIA (MARXIST)  
INC INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS  
 
STATE PARTIES 
AIADMK ALL INDIA ANNA DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 
DMK DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM 
MDMK MARUMALARCHI DRAVIDA MUNNETRA KAZHAGAM  
PMK PATTALI MAKKAL KATCHI 
 
REGISTERED (Unrecognized) PARTIES 
DMDK DESIYA MURPOKKU DRAVIDA KAZHAGAM 
VCK VIDUTHALAI CHIRUTHAIGAL KATCH 
 
INDEPENDENTS 
IND INDEPENDENTS 
 
 
 
